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ABSTRACT 
 Mine remediation entails long-term risks due to the need to contain and monitor 
dangerous materials. To date, research on mine remediation in Canada has focused 
primarily on technical fixes; little is known about the political and social nature of 
remediation. Using the Giant Mine in Yellowknife, NWT as a case study, this thesis 
analyzes mine remediation in the Canadian sub-Arctic and investigates how local 
communities shape remediation processes.  Applying the concepts of ecological 
restoration, environmental justice, social waste theory, and theories of repair, and care, 
this thesis analyzes how effectively community concerns have been included in 
remediation planning. This thesis asks: how can the current approach to mine remediation 
be changed from a focus on site containment to a broader emphasis on community 
remediation, restoration, and reconciliation? Without a community objectives based 
approach to remediation, such projects risk continuing systems of colonization, 
marginalization and environmental degradation.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: THE GIANT MINE MONSTER 
 
Introduction 
 Beyond the danger signs that dot the perimeter of the Giant Mine lease boundary 
just outside of Yellowknife, Northwest Territories, there are few visual warnings of the 
toxic arsenic trioxide waste stored underground, the byproduct of nearly 50 years of gold 
mining at the site. Outside of the mine lease area, unmarked patches of contaminated soils 
and sediments are spread across the nearby landscape and waterways. Those who have 
lived off this land are keenly aware of these invisible threats.1 While many locals hoped 
that remediation of this abandoned mine would entail the removal or neutralization of this 
arsenic trioxide waste, they have been forced to accept that this underground threat could 
be there forever, returning to haunt them unless some other technology is developed.2 For 
the past decade, the federal and territorial governments, as well as the local community, 
have grappled with the question of how to remediate these toxic legacies. The story of 
remediation at Giant Mine is about more than just containing and managing 
contamination. It is also a story of environmental (in)justice, community perseverance, 
intergenerational equity and hope in the face of incredible destruction.   
 Operating from 1948 until 2004, the Giant Mine produced over seven million 
																																																								
1 Yellowknives Dene First Nation Land and Environment Committee, Impact of the Yellowknife Giant Gold 
Mine on the Yellowknives Dene: A Traditional Knowledge Report, Prepared for the Department of Indian 
and Northern Affairs Giant Mine Remediation Project Office, Yellowknife NWT, (October 13, 2005).  
2 John Sandlos and Arn Keeling, “Toxic Legacies, Slow Violence and Environmental Injustice at Giant 
Mine, Northwest Territories,” The Northern Review 42 (2016): 7-21; Arn Keeling and John Sandlos, 
“Ghost Towns and Zombie Mines: The Historical Dimensions of Mine Abandonment, Reclamation, and 
Redevelopment in the Canadian North,” in Ice Blink: Navigating Northern Environmental History, ed. 
Stephen Bocking and Brad Martin (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2017).       
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ounces of gold, with a waste production of over 237 000 tonnes of toxic arsenic trioxide 
dust, some of which is now stored in 14 underground chambers.3 For the first three years 
of operation pollution controls were non-existent, resulting in the distribution of arsenic 
trioxide throughout the surrounding communities, forests and water systems.4 In 1951, 
several months after the death of a Dene child due to acute arsenic poisoning, pollution 
controls were put in place to capture the arsenic trioxide waste and store it underground. 
However, for many years to come, some arsenic trioxide continued to escape into the 
surrounding environment. The Yellowknives Dene community of N’dilo was at a far 
greater risk of health effects from pollution due to its proximity to the mine and their 
reliance on polluted snow or lake water (Fig. 1).5  Attempts to warn the Dene community 
about arsenic contamination were inconsistent and often only expressed in English.6  For 
the Yellowknives Dene, mining and arsenic pollution was central to their experience of 
colonialism.7  
 When the Giant Mine went bankrupt in 1999, the mine owner of the time, Royal 
Oak, left the federal and territorial governments with an extensive legacy of mine 
																																																								
3 John Sandlos and Arn Keeling, Giant Mine: Historical Summary (St. John’s, NL: Memorial University, 
2012), http://www.reviewboard.ca/upload/project_document/ea0809-
001_giant_mine__history_summary.pdf. 	
4 Adam Houben, Rebecca D’Onofrio, Steven Kokelj and Jules M. Blais, “Factors Affecting Elevated 
Arsenic and Methyl Mercury Concentrations in Small Shield Lakes Surrounding Gold Mines near the 
Yellowknife, NT, (Canada) Region,” PLOS One 11 (2016): e0150960.  
5 YKDFN, Impact of the Yellowknife Giant Gold Mine on the Yellowknives Dene: A Traditional Knowledge 
Report.  
6 Fred Sangris (Employee of the YKDFN Land and Environment Department), in interview with author, 
June 2016; John Sandlos and Arn Keeling, Giant Mine: Historical Summary. According to Sandlos and 
Keeling, a study produced in the 1970s by the National Indian Brotherhood stated that warning signs about 
arsenic contamination were not posted in local First Nations languages until 1974. See Lloyd Tateryn, 
“Arsenic and Red Tape,” National Indian Brotherhood, University of Alberta Library (1979).  
7 Sandlos and Keeling, Giant Mine: Historical Summary; John Sandlos and Arn Keeling, “Aboriginal 
communities, traditional knowledge, and the environmental legacies of extractive development in Canada,” 
The Extractive Industries and Society 3, no. 2 (2016): 278-287. 
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pollution. Yellowknife citizens were affected both by the loss of economic opportunities 
and the uncertainty of how the arsenic pollution would be managed far into the future. 
The YKDFN, along with other community stakeholders, were marginalized from the 
processes of remediation planning. In the early 2000s, community stakeholders were 
divided and uncertain, and were not directly involved in setting objectives for remediation 
and arsenic management. Some saw the gold, wealth and community created, while 
others saw the waste and environmental destruction. Many sat uncomfortably in-between.  
 In 2007 a remediation plan was published by the Giant Mine Remediation Project 
Team (GMRPT) that featured the ‘frozen block method’ as the best option for arsenic 
remediation at the Giant Mine.8 This method uses thermosyphon technology to freeze the 
ground around the arsenic chambers, essentially sealing these areas off from the 
environment around them.9 This plan required that the site be monitored and maintained 
in perpetuity. Many community members were unsatisfied with this remediation plan and 
the Yellowknives Dene and Alternatives North, a social justice NGO in the NWT, 
petitioned the City of Yellowknife to request an environmental assessment of the 
remediation plan from the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Assessment Board.10 
The environmental assessment, completed in 2013, led to the signing of the Giant Mine 
Remediation Project Environmental Agreement in June 2015.11 This agreement is a 
																																																								
8 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Giant Mine Remediation Plan, prepared by SRK Consulting and 
SENES Consultants Limited (2007).  
9 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Final Report: Arsenic Trioxide Management Alternatives, prepared 
by SRK Consulting, SENES Consultants Limited, HGE and Lakefield Research (2002).   
10 Office of the Mayor, Yellowknife, “Letter of Referral of Environmental Assessment from the City of 
Yellowknife,” (MVERIB Registry, Mar. 31, 2008).  
11 Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board (MVEIRB), Report of Environmental 
Assessment and Reasons for Decision: Giant Mine Remediation Project (MVEIRB Registry, 2013). 
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legally binding document that holds the Project Team, consisting of the federal and 
territorial governments, responsible to ensure community involvement and consent in 
future remediation planning. 
 
Research Objectives and Questions 
 Several times throughout meetings and interviews, the Giant Mine was referred to 
as an ‘underground monster.’ The first recorded use of this term was by Mary Rose 
Sundberg in the film Guardians of Eternity. She was discussing the use of a story of the 
‘Giant Mine Monster’ as a way to communicate the lessons of the Giant Mine to future 
generations.12 And while it is not a part of the Yellowknives Dene First Nation’s 
(YKDFN’s) traditional knowledge, the term has become a useful metaphor in discussing 
the YKDFN’s relationship with the Giant Mine, and how the site will be cared for in the 
future. I have borrowed this narrative tool as a way of framing the story of remediation at 
Giant Mine.13 Therefore, this research investigates the story of the creation of the Giant 
Mine Monster, how it was defined, how it has changed, and how the community will care 
for the Monster in the future.  
 This research investigates why community stakeholders rejected the 2007 
remediation plan, despite government arguments that the remediation plan did not present 
any cause for concern. I then analyze how community stakeholders redefined remediation 																																																																																																																																																																					
Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board; Giant Mine Remediation Project Environmental Agreement, 
(June 9, 2015).  
12 Guardians of Eternity, directed by France Benoit (Yellowknife: Sheba Films, 2015).  
13 Since the “Giant Mine Monster” term is not a part of YKDFN traditional knowledge, but rather is used as 
a narrative tool to present the YKDFN’s position on Giant Mine, both William Lines, the YKDFN Giant 
Mine Liaison and Johanne Black, the YKDFN Director the Land and Environment Department agreed that 
it would be appropriate for me to use this metaphor in my research.   
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planning at the Giant Mine through the Environmental Assessment and Environmental 
Agreement processes.  Analysis of the Giant Mine Remediation Project from 1999 to 
present is organized into two analytical chapters (Chapter 4 and 5). The research 
questions for both of these sections are complementary. First, I focus on analyzing the 
literature, documents, reports and public hearings specific to the Giant Mine Remediation 
Project and the broader context of remediation in the NWT and Canada. This section 
asks: 
• How has remediation at the Giant Mine progressed since 1999? Why did the 
community reject the Final Remediation Plan in 2007?  
• How does the Giant Mine relate to broader questions of mining impacts and 
remediation practices in Canada? 
Through the process of Environmental Assessment, community stakeholders pushed the 
government project to confront the Giant Mine Monster in a more holistic sense. 
Therefore, Chapter 5: Confronting and Caring for the Giant Mine Monster is based on 
interviews and participant observation and focuses on the different perspectives on 
remediation. This section asks: 
• How do different groups envision the concept of remediation and what does it 
mean to them? What do they think about the Giant Mine remediation process 
today: Is it working, why or why not? 
• How has remediation changed since the Environmental Assessment? 
Going forward, remediation at the Giant Mine has now become a question of long-term 
management, stewardship and perpetual care. Therefore, Chapter 5 also asks: 
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• How can the current approach to mine remediation be changed from a focus on 
site contamination to a broader emphasis on community remediation and 
reconciliation? Should the focus be changed at all? 
 The Giant Mine makes for an interesting case study of community engagement in 
mine remediation because it is the only known mine in Canada to date where an 
environmental assessment and agreement have been carried out for the remediation 
process, at the communities’ request. This research explores the multiple experiences, 
practices and stories of remediation from Indigenous people, government representatives, 
scientists, consultants, NGOs and other community members, while being sensitive to the 
importance of the narratives and values of traditional knowledge systems.14 From this 
platform, I analyze how effectively remediation processes at the Giant Mine have 
included local knowledge and community concerns in remediation planning and how the 
inclusion of such knowledge has shaped the remediation process. This is critical for 
understanding the broader issues of remediation, resource development and 
environmental justice across northern Canada.15 
 
Study Area 
 The Giant Mine is located 5 kilometers north of Yellowknife, the capital city of 
the Northwest Territories (Fig. 1). Geographically, the Giant Mine is on shores of Great 
Slave Lake, one of the largest freshwater lakes in the world, and can be seen across Back 
																																																								
14 Stephen Ellis, “Meaningful Consideration? A Review of Traditional Knowledge in Environmental 
Decision Making,” Arctic 58, no. 1 (2005): 66-77. 
15 Sandlos and Keeling, “Aboriginal communities, traditional knowledge, and the environmental legacies of 
extractive development in Canada.”  
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Bay from the Yellowknives Dene community of N’dilo. The City of Yellowknife was 
built on mining - as local street signs say, ‘Yellowknife, where the gold is paved with 
streets.’ Serious prospecting in the area began in the 1930s, and major development 
followed after the Second World War. In 1935, Johnny Baker discovered gold at the 
current day Giant Mine site. The population of Yellowknife grew from a few hundred in 
the 1930s to over 3000 by the 60s, many of whom came for jobs at the Con and Giant 
Mines. Until the 1990s gold mining was the main driver of the Yellowknife economy, 
which has since transitioned to diamond mining and services. Today, about 20 000 people 
live in Yellowknife.16 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
16 O’Reilly, Kevin. “Liability, legacy, and perpetual care: Government ownership and management of the 
Giant mine, 1999-2015,” in Mining and Communities in Northern Canada: History, Politics and Memory, 
ed. Arn Keeling and John Sandlos, (Calgary, Alberta: University of Calgary Press, 2015). 
Fig. 1 Map of the Yellowknife area (credit: Charlie Conway) 
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 The Yellowknives Dene and their ancestors have lived in the area for more than 
7000 years. The Yellowknives Dene signed Treaty 8 in 1900 in Fort Resolution; however, 
their traditional lands were not originally recognized.17 In 1920s, Liza Crookedhand, a 
member of the YKDFN, found gold near the Yellowknife River (Weledeh), which she 
later traded to a prospector. At this point, Treaty rights were not honoured, and the 
YKDFN lost control over their land, as mining development spread and the community of 
Yellowknife was established.18 Permanent settlements at N’dilo and Dettah were 
established alongside the development of Yellowknife and were greatly affected by their 
proximity to mining developments.19 Negotiations for the Dene/Metis Comprehensive 
Land Claim did not begin until 1984. In 1991, the Yellowknives Dene, as a part of the 
Akaitcho Dene First Nations, decided to continue with Treaty Implementation instead of 
pursuing a comprehensive land claim. As a part of the Akaitcho Territory government the 
Yellowknives Dene are still negotiating land claims, a process that has been long, 
complicated and full of controversy.20 This continuing uncertainty surrounding control 																																																								
17 Rene Fumoleau, As Long As This Land Shall Last: a history of Treaty 8 and Treaty 11, 1870-1939. 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974). The original Treaty 8 map does not include the 
Yellowknife/Akaticho Territory, even though Chief Drygeese of the Yellowknives did sign the Treaty. In 
1923 the Yellowknife Game Preserve was established, which was set-aside for Dene hunting and trapping. 
Although it is unclear how this has carried through to today. Yellowknife was established and mines were 
developed despite this Yellowknife Game Preserve. In the YKDFN, The Giant Mine: Our Story, The 
Impact of the Yellowknife Giant Gold Mine on the Yellowknives Dene, A Traditional Knowledge Report it is 
suggested that because Chief Drygeese spoke the language of the Tlicho and southern Chipewyan, that it 
was assumed by priests and government officials that they were the same. Later, Randy Freeman says that 
there are maps that show an extension of the Treaty to include Yellowknife/Akaitcho Territory, but the 
Treaty has not recognized this. 
18 YKDFN, The Giant Mine: Our Story, The Impact of the Yellowknife Giant Gold Mine on the 
Yellowknives Dene, A Traditional Knowledge Report. Prepared by the Yellowknives Dene First Nation 
Land and Environment Committee. Prepared for the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, Giant 
Mine Remediation Project office, Yellowknife, NWT, October 13, 2005.  
19 Sandlos and Keeling, Giant Mine: Historical Summary.	
20 A framework agreement for land claims was signed in 2000 and the commissioners land withdrawal was 
announced in 2006, however the land claims and treaty implementation process has yet to be completed. 
For a list of relevant documents and agreements see The GNWT’s “Concluding and Implementing Land 
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over land and resources only serves to deepen sentiments of marginalization and mistrust. 
The Yellowknives Dene First Nation has been continuously exposed to elevated levels of 
arsenic for more than 50 years.21 According to Sandlos and Keeling, “The historical 
geography of arsenic contamination in the Yellowknife region reveals the unequal 
‘pathways of exposure’ of the Yellowknives Dene people to arsenic.”22 The YKDFN 
community relied on contaminated local land and water sources for their subsistence. 
Arsenic contamination resulted not only in sickness and death within the YKDFN 
community, but lead to a “profound alienation from a landscape that had, in effect, been 
colonized as a pollution sink for southern economic interests.”23 Memories of the arsenic 
continue to be widely discussed in the communities of Dettah and N’dilo, “forming the 
core narrative of the Yellowknives’ encounter with the gold mines.”24  
 
Conceptual Framework  
 In order to address these research questions, this thesis begins by questioning what 
mine remediation is and how it has traditionally been defined. To date, research on mine 
remediation in Canada has focused primarily on its scientific and economic aspects; little 
is known about the political, social and environmental dimensions of remediation in the 
																																																																																																																																																																					
Claim and Self Government Agreements: Akaitcho Dene First Nation,” 
https://www.eia.gov.nt.ca/en/priorities/concluding-and-implementing-land-claim-and-self-government-
agreements/akaitcho-dene-first.   
21 YKDFN, The Giant Mine: Our Story.  
22 John Sandlos and Arn Keeling, “Toxic Legacies, Slow Violence, and Environmental Injustice at Giant 
Mine, Northwest Territories,” The Northern Review 42 (2016), 8 
23 Ibid.  
24 Sandlos & Keeling, Giant Mine: Historical Summary. 
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Canadian north.25 Current federal, territorial, and regional policies addressing remediation 
are fragmented and incomplete.26 There are no requirements for community or Indigenous 
involvement in remediation planning and there are limited financial supports for any 
groups that want to be involved in decision-making processes.27 In other words, the 
current policy framework does not support meaningful, self-determined community 
involvement in remediation processes. Remediation requires more than just a 
technological fix or strategy in order to ensure that colonial, environmentally destructive 
systems of development do not persist throughout remediation processes.  
 The Giant Mine has a long history of pollution and environmental injustice; 
remediation at Giant is not an apolitical or ahistorical process. Today, the Giant Mine 
Remediation Project has the potential to continue to impact surrounding communities for 
generations to come. As Anne Dance argues, a discussion of goals and a thorough 
reflection of remediation projects in the past and present are required to inform current 
processes.28 With numerous abandoned mines across the North, as well as an increasing 
number of new resource developments, the Giant Mine Remediation Project presents an 
important opportunity to analyze and assess closure and remediation practices at the 																																																								
25 Ken Coates, History and Historiography of Natural Resource Development in the Arctic (2013); Ken 
Coates, W. Lackenbauer, B. Morrison, & Greg Poelzer, Arctic Front: Defending Canada in the Far North, 
(Toronto: Thomas Allen Publishers, 2008); Arn Keeling, John Sandlos, John Sebastien Boutet and 
Hereward Longley, Managing Development? Knowledge, Sustainability and the Environmental Legacies of 
Resource Development in Northern Canada (Resources and Sustainable Development in the Arctic, 2013), 
Gap Analysis Report #12 http://yukonresearch.yukoncollege.yk.ca/wpmu/wp-
content/uploads/sites/2/2013/09/12-Keeling-et-al2.pdf  
26 M. Wenig, Kevin O’Reilly, & D. Chambers, The Mining Reclamation Regime in the Northwest 
Territories: A Comparison with Selected Canada and U.S. Jurisdictions (Canadian Institute of Resources 
Law and Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, 2005).  
27 Diana Valiela & Christopher Baldwin, “Dealing with Mining Legacy – Some Canadian Approaches,” 
Lawson Lundell LLP (2007); and Carly Dokis, Where the Rivers Meet: Pipelines, Participatory Resource 
Management and Aboriginal-State Relations in the North West Territories (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2015).  
28 Anne Dance, “Northern Reclamation in Canada: Contemporary Policy and Practice for New and Legacy 
Mines.” The Northern Review 41 (2015): 41-80.  
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social and political levels in order to improve the planning process and ensure 
environmental justice for local communities.29  
  Recognizing the gap in socially focused literature on remediation and the 
fragmentation of policy regarding remediation, this thesis investigates the socio-political 
context of remediation at the Giant Mine through the critical theoretical lenses of 
ecological restoration, environmental justice, discard studies and ‘matters of care’.30 In 
this sense, my conceptual framework goes beyond containment and management 
approaches to remediation in order to investigate broader issues of morals, values, justice, 
care and reconciliation alongside remediation at the Giant Mine.  
 In regards to the Giant Mine, community stakeholders have every different 
perceptions of what remediation should mean, and it is therefore important to discuss 
definitions of remediation. Various ‘levels’ of remediation can bring about distinctly 
different end land uses and costs. Words such as restoration or rehabilitation imply some 
kind of return of value to the land that was degraded. Remediation can also be considered 
a type of mediation, including the remaking or repairing of relationships between people 
and the land that they use.  
 Focusing on the social implications of mine remediation and how community 
stakeholders perceive remediation differently, I combine environmental justice and 
discard studies with a “matters of care” approach in order to question how mine 
remediation and the long-term care of contaminated sites are perceived, valued and 																																																								
29 Arn Keeling and John Sandlos, “Environmental Justice Goes Underground? Historical Notes from 
Canada’s Northern Mining Frontier,” Environmental Justice 2, no. 3 (2009): 117-125; National Orphaned 
and Abandoned Mines Initiative (NOAMI), Lessons Learned: On Community Involvement in the 
Remediation of Orphaned and Abandoned Mines (2003).  
30 Refer to Chapter 2 Literature Review: Rethinking Remediation for citations on these theoretical lenses.  
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planned for in different ways by different groups of people. Framing discussions on toxic 
mine waste and remediation within an environmental justice (EJ) framework brings the 
community to the center of the discussion.31 However, mine waste is dynamic, it can 
change and flow over time and presents problems of cumulative impacts across multiple 
geographies and over long periods of time.32 Discard studies, in addition to an 
perspective, situates mine waste as something both material and social and argues that we 
must confront both the materialities of the waste we have produced and the colonial, 
gendered, racialized systems in which they are produced.33  The Giant Mine Remediation 
Project is a political, messy, dynamic process that involves humans, mine waste and the 
environment. A “matter of care’ approach recognizes the Giant Mine Monster as 
something that must be cared for, including the relationships between humans, waste and 
environment that are shaped by this toxic space.34 In this sense, remediation can be 
framed as a long-term ‘stewardship’ or ‘care’ plan for the Giant Mine Monster and can be 
approached within broader frameworks of reconciliation and environmental justice.  
 At the Giant Mine, initial remediation plans did not ‘care’ for or consider the 
relationships created through mining. The YKDFN and other community stakeholders did 
not have the opportunity to participate fully and were denied environmental justice for 																																																								
31 Richard Howitt, Rethinking Resource Management: Justice, Sustainability and Indigenous Peoples 
(London: Routledge, 2001); Joan Martinez-Alier, “Mining conflicts, environmental justice, and valuation,” 
Journal of Hazardous Materials 86, no.1-3 (2001): 153–170; David Pellow, “Environmental Inequality 
Formation: Toward a Theory of Environmental Justice,” American Behavioral Scientist 43, no. 4 (2000): 
581-601.  
32 Joshua Reno, “Waste and Waste Management,” Annual Review of Anthropology 44 (2015): 557–72l; Rob 
Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
2011). 
33 Lindsey Dillon, “Race, Waste, and Space: Brownfield Redevelopment and Environmental Justice at the 
Hunters Point Shipyard,” Antipode 46, no. 5 (2014): 1205–21; Traci Brynne Voyles, Wastelanding: 
Legacies of Uranium Mining in Navajo Country (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015).  
34	Sebastian Ureta, “Caring for Waste: Handling Tailings in a Chilean Copper Mine,” Environment and 
Planning A 48, no. 8 (2016): 1532–48.	
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past contamination. Also, community stakeholders were not involved in defining what 
mining waste was, what the geographies of waste were, or what remediation and 
perpetual care of mine wastes might mean for future generations. However, by forcing the 
Giant Mine Remediation Project through an Environmental Assessment, community 
stakeholders attempted to redefine remediation alongside community-based values. With 
the development of the Environmental Agreement, the direct involvement of multiple 
stakeholders and the Giant Mine Oversight Board, there are now structures being put in 
place that can make space for environmental justice and planning for long-term process of 
care. 
 
Methods and Methodology 
 Using a case study research methodology, this project adopts a mixed-methods 
approach that combines archival study, literature reviews, key informant interviews, and 
participant observation aimed at recovering and analyzing the multiple experiences, 
practices and stories of mine remediation from Indigenous people, government 
representatives, scientists and other community members while being sensitive to the 
importance of traditional knowledge systems.35 According to Gerring, a case study is “an 
intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of similar 
units.”36 Baxter builds on this definition stating that a case study involves the study a 
single instance or a small number of instances of a phenomenon in order to explore in-																																																								
35 Julie Cruikshank, Do Glaciers Listen?: Local Knowledge, Colonial Encounters and Social Imagination, 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005).   
36 J. Gerring, “What is a case study and what is it good for?” American Political Science Review 98, no. 2 
(2004): p. 342.  
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depth nuances.37 Such an approach works well for analyzing the specific processes of 
remediation at Giant Mine, while taking into account the broader narratives of mining and 
resource development in Northern Canada. 
 Building on my supervisors’ existing research relationships through the “Toxic 
Legacies” and “Northern Exposures” projects, I worked directly with the Yellowknives 
Dene First Nation and Alternatives North in planning and conducting my research. This 
helped to ensure local research authorization and ensured that cultural protocols were 
honoured, especially in regard to the sharing and use of local knowledge.  To clarify, this 
research is not a Traditional Knowledge study,38 but rather, focuses on community and 
Traditional Knowledge integration in the remediation plan. In order to build a general 
context of remediation at the Giant Mine, I began my research with an investigation of 
online public registries such as the Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board Registry, the 
NWT’s Archives and documents in the Federal Contaminates Sites Portal. Document and 
policy analysis provided background for interviews and participant observation.  
 
Interview Methods 
 Semi-structured, key informant interviews engaged people with specific 
knowledge on the remediation process including government officials, environmental and 
social justice NGOs, industry, consultants, scientists, Indigenous leaders, and community 
participants (Appendix I). According to Shopes, “Including a range of narrators 																																																								
37 Jamie Baxter, “Case Studies in Qualitative Research,” in Qualitative Research Methods in Human 
Geography: 3rd Edition, ed. Iain Hay (Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2010), 81. 
38 See an overview of Traditional Knowledge studies on mining and environmental decision making in the 
NWT, see: Stephen Ellis, “Meaningful Consideration? A Review of Traditional Knowledge in 
Environmental Decision Making,” Arctic 58, no. 1(2005): 66-77.	
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simultaneously deepens the inquiry and extends it outward, helping us understand both 
the internal complexity of the community under study and its relationship to a broader 
historical process.”39 These diverse, semi-structured interviews were organized around 
ordered, but flexible and open-ended questions outlined in an interview guide.40 
According to Dunn, a mix of carefully worded questions, topic areas, key words and 
concepts in interview guides provides both predetermined questions and prompts that 
allow for a guided, but still flexible interview.41 Such a guide or checklist assists the 
interviewer to direct the conversation, ensuring that the researcher meets their objectives, 
that there is equivalence across interviews and that interviewees are allowed to raise their 
own issues for discussion and potential inclusion in the researcher’s continually modified 
interview framework.42 According to Crang and Cook, “the researcher and researched 
together construct intersubjective understandings.”43 Along the same lines, Shopes 
suggests framing the interview as a mutual exploration of the issue being discussed.44 
Open-ended questions lead to more discursive answers and allowed the interviewee to 
define the conversation and introduce different lines of inquiry. For this research, open-
ended questions were more likely to allow for deeper discussion about the remediation 
process than a survey or structured interview would allow. Specific questions within the 
interviews changed depending on the interviewee’s position and experience. The 
																																																								
39 Linda Shopes, “Oral History and the Study of Communities: Problems, Paradoxes, and Possibilities,” The 
Journal of American History 89, no.2 (2002): 597. 
40 Iain Hay, Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography: 3rd Edition (Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford 
University Press, 2010).  
41 Kevin Dunn, “Interviewing,” in Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography: 3rd Edition, ed. Iain 
Hay, (Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2010).  
42 Mike Crang & Ian Cook, Doing Ethnographies (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2007). 
43 Ibid.  
44 Shopes,“Oral History and the Study of Communities: Problems, Paradoxes, and Possibilities,” 597.  
	 16	
interview guide included a list of general issues to cover in the form of questions, 
prompts, key words and concepts and was adapted for each specific interviewee.  
 Written consent was sought before the interview commenced. Interviews were 
audio recorded, with ethics approval from the Memorial University Interdisciplinary 
Committee on Ethics in Human Research and the consent of the participants.45 Two 
participants did not consent to being recorded, but consented to written notes. Each 
interview was transcribed and emailed to the participants for verification and redaction. 
Interviews were analyzed using latent content analysis and thematic coding in order to 
evaluate the emergent themes articulated by the interviewees.46 Interview data was used 
to construct themes and identify relationships and patterns among variables.47 These 
emerging themes were then analyzed in relation to broader questions surrounding 
community participation in mine remediation in northern Canada. First, interviews were 
grouped based on stakeholder identification so that interviews could be analyzed for 
similarities and differences within and between these groups. These groups included 
general community members (2), Alternatives North (2), the City of Yellowknife (4), 
technical consultants (1), the Giant Mine Oversight Body (GMOB) directors and 
employees (4), Land and Water Board and Review Board employees (3), NWT and 
federal government employees (5), Project Team members (5), Yellowknives Dene First 
Nations members (3), Yellowknives Dene First Nations employees (2), North Slave Métis 
																																																								
45 Memorial University ICEHR Approval number: 20162052-AR 
46 V. Braun & V. Clarke, “Using thematic analysis in psychology,” Qualitative Research in Psychology 3, 
no. 2 (2008): 77-101; and M. Cope, “Coding Qualitative Data,” in Qualitative Research Methods in Human 
Geography: 3rd Edition, ed. Iain Hay, (Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University Press: 2010).  
47 Hay, Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography.   
	 17	
Alliance employees (1).48 In addition, several of these interviewees are locals, having 
grown up in Yellowknife or spent the majority of their life there (13). The majority of 
local people were involved in City government, community organizations, GMOB or 
with the Yellowknives Dene First Nation. The majority of government employees and 
project employees are more recent residents in Yellowknife (11).  
 Recurring themes within interviews were colour coded and then compiled based 
on these themes. Interviews were crossed referenced with field notes and question 
outlines to help identify emerging themes. Analytical themes included: mistrust (of 
government, industry and science), communication with future generations, project 
boundaries and mandates, environmental degradation and injustice, long term care and 
stewardship, traditional knowledge, capacity and stakeholder fatigue, land claims and 
reconciliation, and economic opportunities. These themes directed my document analysis 
and formed the basis of my analysis of the issues and experiences surrounding the Giant 
Mine Remediation.  
 
Participant Observation 
 I participated in the Giant Mine Remediation Surface Design Engagement 
Evaluation Workshop from February 16-19, 2016, alongside Alternatives North and with 
the permission of the Yellowknives Dene First Nation. I was also invited to participate in 
the YKDFN’s Giant Mine Advisory Council monthly meeting on May 26, 2016 and the 
first bi-annual meeting of the Giant Mine Oversight Board on May 31, 2016. In the spring 																																																								
48 I found it more difficult to speak with technical consultants because they are bound by contracts with 
employers and were not always free to communicate openly.	
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of 2017 I returned to Yellowknife to follow up with interviewees, present my research to 
the YKDFN, Alternatives North and the GMRPT, and to attend the first annual public 
forum for the Giant Mine Oversight Board.  
 Throughout these workshops and meetings, I used methods of participant 
observation in order to record and analyze the proceedings. According to Guest et. al., 
participant observation is useful because it “opens up areas of inquiry to collect a wider 
range of data, … reduces the problem of reactivity, … gives you an intimate knowledge 
of your area of study… and addresses problems that are simply unavailable to other data 
collection techniques.”49 Participant observation included being actively involved in 
community meetings and workshops, building rapport with the participants and spending 
time in the communities. Participant observation was a useful method in this research 
because it helped to develop a highly contextual understanding of the situation.50 
Participant observation was useful for determining and expanding my interview 
framework, for building general knowledge of the remediation situation and for 
developing research relationships in the community. Potential drawbacks of participant 
observation and interview methods which were addressed throughout the research process 
are that such methods are time consuming, they can be “practitioner sensitive” or biased, 
and it can be difficult to compare results to other studies.51 Building off of already 
established research relationships helped to address some of these challenges, as many 
interviewees were already familiar with the research of the Toxic Legacies project. 
																																																								
49 Greg Guest, Emily Namey & Marilyn Mitchell, Collecting Qualitative Data: A Field Manual for Applied 
Research (London: SAGE Publications, 2013). 
50 Ibid 
51 Ibid. 
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Positionality 
 Experiences, actions and identities are gendered, classed and racialized and cannot 
be understood outside of the context and histories of these categories; researchers should 
consider the context in which the research encounter takes place.52 Since I was working 
with a First Nations community within a colonial context, this positionality was important 
to recognize and reflect upon. According to Howitt and Stevens, “post-colonial research 
is a reaction to and rejection of colonial research and is intended to contribute to the self-
determination and welfare of ‘others’ through methodologies and the use of research 
findings that value their rights, knowledge, perspectives, concerns and desires and are 
based on open and egalitarian relationships.”53 Decolonizing research goes even further 
than post-colonial research in an attempt to use the research process and findings to break 
down inequitable power relations, discriminatory discourses and social structures through 
which such inclusionary research is aimed at helping to empower subordinated, 
marginalized and oppressed others.54  
 Wilson speaks of Indigenous research as a ceremony, which includes relational 
accountability and research methods as strategies of inquiry and mutual sharing of 
information rather than simply data collection. According to Wilson, “the difference is 
that, rather than the truth being something that is ‘out there’ or external, reality is in the 
																																																								
52 Crang and Cook, Doing Ethnographies.  
53 Richard Howitt and Stan Stevens, “Cross-Cultural Research: Ethics, Methods and Relationships,” in 
Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography: 3rd Edition, ed. Iain Hay (Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 42.   
54 Linda Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples (London: Zed Books, 
1999); Howitt, Rethinking Resource Management.   
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relationship that one has with the truth.”55 Relational accountability leads to research that 
is connected to a community and is a set relationships not only between people, but also 
between people, land and non-human beings.56 In this sense, everyone involved in the 
research is a participant, or a co-researcher; it is not divided between researcher and 
subjects.  
 Inclusionary, decolonizing research and relational accountability directs my own 
research. As a white, southern female researcher, my own positionality has the potential 
to perpetuate systems of colonial research.  In this sense, it was important to identify my 
positionality to research participants and to make them aware of how this research would 
be used and how they could shape the research themselves (see Appendix II). Several 
times interviewees and community members stated that part of the problem with 
remediation at Giant Mine was that southern experts and governments defined the process 
from afar. In order to work towards relational accountability and de-colonized research, 
my research objectives were directed and designed alongside the Yellowknives Dene 
First Nations through the Toxic Legacies Project and I positioned myself to spend time 
listening to community members throughout interviewees, workshops, public meetings, 
and discussions over coffee, reflecting on what Emilie Cameron calls “learning to learn”57 
and attempting to foster knowledge creation processes that “account for many variables, 
including epistemological, cultural, colonial, historical and contemporary contexts of both 
the researched and the researcher.” This included ongoing communication throughout the 																																																								
55 Shawn Wilson, Research is Ceremony: Indigenous Research Methods (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 
2008), 73.  
56 Ibid.		
57 Emilie Cameron, Far off Metal River: Inuit Lands, Settler Stories, and the Making of the Contemporary 
Arctic (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2015).   
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research and writing process and a return trip to Yellowknife to present the results of 
research and receive feedback from the YKDFN. As Absoln and Willet state, “It is 
putting ourselves forward that establishes these contexts, guides the research process, and 
determines research outcomes.”58  
 
Conclusion 
 At the Giant Mine, issues of mining and remediation extend beyond the 
distribution of environmental contamination and include wider social and historical issues 
of dispossession connected to colonialism.59 In this thesis, I argue that the Giant Mine 
Monster can be seen as more than just an arsenic trioxide problem. It is multi-faceted, and 
includes the colonial processes of environmental degradation, the marginalization of the 
First Nations community and the failure of the government to regulate pollution. While 
the term Monster may be seen as inherently negative, arguably, like the prodigy of Dr. 
Frankenstein in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, mine wastes are of our own creation and 
cannot easily be locked up and forgotten about, as the technologies used to contain mine 
wastes have the potential to fail over time. According to Latour and Puig de Bellacasa, we 
must learn to love and care for our technologies and our monsters.60 At the Giant Mine, 
local communities are now navigating how they will live with and care for the 
contaminated mine site far into the future.  																																																								
58 Kathy Absolon and Cam Willet, “Chapter four: Putting ourselves forward: location in Aboriginal 
Research,” in Research as Resistance: Critical, Indigenous and Anti-oppressive Approaches, ed. Leslie 
Brown and Susan Strega (Toronto Ontario: Canadian Scholars’ Press/Women’s Press, 2005).			
59 Keeling and Sandlos, “Environmental Justice Goes Underground?” 
60 Bruno Latour, “Love your Monsters: Why we must care for our technologies as we do our children,” The 
Breakthrough Journal (Winter, 2012), accessed July 10, 2017, 
https://thebreakthrough.org/index.php/journal/past-issues/issue-2/love-your-monsters  
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 This research tracks how the Giant Mine Monster was created, why the initial plan 
for arsenic remediation was rejected by the community, and how the project has been re-
orientated to confront and care for the mine site, the environment and the relationships 
between the people affected. Chapter 2: Rethinking Remediation discusses how 
remediation is defined and associated with terms such as restoration, rehabilitation and 
repair and how these practices are connected to environmental justice, waste studies and 
“matters of care.”61 Building off this theoretical framework, this thesis is then organized 
into three sections: Chapter 3: Creating the Monster; Chapter 4: Containing the Monster; 
and Chapter 5: Confronting and Caring for the Monster.  
 Chapter 3: Creating the Monster summarizes the circumstances in which the Giant 
Mine Monster was created, and identifies major historical points of contention that 
continue to influence the remediation project today. At the Giant Mine, a legacy of 
mining and contamination created a monster of mistrust that has continued to haunt the 
remediation planning process. These historical issues were not directly addressed in the 
early stages of remediation planning, resulting in a plan that focused on containment and 
limited the remediation project, not only geographically within the mine lease area, but 
also limited the kinds of knowledge used to plan for remediation. 
 Chapter 4: Containing the Monster analyzes initial approaches to remediation 
planning at the Giant Mine. Early on, the government-led remediation project sought to 
contain arsenic and limit liability, and in turn contained knowledge on remediation and 
limited how community stakeholders could be involved, resulting in a lack of community 																																																								
61 Chapter 2 was written with contributions from Dr. Arn Keeling and is currently being prepared for 
submission to Local Environment, with myself as the primary author.  
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trust in the 2007 Remediation Plan. The second half of this chapter summarizes and 
analyzes the structure of the Environmental Assessment and community engagement 
throughout this process. This chapter demonstrates that despite the claim that remediation 
is inherently ‘good’ because it is cleaning-up and managing contaminants, it can in fact 
perpetuate the systems of power that led to marginalization and degradation in the first 
place. 
 Finally, in Chapter 5: Confronting and Caring for the Monster, I summarize how 
the Giant Mine Remediation Project has changed since the Environmental Assessment 
and I present community stakeholders reflections on the Giant Mine Remediation Project 
over the past 17 years. In this chapter, I argue that the Giant Mine case illustrates the 
potential for community activism to shift remediation in order to confront social issues 
such as environmental injustice and to care for people and the environment through 
reconciliation and intergenerational equity.  
 Definitions of remediation tend to focus on the cleanup, containment and risk 
mitigation of a site. This focus overlooks discussions on morals, values and community 
objectives for future land uses. In the conclusion, I reflect on how socio-political research 
on remediation is critical for understanding the broader issues of resource development 
and environmental justice across northern Canada. This research will contribute to a 
broader understanding of the social dimensions of toxic contamination and mine 
remediation, and the development of best practices for community engagement during 
mine closure. Remediation is a creative opportunity to confront historical injustices and to 
negotiate how the space will be remembered, valued and cared for in the future. In order 
to rethink remediation, the current approach to mine remediation must change from a 
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focus on site containment to include an emphasis on broader issues such as community 
engagement, reconciliation, healing and caring for the land. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW: RETHINKING REMEDIATION 
 
Introduction 
 Industrial scale mineral extraction engenders some of humanity’s most dramatic 
and enduring landscape transformations. On the surface, mining entails the removal of 
more or less extensive areas of soil and vegetation; open-pit or strip mining methods 
completely remove topsoil as “overburden,” often leaving behind landscapes hostile to 
recolonizing vegetation. Similarly, the disposal at the surface of non-ore-bearing material 
(“waste rock”) or of the by-products of mineral extraction (tailings) provides dramatic, 
visible and long-lasting evidence of mining’s environmental transformations. These are 
not simply rock piles; they may present chemical and physical environmental hazards, 
from the erosion or failure of tailings impoundments, to the slow leaching of heavy 
metals or chemicals into local waterways, to acute environmental toxicity from acid mine 
drainage. Mining’s modification of the surface and subsurface environments often 
persists for decades, even centuries after the supposed ‘end’ of mining. 
 In recent decades, efforts to restore or remediate these impacts at both current and 
abandoned mine sites have gained momentum under the influence of growing 
environmental concern and regulation, and corporate embrace of more ‘sustainable’ 
mining practices.1 Technical processes of mine remediation such as acid rock drainage 																																																								
1 Opinions on and approaches to sustainable resource development are diverse. Some argue that sustainable 
mining is an oxymoron and is, in fact, impossible. For a review of sustainable development see: Andy 
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management, the construction of tailings covers, revegetation, soil contamination 
treatment and water treatment, have been widely researched.2 At the same time, 
governments have been developing more detailed and comprehensive mine closure and 
remediation policies.3 
 Yet, while there has been increasing attention to the material, environmental and 
engineering challenges of remediation, there has been rather less attention given to public 
participation and community values associated with cleaning up mine sites.4 Even when 
technical descriptions of remediation are presented to the community, these options are 
brought to the community only after experts have already defined the problem and the 
possible solutions.5 This gap arises from a variety of factors. First, remediation is often 
overlooked in public and scholarly debates over the environmental impacts and benefits 
of mining, in spite of a growing literature on the socio-economic dimensions of closure as 
part of the ‘mining cycle.’ Second, mine remediation is dominated by engineering and 
environmental expertise around geochemistry, hydrology, and risk management, and 
																																																																																																																																																																					
Whitmore, “The Emperor’s New Clothes: Sustainable Mining?” in Sustainable Mineral Operations in the 
Developing World, ed. by B.R. Marker, M.G. Petterson, F. McEvoy, and M.H. Stephenson (London: 
Geological Society Special Publications, 2005); Gavin Hilson, “Sustainable Development Policies in 
Canada’s Mining Sector: An Overview of Government and Industry Efforts,” Environmental Science & 
Policy 3, no. 4 (2000): 201–11; Gavin Hilson, and Barbara Murck, “Sustainable Development in the Mining 
Industry: Clarifying the Corporate Perspective,” Resources Policy 26, no. 4 (2000): 227–38.  2 For a summary of these processes see: Bernd G. Lottermoser, Mine Wastes: Characterization, Treatment 
and Environmental Impacts. Mine Wastes, Third Edition (Berlin: Springer, 2010).  
3 Dance, “Northern Reclamation in Canada;”  Rhys Worrall, David Neil, David Brereton, and David 
Mulligan, “Towards a sustainability criteria and indicators framework for legacy mine land,” Journal of 
Cleaner Production 17 (2009): 1426-434.  
4 Laura Banfield and Cynthia G. Jardine, “Consultation and Remediation in the North: Meeting 
International Commitments to Safeguard Health and Well-Being,” International Journal of Circumpolar 
Health 72, no. 1 (2013): 1–7. 
5 Anne Bergmans, Göran Sundqvist, Drago Kos, and Peter Simmons, “The Participatory Turn in 
Radioactive Waste Management: Deliberation and the Social–technical Divide,” Journal of Risk Research 
18, no. 3 (2015): 347–63; Gwen Ottinger, Refining Expertise: How Responsible Engineers Subvert 
Environmental Justice Challenges (NYU Press: New York, 2013).  
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debated in highly technical forums like environmental assessment hearings. In this sense, 
remediation is “rendered technical”6 and tends to exclude public participation or non-
expert assertions surrounding risk and remediation goals. Finally, insofar as it is 
understood as cleaning up or repairing environmental damage from mining, remediation 
is seen as improving the environment and ‘doing the good,’ and is less amenable to 
political or ethical challenges based on community concerns or values.  
 The generally positive associations of remediation with “clean-up” ignore the fact 
that simply containing and managing a toxic site is usually insufficient to deal with the 
broader histories, legacies and liabilities connected to contaminated sites and the 
difficulties of perpetual care for these sites.7 While some research has been carried out on 
the containment and long-term effects of nuclear waste,8 there is limited literature on the 
social effects and perpetual care of mine wastes such as tailings ponds and pervasive 
chemical contamination. Because remediation projects tend to focus on the technical, 
scientific or management aspects of clean-up, such projects risk continuing the 
environmental injustices associated with past development and obscuring blame or 
responsibility from industry and government for environmental degradation.9 
																																																								
6 The phrase “render technical” is from Tanya Murray Li, The Will to Improve: Governmentality, 
Development, and the Practice of Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007). 
7 Keeling and Sandlos, “Zombie Mines”; Houston Kempton, Thomas A Bloomfield, Jason L Hanson, and 
Patty Limerick, “Policy Guidance for Identifying and Effectively Managing Perpetual Environmental 
Impacts from New Hardrock Mines,” Environmental Science and Policy 13, no. 6 (2010): 558–66.  
8 Shannon Cram, “Becoming Jane: The Making and Unmaking of Hanford’s Nuclear Body.” Environment 
and Planning D: Society and Space 33, no. 5 (2015): 796-812; Vincent Ialenti, “Adjudicating Deep Time: 
Revisiting the United States’ High-Level Nuclear Waste Repository Project at Yucca Mountain,” Science 
and Technology Studies 27, no. 2 (2014): 27–48. 
9 Lindsey Dillon, “Race, Waste, and Space: Brownfield Redevelopment and Environmental Justice at the 
Hunters Point Shipyard,” Antipode 46, no. 5 (2014): 1205–21.  
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 Terms such as remediation, restoration, reclamation and rehabilitation include a 
wide range of practices that encompass urban brownfield redevelopment and the clean-up 
of oilrigs, toxic spills and military sites. This chapter focuses on how definitions on mine 
remediation, which focus on managing toxic hazards, can be discussed alongside terms 
such as restoration, reclamation, rehabilitation and repair, which seek to re-establish some 
kind of use or to repair land at an ecosystem level. Drawing from literatures on ecological 
restoration, environmental justice, discard studies, repair, and ‘matters of care,’ this 
chapter highlights critical, yet overlooked issues in the remediation of post-mining 
landscapes, particularly as they affect local communities. Theories of ecological 
restoration emphasize the importance of morals, ethics and value creation. Environmental 
justice research and discard studies push us to identify injustices and inequalities 
associated with the creation, management, geographies and temporalities of waste. 
Theories of repair and ‘matters of care’ push us beyond the act of remediation, towards a 
focus on the ongoing processes of trust building, reconciliation, and perpetual care for 
humans and nonhumans alike.  Remediation and restoration projects present an 
opportunity for the negotiation and articulation of morals, values, emotions, histories, and 
physical experiences associated with a contaminated mine site.10 These projects also 
present an opportunity for creative community discussion about relationships with the 
land, stewardship, perpetual care and future land uses.11 
 
																																																								
10 Laura Smith, “On the ‘Emotionality’ of Environmental Restoration: Narratives of Guilt, Restitution, 
Redemption and Hope,” Ethics, Policy & Environment 17, no. 3 (2014): 286–307.  
11 Anna Storm, Post-Industrial Landscape Scars (New York, NK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Dance, 
“Northern Reclamation in Canada.” 
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Remediation vs. Restoration: Contexts and Definitions 
 In response to rising concerns in the late 20th century over mining’s environmental 
impacts, increasing scientific, regulatory and industry attention has been devoted to mine 
closure and remediation.12 In Canada, post-closure environmental clean-up activities are 
typically referred to as remediation, although other terms such as rehabilitation and 
reclamation are often used interchangeably, with some temporal and regional variation.13 
Many definitions of environmental remediation highlight the technical nature of clean-up 
processes: environmental remediation is the “clean-up [of] operating or abandoned mines, 
usually focused on land and water contaminated with heavy metals, radiation and other 
toxic substances.”14 More specifically, environmental remediation deals with the removal 
or mitigation of pollution or contaminants from soil, groundwater, sediment or surface 
water. It may also entail the engineering and stabilization of closed mine workings and 
tailings storage areas and some degree of landscape recontouring and/or environmental 
restoration, such as revegetation. According to Lima et. al., “reclamation, which aims to 
recover key ecosystem services and biogeochemical functions within a replacement 
ecosystem, or rehabilitation, which implies a repurposing of the landscape, may be the 
																																																								
12 D.E. Hockley and L.C. Hockley, “Some histories of mine closure, the idea,” ed. A.B. Fourie, M. Tibbett, 
L. Sawatsky, D. van Zyl (presentation Mine Closure Conference, Vancouver, Canada, 2015); Duane Smith, 
Mining America: The Industry and The Environment, 1800-1980 (Lawrence, KA: University Press of 
Kansas, 1987).  
13 For example, in Northern Canada, the terms remediation and reclamation are used most often, however 
these terms have changed throughout time, and other terms such as rehabilitation are more popular 
elsewhere in Canada and further south (American management plans often use rehabilitation or restoration). 
See: Hockley and Hockley, “Some histories of mine closure, the idea;” Dance, “Northern Reclamation in 
Canada;” P.A. Steenhof, “Development of international standards for mine reclamation management,” 
(presented at Mine Closure Conference, Vancouver, Canada 2015). 
14 Arn Keeling and John Sandlos (eds.), Mining and Communities in Northern Canada: History, Politics 
and Memory (Calgary, Alberta: University of Calgary Press, 2015), xii.  
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best approaches to deal with surface mining legacies.”15 These approaches imply the 
return of some kind of value, alongside concerns of remediating contaminants. In many 
jurisdictions, these considerations are now the focus of mine closure planning and 
regulatory reviews—as well as subjects of considerable scientific and engineering 
expertise. 
 In a broader, less technical sense, remediation is defined as the “act or process of 
remedying.”16 A remedy is described as a “medicine or treatment that relieves pain,” or “a 
way of solving or correcting a problem.”17 The word remedy is associated with concepts 
of health and healing. To begin looking at remediation as something more than the 
removal and management of waste, the root word ‘mediate’ also points to interesting 
ways to rethink the word. Mediating can be seen as the forming of relationships or 
connections; meditation is an “intervention between conflicting parties to promote 
reconciliation, settlement or compromise.”18 Re-mediation therefore, could potentially be 
seen as the re-ordering or repairing of relationships.19 Arguably, it is important to repair 
the relationships between groups involved in the remediation process, as relationships 
																																																								
15 Emphasis added, Ana T. Lima, Kristen Mitchell, David W. O’Connell, Jos Verhoeven, Philippe Van 
Cappellen, “The legacy of surface mining: Remediation, restoration, reclamation and rehabilitation,” 
Environmental Science and Policy 66 (2016): 227. 	
16 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, “Definition of Remediation,” accessed Nov., 2016, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/remediation  
17 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, “Definition of Remedy,” accessed Nov., 2016, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/remedying  
18 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, “Definition of Mediation,” accessed Nov., 2016, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/mediation  
19 Robert L. France (ed.), Healing Natures Repairing Relationships: New Perspectives on Restoring 
Ecological Spaces and Consciousness (Vermont: Green Frigate Books, 2008).  
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developed through mining have traditionally been very exploitative for local people, 
especially Indigenous or marginalized groups.20  
 As stated above, the terms remediation and restoration are often used 
interchangeably. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, restoration is a “means of 
healing or restoring health,”21 and in this way it is similar to remediation. More 
specifically however, to restore is to  “return to a former state,”22 and the term restoration 
is often used in regards to the restoration of art, historical buildings and ruins.23 In the 
context of mining, restoration typically implies “an attempt to address the ecological 
impacts of mining through a return (as nearly as possible) to the ecological conditions that 
existed prior to mining.”24 According to Marcus Hall, restorationists work to bring back 
ideal versions of nature, and therefore are “automatically testing assumptions about past 
landscapes and the human role in the past.”25 In remediation projects, the politics of who 
defines this past, and how it is negotiated, articulated and memorialized is often 
overlooked. Theories of ecological restoration on the other hand have increasingly 
interrogated and critiqued the broader, moral, ethical and political implications of 
restoration. While the material and technical complexities of contaminated sites should 																																																								
20 Traci Brynne Voyles, Wastelanding: Legacies of Uranium Mining in Navajo Country (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2015).  
21 Oxford English Dictionary, “Restoration,” accessed Nov., 2016, retrieved from 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/163986?redirectedFrom=restoration#eid  
22 Oxford English Dictionary, “Restoration,” accessed Nov. 2016, retrieved from 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/163986?redirectedFrom=restoration#eid  
23 C. Howe, J. Lockrem, H. Appel, E. Hackett, D. Boyer, R. Hall, M. Schneider-Mayerson, et al. 
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not be understated, analyzing mine remediation within a broader conceptual framework, 
and applying debates and discussions of ecological restoration is valuable in that such an 
approach acknowledges the importance of both the material and socially constructed 
nature of mine waste. 
 
Context of Ecological Restoration 
 Hall traces ideas of environmental restoration back to the late 1800s, focusing on 
George Perkins Marsh’s book Man and Nature published in 1864. In the first sentences of 
this book, Marsh states that one of his objectives was “to suggest the possibility and the 
importance of the restoration of disturbed harmonies.”26 Hall argues that this suggestion 
was a shift from previous beliefs that natural agency was the cause of most degradation.27 
In the 18th and 19th centuries, mining landscapes were seen as a “victory in the quest for 
knowledge and superiority over nature.”28 However, by the late 1800s, Marsh placed 
humans at the center of environmental degradation, making humans responsible for 
restoration. In the 20th century, there was another shift, specifically in North America, 
towards the idea of rewilding. This can be seen in Aldo Leopold’s work on returning 
degraded nature to the wild state it was in before.29 Recognizing these shifts and tensions, 
Francaviglia states that, “20th century mining landscapes came to symbolize the turmoil 
between what our culture elects to view as two opposing forces: culture and nature.”30 																																																								
26 George Perkins Marsh, Man and Nature (New York, NY: Charles Scribner, 1864), taken from Hall, 
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Mining sites began to be perceived as landscapes in disequilibrium, places that needed to 
be brought back into harmony through restoration.  
 As shown by Hall, the idea of converting damaged environments into ideal states 
long predated the establishment of U.S. and Canadian federal clean-up programs. 
However, in North America most systematic, widespread discussion of restoration began 
in the late 1970s. Many mines and smelters that had opened in the first half of the 20th 
century, without strict environmental regulations, began shutting down and governments 
were forced to think of ways to handle the remaining environmental liabilities.31 This 
increased focus on mine clean-up coincided with the rise of environmentalism in the 
1960s and 70s, and the creation of environmental protection laws and other regulatory 
mechanisms throughout the U.S. and Canada.32 The initiation of the Superfund program 
in the United States in the 1980s was also a major turning point for the recognition and 
restoration of toxic sites on a large-scale, federal level.33 In addition, with the increasing 
influence of environmentalist scholarship such as Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, it was 
no longer acceptable to simply live with toxicity.34  
 Initially, government programs focused on restoration ecology and land 
management practices that would help to restore land to an optimum, productive state.35 
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However, in the early 1990s scholars began to acknowledge that restoration efforts had 
largely progressed on an ad hoc, site and situation specific basis, with little development 
of general theory or principles that would allow the transfer of methodologies from one 
situation to another.36 This ad hoc situation was largely based on Western scientific 
approaches to land use planning and management, focused on identifying point sources of 
pollution and creating measurable indicators for success, or working back towards an 
identified previous, or optimum state. These key practices are still important to restoration 
processes today, however, academic discourse around restoration has been shifting and 
has begun to acknowledge the importance of creating or restoring environmental, 
economic, and cultural value to degraded sites; this is the focus of reclamation and 
rehabilitation.37 In calling a project a remediation project, governments and industry limit 
the narrative to one of containment and management. In remediation processes, there is a 
danger that a focus on site containment, risk management and mitigation overlooks the 
broader discussions and theoretical contributions of ecological restoration, reclamation 
and rehabilitation.  
 
Insights from Ecological Restoration Theory  
 Beginning in the 1990s, academics and practitioners of ecological restoration 
began to critique the idea that landscapes could actually be returned to some former state. 
Elliot argued that such an approach justified the destruction of ecosystems; he saw 
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restoration as a way of rationalizing destruction and equated it with an art forgery.38 Katz 
reflected these critiques of restoration, but framed it as anthropocentric, resulting in the 
‘improvement’ of ecosystems simply for the use or aesthetic value of humans.39 However, 
Katz and Elliot weren’t necessarily arguing against cleaning up contamination. Katz 
instead calls us to recognize that it is really a process of human values: 
 We are not restoring nature: we are not making it whole and healthy again.  
 Nature restoration is a compromise; it should not be a basic policy goal. It  
 is a policy that makes the best of a bad situation; it cleans up our mess. We  
 are putting a piece of furniture over the stain in the carpet, for it provides a  
 better appearance. As a matter of policy, however, it would be much more 
 significant to prevent the causes of the stains.40 
 
In response to this, Hall argues that Katz and Elliot leave little room for “considering the 
possibility that humans and their activities may themselves be part of nature.”41 Along 
these same lines, Light argues that there is a difference between malicious and benevolent 
restoration, where restoration focuses on fixing and repairing damage rather than being a 
justification for damage or a cover up:42 in a sense, analogous to an art restoration rather 
than an art forgery.43 According to Smith, what can be concluded from the arguments of 
both Elliot and Katz is that even if 'restored nature' is perceived as nothing more than 
culturally produced artefacts, the restoration of human relationships with nature remains 
possible. 
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 Along similar lines, Rohwer and Marris complicate the definition of restoration by 
proposing a redefinition of restoration to mean a “restoration of moral value rather than a 
restoration of a historical state.”44 They emphasize that when talking about restoration 
and remediation, we need to get “comfortable talking about choices, intentions, values 
and justifications in a world where historical fidelity no longer reigns supreme.”45 Hobbs 
mirrors this analysis, stating that within the discipline of Restoration Ecology, definitions 
have shifted, causing a divide between those who see restoration as historical fidelity and 
those who use the approach of making healthy ecosystems, what he terms ‘moral 
restoration.’46 According to Rohwer and Marris, “It's about intent… We either 
intentionally modify or intentionally don't modify but we make an intentional decision to 
create a landscape that means something to us,"47 and in this sense, economic, cultural 
and social values are created within and through the processes of remediation and 
restoration.  
 Building on the idea of restoration as a moral exercise, Smith analyzes restoration 
as a form of ‘ecological redemption.’ According to Smith, “restoration-as-redemption is 
achieved through a 'spirit of performance' and the invention of ritual.”48 Restoration 
provides a context for negotiating relationships with the environment and the use of 
performance and ritual, such as healing ceremonies and volunteer or stewardship 
programs provide a way of dealing with shame and creating value in a once degraded site. 
In this sense, environmental restoration “may be less a process of remedying damaged 																																																								
44 Rohwer and Marris, “Renaming Restoration.” 
45 Ibid.  
46 Hobbs, “Grieving for the Past and Hoping for the Future.”  
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natural systems than of discovering our biases about environmental damage, less a 
process of re-creating past landscapes than of discovering our myths about idealized 
landscapes.”49 Framing environmental restoration in this way can reveal other moral, 
ethical and emotional structures bound up in discourses and practices of restoration.50  
  Restoration practices also reveal our assumptions about degradation and nature. 
Different ideas about what “nature” is and how degradation occurs lead to different 
restoration practices. For example, Robertson outlines several cases of mines in the 
United States where locals fought to preserve some of the physical, industrial features that 
defined the mining landscape, while still protecting community and environmental health. 
In this sense, the degradation and change caused by mining became a part of local 
landscape perspectives and identities.51 Mining landscapes have stories to tell. There are 
“messages hidden in the landscapes that go beyond technology to include some of our 
deepest cultural values.”52 However, Robertson and Francaviglia do not emphasize that 
such landscape identities can also be fractured and controversial. Different community 
members can have different senses of the same place caused by a variety of experiences, 
such as discrimination, racism, sexism, and economic and political marginalization.53 
While exposing and memorializing the past, restoration can also foster a new ‘sense of 
place,’ and can “restore faith and confidence in an area.”54 Therefore, Hall suggests that 
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before setting out to repair degraded land, there must first be some kind of discussion or 
consensus on the ideas of degradation, historical memories and restoration.55   
 Identifying what is valuable and what the goals of restoration are, means thinking 
about, articulating, and justifying values, including the technical, scientific, historical, 
political and economic considerations. Although the terms remediation and restoration are 
often used interchangeably, they are fundamentally quite different conceptual approaches 
to cleaning up mine sites. In reality, the majority of mine sites are remediation projects. It 
is often nearly impossible to actually clean or restore a site to full ecological integrity. In 
the majority of cases, the decision comes down to removing the contaminants or 
stabilizing them on site. These are remediation problems and should be recognized as 
such. Concepts such as reclamation and rehabilitation, which focus on restoring 
ecosystem function and creating some kind of land use value, offer a middle ground, with 
the recognition that destroyed land can likely never be restored. However, the conceptual 
and practical approaches of restoration should be brought to bear on these remediation 
problems. The ideals of morality, redemption, restoring cultural, social and economic 
value to the site, recognizing the historical value of a place and planning for future land 
uses; these are all essential parts of the healing process that should not be separated from 
remediation practice and policy. In multi-stakeholder project situations, identifying, 
articulating and justifying such values and goals can engender a better understanding of 
communication, trust and community engagement.56 Higgs suggests that, "ecological 
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restoration is synonymous with the restoration of hope."57 When there is trust and 
communication, there is room for healing, justice and hope.   
 
Justice and Waste: Justice through Remediation 
 Light argues that, “even if we were to grant Katz his position that it is impossible 
to restore nature, we may still have moral obligations to try to restore nature on the 
grounds of restitutive justice and a principle of restitution.”58 While most ecological 
restoration literature focuses on the relationship between society and nature, placing 
remediation and restoration within an environmental justice (EJ) framework helps to 
approach both the human-nature relationships and the human-human relationships 
connected to degraded mining environments. An EJ approach situates environmental 
degradation within local political contexts and power structures, identifies instances of 
inequality and disenfranchisement, and provides a stage for calls to action. However, 
while siting instances of inequality and power imbalances, EJ literature often overlooks 
the creation, valuation, geography and temporality of the waste itself. Therefore, 
combining an EJ approach with discard studies allows us to identify and address both the 
political and material contexts of mine waste. Bringing together discussions on and 
conflicts over values, morals, and ethics and the actual materiality of the site sets the 
stage for bringing together remediation and restoration and planning for perpetual care. 
 Remediation and restoration processes can and should be used as a mechanism for 
justice. Marginalized people have experienced mining differently. In fact, some 																																																								
57 Eric Higgs, Nature by Design (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2003).  
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communities have become marginalized through destructive mining practices, especially 
within the context of colonial expansion.59 For example, through the analysis of the 
effects of uranium mining on the Navajo peoples’ health and way of life, Voyles argues 
that through the process of ‘wastelanding’ landscapes such as deserts, abandoned mines, 
and industrial sites are produced and perceived as wasted, derelict or useless. The people 
who live in and rely on these landscapes are also ‘wasted’ in the sense that their bodies 
and their cultures become a waste product of extractive industries, and the perception of 
their homeland as a ‘wasteland’ is a form of injustice.60 Racism, ‘wastelanding,’ gender 
and political disenfranchisement introduce unequal effects of toxicity and mining, often 
resulting in calls for environmental justice.61  
 While EJ studies have traditionally focused on identifying and mapping cases of 
inequality associated with waste, many academics now see environmental justice as 
something that cannot be approached only through the collection of quantitative data and 
the analysis of the distribution of waste sites.62 Accordingly, there has been a shift 
towards a broader conceptualization of EJ. Holifield identifies the inclusion of the 
concepts of recognition, participation and capabilities as one important aspect of this 
shift.63 In addition to this shift, Pellow acknowledges the conceptual, theoretical and 
methodological issues with environmental justice research and stresses the need to 
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address how environmental inequalities are actually produced.64 Pellow outlines three 
important points that, he argues, have been overlooked in EJ literature: the process of 
history, the role of multiple stakeholder relationships and a life cycle approach to 
production and consumption.65 These same points can be applied to remediation and 
restoration.  
 How can justice actually be brought about through remediation and restoration? 
The ideas of recognition, participation and capabilities emphasize the importance of the 
inclusion and communication of all stakeholders and the participation and engagement of 
community members throughout the entire process. In addition, capabilities of 
community members can be enhanced through remediation processes. Remediation 
projects can offer jobs for locals, long-term maintenance positions, and opportunities for 
communities to organize around a common cause.66 To care about and live with waste in 
a sustainable manner, which includes the recognition and participation of marginalized 
community members and the increase of capabilities for those negatively affected in the 
past, is to bring about environmental justice in a practical, long term manner. 
 If remediation is to bring about environmental justice, it must be seen as a process 
of rebuilding or reconciling relationships between people and the land. Reconciliation is 
defined as “the restoration of friendly relations…[or] the action of making one view or 
belief compatible with another… [or] the action of making financial accounts consistent; 
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harmonization.”67 According to the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
reconciliation is “very hard to categorize or explain… it is at its core very individual, yet 
when considered collectively, reconciliation can change the very way we look at 
ourselves and at our fellow citizens.”68 Within a context of reconciliation, remediation 
can contribute to environmental justice through an official apology or recognition of 
marginalized communities and the injustices they have suffered due to mining. Including 
reconciliation within the EJ and remediation dialogue can also bring about practical 
strategies for compensation and direct socio-economic involvement in management, 
monitoring and long-term care of a site. Tsosie, using the case study of the remediation of 
radioactive contamination on Navajo lands in the United States, argues for an “ethics of 
remediation,” which includes reconciliation with First Nations peoples:  
 When we consider the question of justice, we often ask whether there is a ‘fair’ 
distribution of goods and harms… the public good is constructed at the cost of 
placing the harms on Indigenous peoples. This constitutes environmental injustice, 
and possibly a form of environmental racism that negates the equal dignity of 
Indigenous peoples by sacrificing their health and well-being for the good of the 
majority society… science policy continues to determine what a ‘safe’ level of 
contamination is and what acceptable technologies for mining are. The dominant 
society also constructs the legal framework that governs redress for harm… 
Indigenous people are excluded from the creation of these policies and therefor 
become victims of such policies. These policies omit the experiences of harm as 
spiritual and cultural.69  
 
According to Tsosie, such science based policy approaches to remediation also “omit the 
testimony of Indigenous community members as ‘experts’ in favour of scientific and 																																																								
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economic accounts of harm.”70 Tsosie states that we must heal these lands with the heart 
and the mind. Reconciliation makes space for Indigenous testimony and accounts of harm 
to be taken seriously. Reconciliation is often defined as healing relationships between 
people, but healing relationships with land is also important in overcoming colonial 
relations.  
 Alongside the broader processes of reconciliation and remediation, apologies and 
redress for historic wrongs can be a symbolic, creative and generative trust-building 
process:  
 The period leading up to an official apology presents an opportunity for survivors 
and state officials to engage in a dialogue regarding the nature of the apology to 
be offered… this process of dialogue itself has a valuable role to play in a process 
of mutual education, mutual understanding, and the longer term process of 
reconciliation.71  
 
Murphy argues that, “official apologies have both a moral and practical role to play in a 
process of reconciling with historic injustice.”72 Place can also play an important role in 
apology and reconciliation, especially with remediation, which is intimately connected to 
land and geography. Not only can an official apology happen on the site of injustice, an 
apology can include a promise for practical, reconciliatory acts through remediation and 
restoration of land and relationships to that land. An official apology is also a way to 
document and communicate historic injustices with future generations: “Official 
apologies are also a part of the process of constructing a public memory of injustice that 
can serve as a cautionary note to future generations…”73 Apologies officially 
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acknowledge responsibility, symbolically restore relations, offer closure from the past and 
a path forward to trust and respect. 
 Focusing simply on the technical fixes allows responsible parties to cleanse 
themselves of social responsibility and overlook past injustices, arguing that they have a 
mandate to clean the site and that they have to stick to the science. Dillon, argues that 
narrow, technical approaches to restoration allow governments and industry to “defer 
responsibility for the social effects of industry.74 She goes on to write that, “maintaining a 
scientific approach to waste management, cleansed of its social and geographical 
relations, also allows the Navy to present its brownfield redevelopment project as a story 
of progress and improvement.”75 Building on these ideas, Krupar states that bureaucratic, 
technical approaches to re-greening and clean-up mobilize certain kinds of power through 
expert knowledge, monitoring, and control of the site.76 However, as Tsosie highlights in 
her ‘ethics of remediation,’ social effects of mine waste and justice for these effects 
should be considered an equally important liability. Together, environment justice and 
reconciliation processes call for an acknowledgment of responsibility for environmental 
and societal harms.  
  
Justice and Waste: Articulating Waste 
 Remediation, in a social justice sense, has to address waste in the context of what 
Dillon calls ‘waste formations,’ including the valuation, temporality and geography of 
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waste and the power relations created around waste, in order to achieve some kind of 
reconciling act or healing process. While environmental justice provides a framework to 
analyze the historical and social aspects of mine sites and the unequal human relations 
created through mining, it does not explicitly address social theories of waste or the 
materiality of mine waste. An environmental justice framework can be seen as a rallying 
point, an acknowledgment of inequality, and a call for better governance, industrial 
development and management. However, remediation and restoration are not just about 
where waste is in relation to marginalized communities. These processes are also about 
social perceptions of waste, how waste is valued, how waste moves and flows through 
environments, and how it perpetuates throughout time. Simply recognizing that certain 
groups of people have been negatively affected and ensuring their participation in the 
process of remediation is not enough, as colonial power structures can continue 
throughout these projects. As Tsosie notes, problems of cumulative impacts and 
intergenerational injustices also need to be acknowledged through an ‘ethics of 
remediation.’77 
 In connecting waste, remediation, and justice, we must also take into account 
theories of waste and investigate how certain relationships and inequalities develop 
around waste. When contemplating remediation, stakeholders need to ask: how was the 
waste created and managed in the past, how will this material act in the future, and what 
are the cultural, environmental and economic valuations of this waste?78 Along with 
understanding the material characteristics of waste, understanding the colonial, racial, and 																																																								
77 Tsosie, “Indigenous Peoples and the Ethics of Remediation.” 
78 For a summary of waste and waste management theory see: Joshua Reno, “Waste and Waste 
Management,” Annual Review of Anthropology 44 (2015): 557–72.  
	 46	
gendered context within which waste is generated, contained, and managed carries 
important implications for environmental justice claims and best practices of remediation 
and restoration.79 In each specific case there is a need to collectively define mine waste 
and the specific ways that remediation and restoration will deal with that waste and 
ensure environmental justice. Inherent in such questions are the challenges of the 
valuations, temporalities and geographies of waste. 
 How we define and manage waste, pollution and environmental degradation 
depends on values, politics and social relations. Waste is often perceived as the opposite 
of economic value: “Waste is a category formed always in relation to value.”80 Most 
discussions in the mining industry focus on economic values and tend to overlook broader 
cultural implications. Echoing Francavigilia and Richardson’s insights on mining 
landscapes and community identity, Hall writes that just like beauty, degradation is in the 
eye of the beholder.81 Often in the case of mining, contaminants are either contained and 
a community must live with the waste far into the future, or the contaminants are moved 
elsewhere and become someone else’s problem, emphasizing and exacerbating political 
relations, discrimination and issues of environmental injustice.82 Some wastes become 
‘re-commodified’ and transformed from waste into an economically valuable 
commodity.83 Other mine wastes, such as overburden, are not considered ‘toxic’ and are 
																																																								
79 Voyles, Wastelanding. 
80 Dillon, “Race, Waste, and Space.”  
81 Francaviglia, Hard Places; Robertson, Hard as The Rock Itself; Hall, M., Earth Repair.  
82 Steve Lerner, Sacrifice Zones: the front line of toxic chemicals in the United States (Cambridge Mass: 
MIT Press, 2010).   
83 Karen Hudson-Edwards, Heather E. Jamieson, and Bernd G. Lottermoser, “Mine Wastes: Past, Present, 
Future,” Elements 7, no. 6 (2011): 375–80.  
	 47	
used in building dams, roads and other infrastructure.84 Landmarks such as mine shafts 
can be considered waste to be removed, or historical monuments. Most recently, as high-
grade ore bodies become increasingly rare and with changes in technology, what was 
once considered waste, may again be mined. In this way, “mining by-products and 
landscapes may shift between the categories of ‘waste’ and ‘value’,”85 depending on 
economic, environmental and cultural valuations.   
 Dealing with waste is dealing with social and material relations, and in this sense, 
we have to ask ourselves if our definitions and management of contaminants deepens or 
continues the discrimination and marginalization stemming from the original creation of 
waste or ‘wastelands.’86 Remediation values are intimately tied to the values and 
perceptions of such ‘wasted’ land: is the land considered a toxic wasteland, an unused 
barren landscape, a historically valuable site, a ‘home’ for survival and production, or a 
sacred space?87 Berger questions why we reclaim: “does society promote reclamation 
activities out of guilt or shame over the destruction caused by consumption-driven 
mining? What ethical values determine thoughts and methods of reclamation?”88 In many 
ways, mine wastes can be considered industrial ruins, associated with many different 
versions of history. According to Jakle and Wilson, “ruins reflect the past, romance, and 
nostalgia, and at the same time represent risk, commodification and neglect… Where 
some people see ruins, others see homes situated within painful processes of 																																																								
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transformation.”89 Identifying differing values amongst stakeholders and outlining shared 
objectives and ethics can help to define how a community values the mine site, which in 
turn helps to define and direct the parameters of remediation outside of scientific 
technicalities.  
 Building on the challenges of identifying common values of mine waste, issues of 
temporalities and geographies of waste can further complicate remediation and restoration 
projects. The legacies of mines can continue to haunt the surrounding environment and 
nearby communities for generations to come.90 While investigating the idea of industrial 
ruination, Mah states, “each phase of industrial ruination is situated along a continuum 
between creation and destruction, fixity and motion, expansion and contraction. Over 
time, landscapes of industrial ruination will become landscapes of regeneration, reuse, 
demolition, or ruination once again.”91 Within mine remediation planning, there is a lot of 
focus on creating a site that requires minimal long-term monitoring and management of 
waste, the ideal being a ‘walk-away’ solution. However, this is rarely the case.92 In mine 
remediation processes, there seems to be a lack focus on long-term care.93 For example, it 
is hard to determine how a tailings cover will change in thousands of years or if the 
tailings underneath will continue to pollute the surrounding area if the covers fail. As 
Nixon argues, legacies of waste can bring about “slow violence,” as cumulative effects 
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influence communities for generations to come.94 Along these same lines, Erikson argues 
that rather than seeing a disaster as one sudden, disruptive event, toxic waste can be 
framed as a “slow disaster,” resulting in what is called ‘chronic dread’ and a sense of 
helplessness among those exposed or those who think they could potentially be 
exposed.95  
 There are thousands of chemical waste sites globally that present long-term 
perpetual care issues, however, there is little planning for managing and communicating 
these challenges far into the future. One area of waste management that has taken into 
account long-term planning is research on nuclear waste containment. For example, in 
Carlsbad, New Mexico, the United States Department of Energy has developed the Waste 
Isolation Pilot Plant, the world’s first permanent nuclear waste repository.96 Research for 
long-term radioactive waste management has investigated best practices for containing 
waste and has hypothesized possible ways to use physical barriers and passive 
institutional controls such as text, symbols and signs to ensure that people in the future 
know how to manage and avoid disturbing that site.97 Although initial research focused 
on technical aspects of containing nuclear waste, increasingly, researchers, companies 
and governments are looking at the importance of involving citizens in these planning 
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processes.98 However, as Bergmans et al. argue, problems and possible solutions are often 
only brought to the community after they have already been defined by technical experts: 
"This maintains a notional divide between the treatment of technical and social aspects of 
radioactive waste management and raises pressing questions about the kind of choice 
affected communities are given if they are not able to debate fully the technical 
options."99 While there are important differences between remediating mine sites and 
managing nuclear waste repositories, including geographic location and social 
perceptions of the waste, there are important lessons to be learned from research on 
nuclear waste management. In addition, it is important to question why the majority of 
research has been directed towards nuclear waste management, while overlooking the 
long-term management of other types of mining waste. 
 ‘Slow violence,’ ‘slow disasters’ and the complexities of perpetual care are not 
easily defined geographically either. Continuous pollution or the potential for 
contamination implies “uneven geographies, affecting certain bodies and areas more than 
others.”100 In addition, remediation might not entirely clean up a site and often does not 
extend beyond certain arbitrary boundaries such as land leases or territorial boundaries, 
disregarding the ability of waste to flow, move and change. Mine wastes leak and 
permeate barriers, transforming into different entities in the process.101 According to Bird, 
remediation often focuses on fixing or containing the point source of pollution, but 																																																								
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doesn’t always look at long-term effects ‘downstream,’ or outside the physical limits of 
the mine site. For example, sediments in rivers are a source of long-term contamination 
that is difficult to track, map, quantify and remediate.102 Such examples emphasize that 
waste containment and stabilization is not an easy task, temporally or geographically, and 
requires continual monitoring, and re-evaluation as waste moves and changes. In addition, 
focusing on a single mine site can cause projects to overlook or underestimate cumulative 
effects of other mines or developments in the area.  
 Remediation practices have largely failed to deal with the prospects of perpetual 
care on large temporal and geographic scales. Gray-Cosgrove et al., argue that a “slow 
disaster” is a fitting concept for remediation: “Disaster occurs when the usual methods of 
triage no longer work in the face of new scales of crisis, when efforts to remediate and 
depollute in the face of extremely long-lived pollutants are a type of disaster in and of 
themselves. Thus… [slow disasters] also describe the crisis of methodology facing 
management of 21st century wastes.”103 If remediation is approached as a technical 
project, without a community discussion of the value, temporalities and geographies of 
waste, the potential for waste to become a slow disaster increases. In such cases, 
remediation becomes a reactionary response to slow disasters rather than a long-term 
solution.  
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Remediation as Repair, Maintenance and Matters of Care  
 Using an environment justice approach can situate mine remediation projects 
within a broader context of historical, political and economic inequality and can provide a 
way to frame action outside of the usual technical processes. Most importantly, an 
environmental justice approach recognizes and challenges the continuation of power 
structures that have disenfranchised certain groups of people throughout mining and 
remediation processes. Discard studies add to the EJ discussion by illuminating the 
important valuations, temporalities, and geographies of waste. In this sense, discard 
studies and EJ add a moral, ethical, and value based approach to technical approaches of 
remediation. However, such a framework is still premised on the idea of some ‘end 
point,’ where remediation is complete, the community has been engaged, justice issues 
have been addressed and some combination of economic, environmental and cultural 
value has been returned or added to the mine site. As mentioned earlier, what these 
approaches fail to address are the complex issues of perpetual care. Maintaining a 
remediated site alongside environmental justice is not a straightforward process; further 
degradation of land and relationships is always a possibility.   
 The terms ‘repair,’ ‘care and maintenance’ and ‘perpetual care’ are often used in 
the context of mine remediation.104 Similar to literature on ecological restoration, recent 
literature on repair and maintenance questions the politics and power relations 
surrounding repair. Repairing is like restoring – there is an objective, an end goal, an 
agreed upon (or contested) optimum state, but the thing being repaired or restored will 																																																								
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never be exactly as it was. To repair is “to mend, to put back in order.”105 Repair is 
related to the word reparation, which is used within the context of reconciliation and 
compensation, meaning the “compensation for war damaged owed by the aggressor.”106 
According to Houston and Jackson, repair studies have brought to light broader questions 
about “how we live with socio-technical systems, drawing attention to larger processes of 
valuation, breakdown, and wasting. Through these processes, the materiality of 
technologies becomes visible in new ways… prompting a wide range of social and 
environmental justice concerns.”107 These ideas present repair as an intrinsically ethical 
activity. In this sense, repair, restoration and reconciliation are brought together as 
environmental destruction is seen as an injustice, responsible parties are held to account, 
and reparative mechanisms are put in place through both material and social repair of the 
land, and relationships. Spelman echoes these ideas of reconciliation and redemption 
stating that,  
 A repair approach can “enrich our understanding of the range of possibilities 
before us as we consider what to do, or to refrain from doing, in the face of 
ecological damage… From apologies and other informal attempts at patching 
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things up, to law courts, conflict mediation, and truth and reconciliation 
commissions, we try to reweave what we revealingly call the social fabric.108 
 
A repair approach offers ongoing opportunities for creativity and adaptation throughout 
remediation processes and the perpetual care of mine sites.  
 However, as Ureta points out, repair can also be seen as a normalization process: 
“understood as normalization, repair practices can be seen not only as contributing to the 
long-term survival of a system, but also as a key strategy for the maintenance of 
power.”109 Graham and Thrift suggest that processes of repair represent ways order is 
maintained in our environment, “emphasizing how maintenance and repair are moments 
of learning and of politics, as values and orders are being negotiated and re-made in and 
through restoration and reproduction.”110 In many cases the aim of repair is to maintain 
the power of ‘experts’ or those in charge of such systems. Problems that arise are dealt 
with by reinforcing the rules of these experts even if mistakes in the past have been 
caused by this ‘expert knowledge.’111  
 Repair and maintenance processes, just like remediation and restoration, are not 
always inherently good.112 As Jackson states, “repair is not always heroic or directed 
towards noble ends, and may function as much in defence as in resistance to anti-
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democratic and anti-humanist projects.”113 Barnes builds on this, stating that, “the 
purpose of maintenance may be not so much about the defective object as about the social 
and political relationships in which that object is embedded.”114 The aim of repair as 
normalization is the maintenance of power, which does not necessarily coincide with the 
improvement or restoration of degraded landscapes and communities.115 However, repair 
can also be creative, political and spatial; what gets repaired, what doesn’t, who are we 
repairing for and how can repair highlight, damage or erase important histories.116 If 
normalizing powers are critiqued, repair offers opportunities for creative innovation 
alongside a remembrance and recognition of the past – a balance of historical fidelity and 
innovation in an ongoing process of repair.  
 According to Ureta, failures, such as the abandonment of a mine, make 
infrastructures visible; “they open a black box of power to possible questions 
and/transformations by actors who might feel disenfranchised from it.”117 Mine failure, 
closure and abandonment reveal power structures and normalizations that can be 
questioned and critiqued throughout the processes of remediation, restoration or repair. 
Therefore, rethinking remediation requires an investigation of how systems of 
degradation are normalized in mining practice and how these systems might be changed 
through remediation processes in order to ensure social betterment. Using concepts of 
repair, remediation can be reframed as on ongoing, long-term process. Combing the 																																																								
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material foundations of remediation, the moral and ethical foundations of ecological 
restoration within a theoretical framework of environmental justice and discard studies 
contextualizes the complexities of toxic mine sites. Repair, while recognizing the problem 
of normalization, points to a remediation approach that is based on the ongoing process of 
maintenance, adaptation and creativity. In combination these approaches to remediation 
point to something that Ureta calls going beyond repair,118, or beyond remediation, 
towards ‘matters of care.’ 
 If we are to go beyond repair, as Ureta suggests, we must approach remediation 
with a cautious and experimental approach. From the outset, remediation planning should 
outline the limits of expert knowledge and emphasize the need to experiment and 
adjust.119 What Ureta terms ‘anti-programs’ or opposition should be framed not as 
“components to be disciplined, but as valuable signals about the shortcomings of the 
available scripts.”120 In other words, disagreement or community opposition should not be 
seen as something that needs to be managed. It is not simply a matter of educating the 
public on the technical aspects of mining and remediation. This approach reinforces the 
authority of scientific knowledge and power structures throughout the mine lifecycle. 
Rather, being transparent about the limits of expert knowledge and embracing dialogue 
and the need to experiment and adjust has the potential to result in much more dynamic 
processes, in which the community is included and supported.  
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  Terms such as stewardship, caretaker, and perpetual care invoke ideas of concern, 
care and even love for the environment and the social relations that sustain a healthy 
ecosystem: "Stewardship sidesteps the notion of specific goals to focus on the idea of a 
caretaker that is not an owner or dominator."121  In this sense, Ureta argues, 
contamination and waste management become ‘matters of concern’ and ‘matters of care’ 
for the communities involved. Referencing Latour, Puig de la Bellacasa states that 
‘matters of concern’ replace ‘interests’: “interests are something that the inheritors of 
agonistic modern politics have learned to approach suspiciously – or that we are supposed 
to jealously preserve when they are our ‘own’ interests. Concerns, in turn, call upon our 
ability to respect each other’s issues, if we are to build a common world.”122 Framing 
contamination as ‘matters of concern’ help to avoid what Whitehead called a ‘bifurcation 
of nature,’ which separates feelings and meaning from fact.123 Care builds on this notion 
of concern; care involves a notion of doing and intervening based on these concerns.  
 According to Puig de la Bellacasa the difference between concern and care is 
illuminated by comparing these two phrases: “I am concerned” and “I care.” The first 
implies worry and attentiveness to an issue as well as recognizing the effects of an issue. 
“I care” on the other hand adds a sense of attachment, commitment and responsibility; “to 
care more strongly directs us to a notion of material doing.”124 The sense of attachment, 
commitment and responsibility means that to effectively care for a thing, we cannot cut 																																																								
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off those with whom we disagree: “To engage properly with the becoming of a thing, we 
need to count all the concerns attached to it, all those who care for it.”125 The becoming of 
a mine relates both to the creation and running of the mine and the becoming of the mine 
as a site of remediation. In all stages of mining there are different concerns and different 
ways to care for these concerns. Those who work for or live with the mine must take all 
the concerns and mechanisms of care into equal consideration. Care is an “active practice 
of monitoring and intervening in a system in order to sustain the system itself and its 
wider relations over time.”126 In this way, care can be mobilized to “serve as a gathering 
purpose: to hold together a thing.”127 Care is a process of continually redefining relations 
in better ways. 
 Typically, the aim of waste management is a technologically based, top-down 
program that results in the containment of waste or disposal of it elsewhere. Waste is 
often presented as an apolitical issue, creating the “illusion that solutions to all problems 
are to be found in a more determined application of rationally organized expertise 
encapsulated in management theory and practice.”128 Such actions eliminate waste as a 
“matter of concern” for the community, since they have no control. According to Ureta, 
care, on the other hand, is based on everyday practices and the expectation of failure; “it 
proposes temporary and experimental ways to involve all the concerned parties in the 
search for alternative ways to live with our waste, in material, ethical and political 																																																								
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terms.”129 Ureta seeks to change this focus and calls for a need to consider a parallel set 
of practices. Using Puig de la Bellacasa’s concept of ‘matters of care,’ Ureta outlines an 
alternative approach to studying the management of mine waste at the El Teniente Mine 
in Chile, where a long canal carrying tailings from the mine, through a community, to the 
tailings pond must be managed and maintained. He acknowledges the importance of 
technology, science and management based approaches, but presents care as a parallel 
way to manage and live with waste.  
 Building on the work of Mol et al., Puig de la Bellacasa, Martin et al., and 
Murphy, Ureta outlines three approaches to care that are important in caring for waste: 
care as tinkering, care as a form of ‘affective entanglement’ and care as a particular kind 
of power. First, Mol characterizes care as “persistent tinkering in a world full of complex 
ambivalence and shifting tensions.”130 Care as tinkering is always experimental and 
tentative, reflexive of its own presence and limits; “nothing is taken to be entirely fixed or 
entirely fluid… technologies, habits, hopes, everything… may have to be adjusted.”131 
Care as tinkering shines more light on the importance of the day-to-day maintenance of 
the infrastructure and communities, through which waste is produced, managed, stored 
and maintained long-term. Something will always go wrong, and continual tinkering and 
experimentation is needed. This not only applies to material fixes, but also to what Henke 
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calls “social repair,”132 or the tinkering with relationships that are shaped by waste, waste 
management, and remediation.  
 Care as an ‘affective entanglement’ is an “ethical commitment to take into account 
all the entities involved in industrial solid waste, even the ones we dislike or are opposed 
to.”133 Caring for waste means living with it and all the things, human or non-human, 
associated with that waste. Waste is not going to simply disappear through the processes 
of remediation and restoration. Caring for waste “requires knowledge and curiosity 
regarding the need of an ‘other’ – human or not, and these become possible through 
relating, through refusing objectification.”134 As Ureta suggests, the management of waste 
must take into account all participants, from disempowered communities to the waste 
itself. Such an approach fits within a combined conceptual framework of environmental 
justice and discard studies.  
 Similar to remediation and repair, care is not necessarily good; caring is “political, 
messy and dirty.”135 In this way, care can manifest as particular kinds of power; it 
cherishes some things while excluding others.136 Care, as Murphy and Martin et al. argue, 
can also become apolitical when governments or industries ‘care for’ communities, but 
communities lose the political ability to care for themselves.137 Similar to the continuation 
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and normalization of marginalizing power structures through processes of remediation, 
restoration and repair, Murphy warns that: “Care is not necessarily the route to 
emancipated science and alternative knowledge-making without critically examining the 
ways positive feelings, sympathy and other forms of attachment can work with and 
through the grain of hegemonic structures, rather than against them.”138 Murphy argues 
that we must continually ‘unsettle’ practices of care. Just as care can be done through 
tinkering, care practices must also be tinkered with. The management of waste must be 
carried out in a reflexive fashion so that it avoids “enacting antipolitics in the name of 
care”139 and so that practices to care for waste are continually remade in better ways.140 
 Using these three concepts of care, Ureta highlights a particular example of care 
that is important to everyone working at the El Teniente Mine: care for the communities 
surrounding the tailings canal. This is based on the concept of simply being a ‘good 
neighbour.’141 Locals who have worked at the mine for years are chosen to deal with 
community relations, which Ureta identifies as a certain kind of politics of care. In this 
sense, maintenance is always material and social.142 Ureta emphasizes that the 
relationships of these Community Relations personnel with the surrounding community 
members is largely informal. They have continual contact as employees walk around the 
mine site and tailings canal for maintenance, stopping to chat with those who live close 
by. This kind of interaction shows care as ‘affective entanglement.’ In addition, while 																																																								
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these employees are chatting with the locals, they are continually checking the physical 
structure of the canal. On these daily trips, the employees are tinkering, adjusting and 
maintaining both the social and physical relations surrounding the tailings canal. Ureta 
quotes one community member as saying, “I’m glad to help them and glad that they 
sometimes help me to take care [of my property], help me to take care.”143 Care gives 
attention to those who could be harmed, whose voices are not often heard, helping to 
mitigate and prevent environmental injustices. This kind of care is all about reciprocal 
relationships.  
 
Conclusions: Remediation as Relationships and Reconciliation 
 According to Storm, landscape restoration or remediation can be seen as a 
scabbing process, an intermediate stage where hierarchies are negotiated, values are 
defined and perceptions of waste and future land uses are discussed. Storm writes that, 
“To heal a mental or physical wound into a scar that one can live with is to recognize key 
signs of difficult or ambiguous pasts and to point towards possible reconciliation.”144 
While using this metaphor she outlines the intermediate stage of scabbing:  
 Scabbing signifies a situation of undefined shapes and unsettled  
 meanings, a liminal condition that is decisive for understanding the  
 people and the places… while the scar often remains ambiguous, the  
 scab is even more open to interpretation in a multitude of ways; here  
 struggles over hierarchies of significance become particularly overt and 
 discernible. Some wounds remain as scabs for a long time, because  
 there is no room for healing and recovery.145  
 
																																																								
143 Ureta, “Caring for Waste: Handling Tailings in a Chilean Copper Mine.”  
144 Storm, A., Post-Industrial Landscape Scars. 
145 Storm, A., Post-Industrial Landscape Scars, 2. 
	 63	
Such a process requires constant tinkering, experimentation and discussion about 
knowledge, research, technology, relationships, history, political power and 
communication. This scabbing process also implies input from all stakeholder groups and 
the continual negotiation of morals, values and objectives.146 Through ongoing care, 
tinkering, experimentation and communication, the past political structures that led to 
degradation and marginalization are brought to light. Storm sees the scarring, like repair, 
as a creative opportunity for how the space will be remembered, valued and cared for in 
the future.147 In a similar way, remediation presents an opportunity for the negotiation 
about the history of the site, and a creative, ongoing discussion about the future; 
possibilities can emerge from the wounds and the wreckage. 
 When mines ‘die’ they do not simply disappear; they cannot be buried and 
forgotten about.148 Remediation is a part of the mine lifecycle and therefore cannot be 
examined as separate from the history of the mine itself. The remediation process is a 
continuation of the mining process; it alters the landscape, society and economy and can 
be both dangerous and beneficial for surrounding communities. In remediation, as it is 
connected to mining, there are many different definitions and valuation systems involved. 
There are many stakeholders with a variety of perspectives, realities, values and practices. 
There are multiple levels of government, consulting companies, mining and construction 
companies, indigenous groups, municipal organizations and environmental organizations. 
In addition, it is difficult to define and manage the temporality and geography of toxic 
waste. Remediation is shaped not only by the complex history of the mine, but also by the 																																																								
146 Rohwer and Marris, “Renaming Restoration.” 
147 Storm, Post-Industrial Landscape Scars.  
148 Worrall, et al., “Towards a Sustainability Criteria and Indicators Framework for Legacy Mine Land.” 
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many different groups articulating their values, how these values are ranked 
hierarchically, and how waste transforms over time and space.149  
 Today, remediation projects are often associated with terms such as liability and 
risk management, where liability and risk can be measured, quantified and dealt with 
through technical management plans. However, socially, it is a messy, tangled process 
that could be seen more as a healing of land and relationships. Remediation, restoration 
and reconciliation present an opportunity for a negotiation about the history of the site, 
and a creative discussion about the future:  
 As an act-centered ethical perspective, restoration-as-redemption thus seeks to 
reverse concerns of moral detachment and ethical indifference - and in so doing, 
counter ecological injustice. In taking forward an ethic of care (through 
engagement and participation), redemption narratives break down and deconstruct 
the dualism between society and nature - a preserve of environmental ethics of 
philosophy - to promote responsibility and mutuality.150 
 
Care as an analytic lens opens up ways of reimagining remediation practices. Following 
the three components of care outlined by Ureta, in order to ensure community 
involvement in waste management and long term care, remediation projects must always 
be tinkered with and adapted; remediation must take into account all actors and 
stakeholders, including the waste itself; and remediation must always be recognized as a 
political process. Attending to care in remediation contexts can “help us locate immediate 
forms of technical work within wider moral and political orderings;”151 Rethinking 
																																																								
149 Joan Martinez-Alier, “Mining conflicts, environmental justice and valuation,” Journal of Hazardous 
Materials 86 (2001): 153-170.  
150 Smith, “On the ‘Emotionality’ of Environmental Restoration,” 298. 
151 Houston, and Jackson, “Caring for the “Next Billion Mobile Handsets: Opening Propriety Closures 
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remediation places these technical practices within a framework of environmental justice 
and discard studies as an ongoing, perpetual process of community concern and care. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CREATING THE GIANT MINE MONSTER 
“Regardless of who you are, Giant Mine weaves very much into the fabric of what makes 
this community this community, whether it’s positive or negative… it has definitely 
shaped the city and the territory in many ways.” 
– Lisa Dyer, Government of the Northwest Territories 
 
Introduction 
 In order to better understand the underlying relationships and environmental 
injustices that shape the Giant Mine Remediation Project today, it is first important to 
outline the decisions, events and policies that created the Giant Mine Monster. Moving 
from the late 1940s through the 1990s, I briefly outline a few of the many incidents, 
flashpoints and experiences that shaped the definitions, values and perceptions of 
remediation at the Giant Mine. Through these histories I hope to highlight the ways in 
which the remediation project at the Giant Mine cannot be detached from its history and 
politics as a mining operation. While bringing jobs, wealth and a sense of community to 
some, others’ experiences led to a lack of trust in government and industry, resulting in 
conflicts and protests that continue to shape the remediation process. Without 
acknowledging and incorporating the historical relationships that the Giant Mine created 
and imposed on local residents, the Giant Mine Remediation Project risks perpetuating 
the political systems that broke trust and marginalized First Nations.1  
 
																																																								
1 Lindsey Dillon, “Race, Waste, and Space: Brownfield Redevelopment and Environmental Justice at the 
Hunters Point Shipyard,” Antipode 46, no. 5 (2014): 1205–21.   
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1940s-1960s: Setting a precedent of pollution and secrecy at Giant Mine 
 Northern industrial development in the first half of the twentieth century was 
characterized by limited institutional and government controls.2 Rather than regulating 
pollution and development, the federal government focused on promoting industry, 
development, settlement and expansion in the north.3 This expansion occurred within a 
post war context, when the federal government was eager to create jobs and develop 
industry. In the Yellowknife area, such expansion occurred after the signing of Treaties 
and the implementation of the Indian Act, which effectively marginalized First Nations 
communities from economic and industrial developments on their traditional lands.4 It is 
within this colonial, industrial context that Giant began operations in 1948. The Canadian 
government’s push for Northern industrialization created a relatively isolated, volatile 
northern mining context, resulting in a “social and economic dislocation that continues to 
disproportionately impact northern Native communities.”5    
 The specific geographic and geological details of the Yellowknife area played a 
crucial role in the creation and management of waste at Giant. The local bedrock is 
comprised of arsenopyrite, a mineral containing iron, sulphur and arsenic. In this 
situation, gold in the rock is bonded within the sulphide ore and needs to be crushed then 
																																																								
2 Liza Piper, The Industrial Transformation of Subarctic Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008).  
3 Anne Dance, “Northern Reclamation in Canada: Contemporary Policy and Practice for New and Legacy 
Mines,” The Northern Review 41 (2015): 41-80. ; Liza Piper. The Industrial Transformation of Subarctic 
Canada.   
4 Rene Fumoleau, As Long as This Land Shall Last: A History of Treaty 8 and 11, 1870-1939 (Calgary: 
University of Calgary Press, 2004) 
5 Arn Keeling and John Sandlos, “Introduction: The Complex Legacy of Mining in Northern Canada,” in 
Mining and Communities in Northern Canada: History, Politics and Memory, ed. Arn Keeling and John 
Sandlos (Calgary: University of Calgary, 2015), 4.   
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roasted before being separated from the waste rock using cyanidation processes.6 At 
Giant, this process created an arsenic gas, which, when combined with oxygen and 
cooled, formed arsenic trioxide dust, a highly toxic form of arsenic that is odourless and 
tasteless.7 For the first three years of operation, 22 000 lbs. of arsenic trioxide dust was 
sent up the mine’s smokestack daily, which then dispersed across the local environment, 
collecting in lake sediments and pockets of soil between rocky outcrops.8  
 Soon after operations began, the potentially negative health effects of arsenic 
pollution became evident. Initially, the mining company and government thought that 
tailings dams and a tall roaster stack would be sufficient to eliminate health risks to the 
nearby communities. However, despite dams, tailings waste continued to flow into Baker 
Creek and Great Slave Lake, resulting in water pollution problems at both the Con and 
Giant mines.9 Arsenic trioxide dust from the smokestack collected in sediments, soils and 
on top of snow, rather than being dispersed or ‘flushed out’ by water flows. In the late 
																																																								
6 For more details on the crushing and cyanidation processes see: Ryan Silke, The Operational History of 
Mines in the Northwest Territories, Canada (Yellowknife: Northwest Territories Geoscience Office, 2009).  
7 Silke, The Operational History of Mines in the Northwest Territories.  
8 For early emissions data and the unregulated nature of emissions from 1949-51, see A. J. de Villiers and 
P.M. Baker, An Investigation of the Health Status of Inhabitants of Yellowknife, Northwest Territories 
(Ottawa: Occupational Health Division, Environmental Health Directorate, Department of Health and 
Welfare, 1970); There are also details about emissions data in correspondence from Dr. O. Schaefer, 
Northern Medical Research Unit to the Regional Director, Northern Region, National Health and Welfare 
(RG 29, vol. 2977, file 851-5-2, pt. 1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC): November 1971).  
9 John Sandlos and Arn Keeling, Giant Mine Historical Summary (August 8, 2012), 
http://www.reviewboard.ca/upload/project_document/ea0809-001_giant_mine__history_summary.pdf. A 
comprehensive overview of all these issues, including the prevalence of tailings spills, is contained in 
Villiers and Baker, An Investigation of the Health Status of Inhabitants of Yellowknife, and a report 
authored by the Canadian Public Health Association (CPHA), Task Force on Arsenic – Final Report, 
Yellowknife Northwest Territories (Ottawa: CPHA, 1977). The toxicity of these tailings overflows was 
documented in a federal Environmental Protection Service report: R.R. Wallace, M.J. Hardin and R.H. 
Weir, “Toxic Properties and Chemical Characteristics of Mining Effluents in the Northwest Territories,” 
EPS Report no. EPS-5-NW-75-4 (Department of the Environment, Feburary 1975). 
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1940s there were two recorded cases of arsenic poisoning,10 at which point two local 
doctors, Dr. Kingsley Kay and Dr. Oliver Stanton, expressed concerns about arsenic 
poisoning to government officials.11 The government and company did nothing until the 
death of a Dene child in April 1951 due to acute arsenic poisoning from drinking 
contaminated snowmelt water.12 At this time, the company was pressured by the federal 
government to investigate methods of pollution control.13 An electrostatic precipitator, 
which captured the arsenic trioxide dust before it entered the atmosphere, was not 
installed until six months after the death of the Dene child.14  
  The electrostatic precipitator did not entirely plug the flow of arsenic into the 
surrounding environment and created the new problem of having to manage the arsenic 
that was being collected.15 In the early 1950s, federal bureaucrats and mine managers 
discussed several options for managing the captured arsenic, including moving the arsenic 
waste to another site, sealing it in concrete containers, or refining it in such a way to make 
																																																								
10 In 1949 two workers at Akaitcho Mine receive treatment in hospital due to drinking contaminated 
snowmelt: see A. J. de Villiers and P.M. Baker, An Investigation of the Health Status of Inhabitants of 
Yellowknife; and Canadian Public Health Association (CPHA), Task Force on Arsenic – Final Report, 
Yellowknife Northwest Territories (Ottawa: CPHA, 1977). 
11 John Sandlos and Arn Keeling, Giant Mine: Historical Summary. There is key information on the first 
health survey and monitoring effort by Dr. Kingsley Kay in RG 85, vol. 40, file 139-7, pt. 1, LAC.  
12 The death of this Dene child was discussed at a meeting among government officials and Giant Mine 
managers held in Ottawa June 1st, 1951. The minutes are contained in the file RG 29, vol. 2977, file 851-5-
2, pt. 1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC).  The Yellowknives Dene First Nations say that there were 
other deaths and illness of both humans and animals throughout these decades. However, this was never 
officially confirmed or recorded by government regulators or the mining company. 
13 John Sandlos and Arn Keeling, “The Giant Mine’s Long Shadow: Arsenic Pollution and Native People in 
Yellowknife, Northwest Territories,” in Mining North America: An Environmental History Since 1522, ed. 
John R. McNeill and George Vrtis (Oakland, California: California University Press, 2017), 280-312.  
14 Details on the pollution control equipment at Con Mine and Giant Mine were found in W.H. Frost, Senior 
Medical Advisor, Medical Services Branch, National Health and Welfare, “Arsenic – Yellowknife,” 28 
October 1970, RG 29, vol. 2977, file 851-5-2, pt. 1, LAC. 
15 Matthew Mcclearn, “Mining: Shit Happens but You Move on,” Canadian Business (2009). 
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it chemically neutral.16 Similar options would again turn up in arsenic management 
studies and remediation options throughout the 1980s, 90s and 2000s.17 In a letter dated 
July 21, 1950, the Department of National Health and Welfare stated that it regarded the 
use of concrete vats on the surface as the safest method of storage, however it did not 
want to cause the company unnecessary expense and was open to other options.18 
Through experimentation and discussion with government regulators, the mine company 
determined that an underground storage method, using bunkers would be the most stable 
and cost effective, and that permafrost would help to stop water flow through the waste 
bunkers.19 Letters also outlined the government’s economic priorities and a certain 
willingness to bury the arsenic, contain it with permafrost, and forget about it.20  
  While the electrostatic precipitator reduced the amount of arsenic going up the 
Giant Mine roaster stack, lingering concerns about arsenic contamination prompted a 
survey by the federal Department of National Health and Welfare in 1955. Entitled, The 
Arsenic Problem at Yellowknife: A Report of Environmental and Medical Conditions, this 
survey included both environmental and medical assessments and it documented 
continued illnesses of workers and the deaths of cows and pets, despite pollution 																																																								
16 Letter from Giant Yellowknife Gold Mines Limited to Mr. G.E.B. Sinclair, Director, Northern 
Administration and Lands Branch, Department of Resources and Development, “Underground storage of 
Dry Arsenic-Trioxide” (February 24, 1951); Letter from Dr. Oliver L. Stanton to Mr. G.E.B. Sinclair 
Director, Northern Administration and Lands Branch, Department of Resources and Development, “RE: 
Arsenic disposal Giant Yellowknife Mines” (March 2, 1951).  
17 SRK Consulting Ltd., Final Report: Arsenic Trioxide Management Alternatives: Giant Mine, prepared 
for Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (December 2002).  
18 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada and the Government of the Northwest Territories, Giant Mine 
Remediation Developer’s Assessment Report, submitted to the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact 
Review Board as a part of the Giant Mine Remediation Project Environmental Assessment (EA0809-001, 
October 2010).  
19 Letter from Giant Yellowknife Gold Mines Limited to Mr. G.E.B. Sinclair, “Underground storage of Dry 
Arsenic-Trioxide.” 
20 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada and the Government of the Northwest Territories, Giant Mine 
Remediation Developer’s Assessment Report.  
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controls.21 In this survey, The Department of National Health and Welfare recommended 
that roasting at Giant Mine should be stopped until more adequate collection procedures 
could be installed, but this suggestion was blocked by the Northwest Territories Council 
and instead, focus was placed on installing additional pollution controls, while the mine 
continued to operate.22 In 1954 a second electrostatic precipitator was installed, collecting 
about 60 percent of the arsenic produced and reducing the dispersal of arsenic to 7250 lbs. 
per day.23 In 1958 a baghouse filtering system was installed in addition to the electrostatic 
precipitators, which reduced arsenic emissions to about 694 lbs. per day.24 The increased 
effectiveness of arsenic collection and the use of underground storage gave the 
impression that contamination was no longer a problem.25 
 This impression didn’t last long. Increased public concern in the early 1960s led to 
several tests and studies on arsenic pollution in the Yellowknife area.26 Instead of 
imposing pollution control regulations on the mining company, studies done throughout 
																																																								
21 Occupational Health Division, Department of National Health and Welfare, The Arsenic Problem at 
Yellowknife: A Report of Environmental and Medical Conditions (NWT Archives: September 1955).  
22 Kevin O’Reilly, “Liability, legacy, and perpetual care: Government ownership and management of the 
Giant mine, 1999-2015,” in Mining and Communities in Northern Canada: History, Politics and Memory, 
Mining and Communities in Northern Canada: History, Politics and Memory Mining and Communities in 
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23 Sandlos and Keeling, Giant Mine: Historical Summary; Devilliers, A.J. and Baker, P.M., An 
Investigation of the Health Status of Inhabitants of Yellowknife, NWT; Reference to the second ESP and its 
impact on emissions was found in D.A. Gemmill, “Yellowknife Environmental Survey: Summary Report,” 
(Ottawa: Environmental Protection Service, Department of the Environment, 1975), RG 29, vol. 2977, file 
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25 Sandlos and Keeling, Giant Mine: Historical Summary 
26 J.W. Grainge, Water Pollution, Yellowknife Bay, Yellowknife, NWT (Department of National Health and 
Welfare, 1963); J.W. Grainge, Arsenic Survey of Yellowknife Bay (Department of National Health and 
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the 1950s and 60s served only to “confirm the status quo of mining operations.”27 While 
these studies did find elevated levels of arsenic in water sources and the surrounding 
environment, little action was taken besides warning residents to wash produce. There 
was little follow-up or communication of findings to the community regarding scientific 
health and environment studies. One health study done between 1967-1969 by the 
Department of National Health and Welfare was not publically released until 1971, 
causing people to suspect the government of secrecy and conspiracy.28 Eventually, in 
1969, the City’s water intake pipeline was moved to the mouth of the Yellowknife River, 
upstream from the Giant Mine. However, City water was not available in Dettah, the 
Dene community across the Bay from Yellowknife.29  
 Despite early evidence of pollution and negative health effects, the Department of 
National Health and Welfare and the mining company initially did little to warn locals or 
to prevent ongoing pollution. The lack of immediate action after the death of this Dene 
child illustrated the limited concern for the health and safety of First Nations who relied 
on local water sources and underscores the Yellowknives Dene First Nation’s feeling of 
mistrust towards the mining industry and regulatory agencies. Arguably, the Giant Mine 
Monster was created when the government and company ignored initial concerns from 
local physicians, setting a precedent that resulted in the death of the Dene boy and 
allowed the mining company to continue polluting. These early health incidents and a 																																																								
27 Sandlos and Keeling, Giant Mine: Historical Summary, 10.  
28 Devilliers, A.J. and Baker, P.M., An Investigation of the Health Status of Inhabitants of Yellowknife, 
taken from: Sandlos and Keeling, Giant Mine: Historical Summary, 11. 
29 The Department of Health and Welfare paid for this pipeline. Today, the federal government refuses to 
pay for the City of Yellowknife to have the pipeline replaced. The City of Yellowknife will have to either 
pay for the pipeline itself, or take water from Great Slave Lake. This is an ongoing point of contention 
between the City, the GMRPT and INAC. See City of Yellowknife, “Municipal Services Committee 
Report: Meeting Minutes” (June 27, 2016).  
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lack of government and company transparency created a monster of mistrust even before 
the arsenic trioxide was put underground. Concrete evidence of health effects are difficult 
to come by over the following decades, but throughout the 50s and 60s, there are 
continual oral references to negative health effects for humans and animals.30 These 
environmental injustices have yet to be resolved for the Yellowknives Dene First Nations 
and Yellowknifers.  
 
1970s-1980s: Increasing Environmental Awareness and Concern  
 Throughout the 70s and 80s, North Americans became increasingly aware of the 
environmental, health and safety risks associated with mining waste.31 In Canada, many 
mines that opened in the first half of the 20th century without strict environmental 
regulations began shutting down, and governments were forced to think of ways to handle 																																																								
30 Several incidents are outlined in Sandlos and Keeling, Giant Mine: Historical Summary. There is a 
reference to arsenic related illness in an "indigent Indian" named Henry Lafferty in 1953 contained in a 
memo from P.E. Moore, Director of Indian Health Services, to L.I. Pugsley (Laboratory Services, 
November 1953), RG 85, vol. 40, file 139-7, pt. 1, LAC.  Several oral interviews recall the death of 
domestic animals at the Bevan farm in the early 1940s due to water pollution from Con Mine. See Susan 
Jackson, Yellowknife, NWT: An Illustrated History (Sechelt, B.C: Nor’West Pub., 1990); Ronne Heming 
and Terry Foster, Yellowknife Tales: Sixty Years of Stories from Yellowknife (Yellowknife: Outcrop 
Limited, 2000) 97-98. In 1978 a doctor recalled treating several "middle-aged Indians" in 1957-58 for 
several arsenic-related skin conditions and anemia. The specific references to skin conditions such as 
keratosis, hyperpigmentation, and parenthesias were found in a memo from Dr. O. Schaeffer to Dr. B. 
Wheatley, Environmental Contaminant Program, Medical Services Branch, Health and Welfare Canada 
(NWT Archives, May, 1 1978). Oral history recollections of deaths can be found in YKDFN Elders 
Advisory Council, Weledeh Yellowknives Dene: A History (Dettah: 1997). See also Fred Sangris, Isadore 
Tsetta, and Michelle Paper, Evidence, Parliamentary Hearings on Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 
11 May, 1995 http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/hoc/archives/committee/351/sust/evidence/122_95-05-
11/sust122_blk-e.html#0.1.SUST122.000001.AA1040.A 
31 Increasing influence of environmentalist scholarship such as Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring Houghton 
Mifflin: U.S (1962); D.E. Hockley and L.C. Hockley, “Some Histories of Mine Closure, the Idea,” Mine 
Closure Conference, (Vancouver: InfoMine Inc., 2015); The Bureau of Land Management, Forest Service, 
“Abandoned Mine Lands: A Decade of Progress Reclaiming Hardrock Mines,” (2007); John Wirth, Smelter 
Smoke in North America (Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2000); Arn Keeling and John Sandlos, 
“Pollution, Local Activism, and the Politics of Development in the Canadian North,” in “Environmental 
Knowledge, Environmental Politics,” edited by Jonathan Clapperton and Liza Piper, RCC Perspectives: 
Transformations in Environment and Society, no. 4 (2016): 25-32.  
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these liabilities.32 This increased focus on the clean up of contaminated sites followed the 
rise of environmentalism in the 1960s and 70s and the creation of environmental 
protection laws, water licensing bodies and other regulatory mechanisms across Canada.33 
In 1972, the Northern Inland Waters Act was introduced to govern the use of water in the 
Canadian Territories. This Act resulted in the creation of the Northwest Territories Land 
and Water Board, which regulated mining in the NWT through water licenses and 
provided opportunities for public hearings.34 However, the Northern Inland Waters Act 
failed to define expectations or guidelines for closure, abandonment or restoration, 
making it more difficult for communities to hold companies to any kind of remediation 
standard. 
 Due to new regulations, the majority of scientific and regulatory research at Giant 
throughout the 70s and 80s focused on tailings containment and water management, with 
less attention given to the underground arsenic or potential mine closure strategies.35 
																																																								
32 Examples in Canada include Sydney, Sudbury, Britannia, Port Radium. In the late 90s and early 2000s, 
examples include Colomac Mine, Faro Mine, and Giant Mine. Major examples in the US include Superfund 
sites. The initiation of Superfund programs in the United States in the 1980s was a major turning point or 
the recognition and restoration of toxic sites on a large-scale, federal level. See David Brooks, Restoring the 
Shining Waters: Superfund Success at Milltown, Montana, (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 
2015).  
33 The Environmental Contaminants Act was introduced in 1975. See also: Dance, “Northern Reclamation 
in Canada;” Steve Roberts, Marcello Veiga, and Carlos Peiter, “Overview of Mine-Closure and 
Reclamation in the Americas Executive Summary,” Mine-closure and Reclamation Bibliographic Database 
Project for the International Development Research Center (Canada, October 2000); J.F. Castrilli, “Control 
of Toxic Chemicals in Canada: An Analysis of Law and Policy,” Osgoode Hall Law Journal 20, no. 2 
(1982): 322-401. 
34 The Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry, or Berger Inquiry, beginning in 1974 set an important precedent 
for public hearings and community involvement in resource development in the North. See Carly Dokis, 
Where the Rivers Meet: Pipelines, Participatory Resource Management and Aboriginal-State Relations in 
the Northwest Territories (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2015). 	
35 Water monitoring began in 1973 under the Water Management Section of the Department of Indian and 
Northern Affairs. See Ron Wallace, M. J. Hardin, Chemical and Biological Characteristics of Seepages 
from Tailings Areas at Giant Mine Yellowknife Mines, Ltd., into Great Slave Lake, Northwest Territories in 
1974 (Environment Canada, 1974); B. Berube, Frenette, M., Gilbert, C. Anctil, “Studies of Mine Waste 
Containment at Two Sites Near Yellowknife, NWT” (ALUR Report Number 72-73-32 1973); M. Roy, P. 
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Several studies produced throughout the 70s concluded that pollution had occurred and 
that there was a potential for water contamination through the tailings. One Environment 
Canada report on the mine waste seepage from the tailings ponds recommended that the 
tailings disposal system be upgraded, that all wastes be treated, that continual monitoring 
of the site be put in place, and finally that a study should be implemented to investigate 
the historical impact of emissions and effluent from the mine site on the surrounding 
environment.36 While tailings dams were added and reinforced, little was done to follow 
up on these recommendations. The construction of a water treatment plant was delayed 
and the mining company did not receive any consequences for not completing it on 
time.37 Throughout this period government responsibility for regulating spills and 
contamination continued to be uncertain and the NWT Land and Water Board continually 
forgave water license violations.38 As many locals pointed out in public hearings, 
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(ALUR Report Number 72-73-31, 1973).  
36 Ron Wallace, M. J. Hardin, Chemical and Biological Characteristics of Seepages from Tailings Areas at 
Giant Mine; Ron Wallace, M. J. Hardin, Toxic Properties and Chemical Characteristics of Mining Effluents 
in the Northwest Territories, (Environment Canada, February, 1975).  
37 Fisheries Act (1985), the Clean Air Act, the Ocean Dumping Act, the Canada Water Act, and the 
Canadian Environmental Protection Act (1988); The 1981 license required that a water treatment plant be 
implemented, see: Kevin O’Reilly, “Liability, legacy, and perpetual care: Government ownership and 
management of the Giant mine, 1999-2015,” in Mining and Communities in Northern Canada: History, 
Politics and Memory, ed. Arn Keeling and John Sandlos, (Calgary, Alberta: University of Calgary Press, 
2015). 
38 Northwest Territories Land and Water Board, “Public Hearing: Application for Water License Renewal 
by Giant Yellowknife Mines Limited,” License No. N1L30043 (Yellowknife, NWT, January 27, 1981); 
Northwest Territories Land and Water Board, “Public Hearing on an Application by Giant Yellowknife 
Mines Ltd. Yellowknife Operations to Renew Water License N1L3-0043,” (Yellowknife, NWT, November 
27, 1985). See also compliance reports and spill reports from the 1980s: J. Redburn and A. MacDonald, 
“Report on the Compliance of Giant Yellowknife Mines Limited with Water License N1L3-0043,” (NWT 
Land and Water Board Archives, Nov. 27, 1985).  
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governance over such failures, and assurance of financial security if something did go 
wrong, was continually lacking.39   
 In addition to the increased level of scientific scrutiny on water management, an 
important aspect of the Northern Inland Waters Act was the public hearing process for 
water licenses.40 Despite a promise of transparency, such boards perpetuated colonial 
power structures and environmental injustices, allowing only certain types of questioning 
that catered to the mining company, the government and economic development.41 In 
addition, these hearings tended to focus on tailings and water management. Community 
fears about the arsenic underground were continually overlooked, as the government and 
mine experts assured the community that the underground storage system was technically 
sound. 
 Testifying at the 1974-75 Water Board hearings, Jerry Sutton, the legal advisor for 
the Indian Brotherhood, an Indigenous rights advocacy organization, highlighted the 
issues of colonial power dynamics in government regulation in the North: 
 The record of the Mining Industry in Yellowknife patently demonstrates that 
government responsibility has been lacking. The fact that deaths have occurred 
shows not only irresponsibility, but frightening negligence on the part of the 
government. This becomes all the more serious when it is noted that one of the 
government agencies involved, The Department of Indian Affairs, has as its 
responsibility the welfare of the Indian people. This leads, in turn, to the question 
of the role of the Water Board. How can the Native people, or any interested party 
for that matter, expect any meaningful regulation of the Mining Industry in 
Yellowknife if the very government departments which are guilty of allowing 
pollution to occur in the past, make up the Water Board? As such, it is impossible 
to feel secure and confident that the Water Board would be that interested in 																																																								
39 Northwest Territories Land and Water Board, “Public Hearing: Application for Water License Renewal 
by Giant Yellowknife Mines Limited,” License No. N1L30043 (Yellowknife, NWT, January 27, 1981);   
40 This also occurred in the context of the Berger Inquiry public hearings, beginning in 1974: Thomas 
Berger, Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland: The Report of the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry 
(Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1977).  
41 Dokis, Where the Rivers Meet.  
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having a full and open inquiry…. What is the role of the Water Board? Is it to give 
licenses to pollute?42 
 
This quote highlights ongoing public calls to limit the conflict of interest between 
government, regulators and industry, and to take responsibility for the wastes of industrial 
production and environmental injustices against local First Nations. Sutton also 
questioned the Board’s own authority, saying, “under what authority was Giant Mine first 
established and what authority gave them the right to use water in the manner that they 
have been doing since 1948.”43 The Board deemed this question irrelevant to the hearing 
process.   
 The 1975 hearings also highlighted the conflict of different knowledges and 
perspectives regarding the Giant Mine. Tapwe Chretien, a Yellowknife community 
member critiqued the companies presentations and studies, saying that there were no 
human values involved: “They’re just figures, numbers, maps, you show maps… This is a 
moral issue we are facing.44 Emphasizing the importance of morals, values and local 
knowledge, Chief Beaver stated: “All our basis that you base your facts on are from down 
South. Why don’t we base our facts from the facts that are here? Let us make our own 
facts. Let the people of the Northwest Territories make their facts of how the Mine should 
operate.”45  
 In response to public concern throughout the 1970s and 80s about the arsenic 
being stored underground, experts and mine employees presented technical evidence that 																																																								
42 Northwest Territories Land and Water Board, “Giant Yellowknife Mines Ltd. Public Hearing Under the 
Northern Inland Waters Act” (Yellowknife, NWT, April 22, 1975), 15.   
43 Northwest Territories Land and Water Board, “Public Hearing, Giant Yellowknife Mines Ltd.” 
(Yellowknife, NWT, October 10, 1974), 13.   
44 Ibid., 21.  
45 Ibid., 46.  
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emphasized the use of the best available science and technology. For example, in 1975, 
when Chretien asked the mining company how they could be sure that the permafrost 
wouldn’t melt and that water wouldn’t come into contact with the underground arsenic, A 
mine employee, responded:  
 Easy. The storage chambers have been carefully chosen by our Engineers and 
have been approved by the Mines Inspection Branch… We are using the best 
Engineering Technology available to ensure that the arsenic stored is in a safe 
place… We can’t visualize a significant change in climate that would change the 
permafrost level.46 
 
This was in fact untrue. Since the implementation of underground storage in the 1950s, 
there was continual disagreement as to whether the permafrost would in fact keep the 
arsenic contained. For example, in an internal memorandum in May 1973, the Mining 
Inspector presented evidence of permafrost thawing throughout the mine workings at 
depths up to 50 feet and questioned the continued presence of permafrost at the Giant 
Mine, recommending that the mine should not be allowed to flood if it closed.47 
According to historical research done for the Final Arsenic Management Alternatives 
Plan in 2002, “by the end of the 70s, there was strong observational evidence that 
permafrost in the arsenic storage areas was receding and the movement of groundwater in 
these areas was increasing.”48 In the 1975 public hearing, when questioned about the 																																																								
46 Ibid., 39.  
47 Erland Bengts, Mining Inspector, “Government of Canada Memorandum,” to N.L. Brown, Mining 
Engineer, in Appendix E, “Government Memos on Arsenic Storage in Yellowknife,” in “Document 
released by the National Indian Brotherhood, the United Steel Workers of America and the University of 
Toronto on January 15, 1977,” unpublished manuscript, Canadian Circumpolar Institute Library. A research 
program to monitor permafrost was not established until the mid 1990s, when temperature measurement 
devices were installed in several new drill holes. By the end of the 1970s there was strong observational 
evidence that permafrost in the arsenic storage areas was receding and the movement of groundwater in 
these areas was increasing. See: SRK Inc., “Final Report: Arsenic Trioxide Management Alternatives: 
Giant Mine,” prepared for the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (Yellowknife, 
December, 2002), 28. 
48 SRK Inc., “Final Report: Arsenic Trioxide Management Alternatives: Giant Mine,” 28. 
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levels of arsenic, the company continually responded that the mine was within the 
acceptable limits and the arsenic was being safely stored underground, to which 
community members generally responded that it was not in fact acceptable, because they 
were uncomfortable. The community was promised that the permafrost would keep them 
safe; that promise was broken.  
  Another reoccurring problem highlighted in the 1978 and 1981 public hearing 
was financial security in case of mine closure. According to the 1981 water license, a 
financial bond of $150 000 dollars was required. In the 1981 public hearings, John Bayley 
asked if this had in fact been posted as required by the license and wondered what this 
money would be used for; he asked how this amount was determined?49 Answers to 
questions about financial securities were consistently vague and it is unclear if the 
financial bond was actually posted, or how the amount was determined. 
 While scientific research on human and environmental health was increasing 
throughout the 1970s, not all community members agreed with the methods or results of 
these studies. After the results of a 1975 health study failed to include First Nations 
people, the National Indian Brotherhood and the United Steelworkers Union 
commissioned an independent study. This study showed high levels of arsenic in humans, 
contradicting earlier government studies and spurring further accusations of cover-ups 
and lies.50 Many community members argued that arsenic was a known carcinogen and 
no amount should be a safe amount. In response, in 1977 the Canadian Public Health 																																																								
49 Northwest Territories Land and Water Board, “Public Hearing: Application for Water License Renewal 
by Giant Yellowknife Mines Limited,” License No. N1L30043 (Yellowknife, NWT, January 27, 1981), 58.  
50 “Document released by the National Indian Brotherhood, the United Steel Workers of America and the 
University of Toronto on January 15, 1977,” unpublished manuscript, Canadian Circumpolar Institute 
Library. 
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Association Task Force on Arsenic was established to assess the effects of arsenic on 
Yellowknife inhabitants. The task force was to recommend any remedial action that 
needed to take place. Suggestions included everything from washing vegetables and 
berries thoroughly to continuing to increase emission control measures. However, it 
concluded that there were no significant health impacts on the nearby community and 
storage underground was considered acceptable. Backed with results that stated that 
effects were confined to workplace exposure, in public hearings and water licenses, 
government regulators and the mining company dismissed the concerns of the National 
Indian Brotherhood and the local community and continually referenced the Task Force’s 
approval of the underground storage as proof that this approach was best practice. 
 Throughout public hearings, the mine employees, technical experts and board 
members usually politely dismissed questions about community engagement and local 
values, saying ‘thank-you for your comments’ or simply stating that such issues were 
outside of the scope for the water licensing process, for example:  
 The board has substantial powers but can use them only to conserve, develop and 
use the water resource of the Northwest Territories. Political, social, economic and 
other concerns which arise from a water use proposal are beyond the Board’s 
scope and must be dealt with in other forums.51 
 
There were no other processes to raise political and social issues, and by dismissing these 
concerns the Land and Water Board implied that these questions were illegitimate. Calls 
to engage with the local community, to recognize government responsibility for historical 
contamination, and to implement some kind of independent oversight have echoed 
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throughout the past few decades and later became an important part of community 
concerns during early remediation planning.  
 Following public hearings in 1974-1975 and 1981, water licenses were issued in 
1978 and 1982.52 The 1978 water license included the first documented ‘Rehabilitation 
Program.’53 The use of the word rehabilitation highlights the idea that the company was 
focused on returning or gaining some kind of economic value from the site. This program 
separated rehabilitation strategies into two sections, underground and surface, and 
focused on creating an inventory of the site. After mining ceased, permafrost would be re-
established and would contain the arsenic trioxide underground. The underground would 
be sealed off and allowed to flood. Surface structures would be sold off or demolished. In 
general, the plan stated that all areas would be restored to “as much possible a natural 
type condition,”54 but the plan failed to give any details on how this would be done. 
Instead, this plan focused heavily on estimating the economic value of materials and 
equipment, detailed down to the furniture in the residences, the copper wiring in buildings 
and any piping or other material that might have been of value.  
 An Abandonment and Restoration (A&R) plan was published in 1985 as a part of 
the water license stipulations.55 This plan outlined three stages of closure, which were 
used throughout subsequent A&R plans. In the first stage, the mine closed due to low 
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54 Ibid., 1.  
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profits, but re-opening was seen as a foreseeable possibility. In this stage, everything 
would stay in place while monitoring, dewatering and water treatment would continue 
until the mine was again economically viable or moved to stage two. Stage two was 
extended closure, where mine openings would be sealed off and surface extraction 
facilities would be ‘moth balled.’ Shut down was rarely considered permanent. Stage two 
also focused on securing the economic value of the site. In the 1981 public hearing, when 
asked by a community member if the company had any plans to set aside the resources to 
ensure that reclamation could be accomplished, Ken Blower, a Giant Mine employee, 
responded that the value from the salvaged equipment and material would help to cover 
the costs of clean-up, in addition to the value of infrastructure on site.56   
 Stage three occurred when the mine was no longer economically profitable and 
facilities were not being used. According to the 1985 A&R plan, stage 3 focused on the: 
  objective of restoring lands utilized to a condition resembling a natural ecological 
condition suitable for supporting local fauna. Physical disturbance of land would 
be covered to reduce further degradation as a result of erosional forces. Vegetation 
cover is considered the most suitable.57  
 
The two major aspects of stage three were: “to reduce the interim period of continued 
degradation and unsightliness” and “to initiate and accelerate the process of continuous 
natural recovery.”58 The company argued that nature could be restored to a condition 
resembling the original, and that it would continually recover once the initial restoration 
efforts were initiated. Rehabilitation planning focused on covering up and plugging the 
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holes, revegetating and leaving nature to ‘take care of itself.’ The prospect of perpetual 
monitoring and care was not acknowledged in any stages of this plan.  
 In addition, the 1985 A&R plan still rested on the fundamental idea that 
permafrost could be reintroduced to deal with the arsenic chambers. The mining company 
relied on the Federal CPHA Task Force on Arsenic’s Final Report in 1977 to support its 
decision to contain the waste underground. Little new research was published on the 
soundness of this decision in preparation for the A&R plan in 1985. In fact, the mining 
company planned to recover the stored arsenic prior to abandonment and purify and sell it 
alongside all the other equipment and salvageable items, essentially ‘re-commodifying’ 
the waste.59 In the 1985 A&R plan, the mining company does take responsibility for the 
underground mine waste, saying:  
 In general it could be said that Giant recognizes its responsibilities and liabilities 
for the careless use of chemicals. If runoff waters get polluted the company 
remains responsible but it is expected that if any problems exist, they will be 
identified long before abandonment.60  
 
The company wasn’t in fact held responsible for contamination and the permafrost did 
not come back. 
 While scientific research on water management increased throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s, this did not necessarily translate into company policy, practice or remediation 
planning. The intent of the 1978 and 1982 remediation plans was quite ambiguous and 
allowed for a lot of different outcomes. While the mining company committed itself to 
restoring aesthetic and environmental value to the site, they glossed over the details. The 																																																								
59 Arn Keeling, “Mineral Waste,” in SAGE Encyclopedia of Consumption and Waste: the social science of 
garbage (California, U.S: SAGE Publications, 2012), 553. 
60 Giant Yellowknife Mines Limited, “Abandonment and Restoration Plan for Yellowknife Division 
Operations,” (October 16, 1985), 18. 
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language used ranged from restoring all areas to “a condition that, as closely as practical, 
duplicates natural environmental conditions and is aesthetically pleasing” or “to leave 
facilities that can be used by the general public for recreation purposes,” or “to leave 
areas in their present condition if we have been requested to do so.”61 The 1978 plan 
claimed that after a year of improved water management around Baker Creek the 
“vegetation is lush and green… and is growing right to the waters edge. Two more run off 
seasons will clean the Creek and restore it to its natural condition.”62 Both plans 
concluded that life would once again inhabit the area when water quality improved, which 
would happen naturally over time.63  
 In a written submission to a public hearing in 1985, the Dene Nation questioned 
the previous 1982 Abandonment and Restoration plan, stating:  
 The company concludes that this Abandonment and Restoration Plan… is not ‘a 
statement of fixed intentions.’ What degree of commitment is there to this plan? 
The Dene Nation feels that the abandonment plan should be accompanied by a 
financial bond large enough to ensure that the proposed activities will be 
undertaken and completed upon abandonment.64  
 
As highlighted in this statement, the mining company put little serious thought put into 
long-term planning or remediation funding. Well into the 1990s, details in closure plans 
were carried over from one plan to the next without much additional research or 
information provided.  																																																								
61 Ibid 
62 Ibid.  
63 The plans referenced the following study as proof that nature would return to its previous state: James 
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 Throughout the this period, despite the fact that the NWT Land and Water Board 
was created, the increase in research, regulation and bureaucracy did little to address 
community concerns about responsibility, transparent communication, financial security, 
cumulative arsenic contamination or mine closure. Public hearings operated within a 
colonial structure that favoured industry and economy over local concerns. The NWT 
Land and Water Board provided no mechanism or regulations to hold companies 
responsible to clean up or to engage communities in these kinds of decisions.  
 
1990s: Protest and Bankruptcy 
 Throughout the 1990s there were several important developments in the 
Northwest Territories and Canada more generally that contributed to more robust 
environmental policy regime. In the Northwest Territories, increased environmental 
regulations coincided with the move towards devolution from the federal government. 
Specifically, in the Northwest Territories, the development of modern diamond mines 
initiated a new push for increased regulation and impact benefit agreements. While the 
diamond mines were being developed, communities across the NWT continually 
referenced Giant Mine as something that should never happen again.65  New 
environmental regulations in the NWT included the creation of the Mackenzie Valley 
Resource Management Act (1998), which lead to the initiation of the Mackenzie Valley 
Land and Water Board and the Environmental Impact Review Board. Federally, increased 
environmental concern was expressed through the update of the Canadian Environmental 																																																								
65 Ellen Bielawski, Rogue Diamonds (New York: Dougals and McIntyre, 2003). For a critique of diamond 
mining and impact benefits agreements in the NWT and Northern Canada, see: Rebecca Hall, “Diamond 
Mining in Canada’s Northwest Territories: A Colonial Continuity,” Antipode 45, no. 2 (2013).  
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Protection Act (1999).66 In regards to mining, these updated regulations focused on 
evaluating impacts during operation and did not directly address remediation or 
responsibility for waste after mine closure.67   
  Throughout the 1990s, the majority of contention regarding the Giant Mine was 
caused by the new mine owner, Royal Oak, who purchased the Giant Mine in 1990.68 
Many contemporary negative associations with the mine come from company-community 
interactions during the time of Royal Oak’s ownership. The most notable incident was the 
workers strike in 1992.69 Royal Oak refused to negotiate with employees, and instead 
brought in replacement workers from elsewhere and continued operations. Roger Warren, 
a disgruntled mine employee, planted a bomb in the mine, killing nine temporary mine 
workers.70 These negative memories are attached to the mine site and are often brought 
up when discussing remediation or the history of Giant Mine: “I was here in town the day 
the miners were all killed and you know, it was a very memorable experience. I wouldn’t 
wish it upon anyone.”71  
 In addition, many community members felt that Royal Oak was not a cooperative 
or responsible mining company.72 For example, in 1993, as a part of a public hearing 
submission to the NWT Land and Water Board, Clark Marcino, a concerned Yellowknife 																																																								
66 Diana Valiela & Christopher Baldwin, (2007), “Dealing with Mining Legacy – Some Canadian 
Approaches,” Lawson Lundell LLP (2007).  
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citizen, emphasized Royal Oak’s, “production at any cost attitude,”73 and after listing the 
various suits and charges against Royal Oak at the time, Mr. Marcino stated that, “all 
these issues should be considered when the water board decides if Royal Oak has earned 
the right to any breaks or concessions.”74 Throughout public hearings, several community 
members reminded the Land and Water Board that their decisions were political, and that 
they were empowered to protect the community, rather than facilitate the profits of Royal 
Oak.75 Royal Oak continued to operate within the precedents of limited transparency and 
concern for community health that had been set in the early days of the mine. 
 Royal Oak published Abandonment and Restoration (A&R) plans in 1992, 1994 
and 1998, alongside renewals of their water license. The 1992 plan was very similar to 
plans published by the previous mine owner in 1980s and focused on securing economic 
value, with a vague objective to “enhance the natural recovery of areas affected by 
mining activities.”76 Royal Oak was hesitant to carry out any restoration practices that 
might inhibit future mining prospects.77 The focus on aesthetics and the goal of zero 
ongoing maintenance was emphasized more heavily throughout the 1992 report than in 
previous plans. Royal Oak also planned to recreate permafrost around the tailings ponds 
by covering them with thick, insulating rock covers, in addition to sealing off the 																																																								
73 Clark Marcino, “Public Hearing Submission to the NWT Land and Water Board on the application of 
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underground arsenic chambers, rendering both the tailings ponds and the underground 
arsenic “chemically inactive.”78 The 1992 remediation plan did not include any additional 
research on the continued effectiveness of containing the underground arsenic in 
permafrost. Royal Oak predicted that monitoring or maintenance would only be necessary 
for a few years after abandonment was complete.79  
  Following the 1994 water license renewal,80 the Canadian Environmental 
Protection Act identified the arsenic trioxide found at Giant as a toxic substance that 
required immediate action to reduce exposure.81 In 1995 the Parliamentary Standing 
Committee on the Environment and Sustainable Development recommended that 
Environment Canada identify what action it would take at Giant by the end of the year to 
remedy the arsenic contamination and storage. This Committee was particularly 
concerned with the perceptions of arsenic among the Yellowknives Dene. Public 
consultations and testimony from elders revealed a “loss in confidence in the 
government’s ability to protect their environment and health. Nowhere was this loss of 
trust more apparent than on the issues of arsenic pollution.”82 In August 1995 the 
Yellowknife City Council adopted a motion asking the federal and territorial governments 																																																								
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Royal Oak Mines Ltd., “Application for and Amendment of the Water Use License N1L3-0043 The 
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to “take immediate steps to introduce enforceable, binding regulations dealing with 
sulphur dioxide and arsenic.”83 In response the territorial and federal governments 
organized a task force for pollution management, culminating in a workshop in July 1997, 
which ended in recommendations for an agreement between Royal Oak and the 
government to impose a reduction in arsenic emissions and to monitor and reduce the 
discharge of sulphur dioxide.84 In response, Royal Oak openly threatened to shut down 
the mine if such regulations were enforced. Nothing further happened and the ultimate 
solution was to wait for the mine to shut down.85 
 At this same time, DIAND, anticipating Royal Oak’s inability to comply with the 
original terms of its 1994 water license, began its own studies on the underground arsenic 
in preparation for a 1998 water license renewal and public hearing.86 In 1997, DIAND 
contracted Dillon Consulting Ltd. to draft a report outlining possible options for how to 
deal with the arsenic contamination. This report, released in October 1997, included 
several management options with costs ranging from 10 million to 1.2 billion.87 Technical 
meetings to review this report were held in October 1997 with representatives from the 
GNWT, the City of Yellowknife, the federal government and several university 
researchers attending, but no representatives from the Yellowknives Dene or other 
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community groups were invited.88 This technical workshop included discussions about 
the public perception of waste and the environmental justice issues associated with 
moving waste elsewhere. However, issues of public perception were clearly seen as an 
education problem. In other words, the community just needed to be educated about 
arsenic rather than actually engaged in the remediation process.  
 The Dillon report was critical because it was the first to openly acknowledge that 
reintroducing permafrost was not likely to contain the arsenic indefinitely. In addition, the 
report argued that: “The relative uncertainty of the world arsenic trioxide market and the 
presence of arsenic in waste streams from any purification processes may require 
development of a process to stabilize arsenic trioxide for long term storage.”89 The Dillon 
report outlined four strategies for arsenic management: underground storage, 
transportation to surface, processing to upgrade and processing to stabilize. The 
underground storage option was seen as the cheapest and, although human health risks 
were predicted to be low, environmental/ecological health risk was rate medium, and 
long-term liability risks were rated high.90 The report concluded that, under the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act:  
 If the project is deemed to have an effect on the environment including effect or 
change on: health and socio-economic conditions; physical and cultural heritage; 
current use of land and resources; the land, water and air; organic and inorganic 
matter and living organisms and interacting natural systems, a comprehensive 
study may be required.91  
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Thus, in the 1990s, there were early indications that planning for arsenic management, 
closure and restoration would have to go through environmental review. However, the 
federal project team later avoided such an approach.  
 Along with the Dillon report, in November of 1997, Brodie Consulting published 
a Report of Giant Mine Closure Cost Estimate, which “characterized the financial liability 
associated with the ultimate closure of the mine.”92 This report indicated multiple 
shortcomings with the 1992 and 1994 A&R plans. Such shortcomings included a lack of 
planning for water management and the stability of tailings impoundments, or for the 
clean up of tailings in Yellowknife Bay and Baker Creek. This report also pointed out that 
Royal Oak had failed to meet the Land and Water Board’s request in July of 1996 to 
provide concrete remediation options and maps depicting areas of contamination as a part 
of water license updates. In general, there was a growing concern that the use of 
permafrost to contain the arsenic would not be sufficient and according to Brodie 
Consulting, “consequently it is probable that any closure option which relies upon sub-
zero temperature to prevent migration of arsenic will require perpetual intervention.”93 
This is the first time the reality of a perpetual care situation is openly recognized. Finally, 
the Brodie report noted that, “the amount for monitoring and maintenance would be 
required in cash as part of the reclamation security so that the fund for perpetual 
operations could be established.”94  
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 While the Dillon and Brodie reports showcased the growing concern about the 
perpetual contamination problem at Giant, much of the information presented in these 
reports was not reflected in Royal Oak’s subsequent 1998 A&R plan. The objectives of 
this plan remained similar to past plans, focusing on: public health liabilities, enhancing 
natural recovery, minimizing requirements for long term care, and returning the site to an 
aesthetically acceptable condition. The plan included an extensive description of the site 
and the history of mining there, but did not mention community relations or social and 
political history. In contrast to the Dillon and Brodie reports, Royal Oak stated that, “the 
dry arsenic trioxide does not pose a significant risk to the environment, provided the 
underground workings are dewatered.”95 Containing the arsenic underground relied on a 
perpetual care plan, something that the company was hoping to avoid, and they therefore 
favoured alternatives based on waste removal. According to Royal Oak, removal options 
included: storage in a suitable facility, the conversion to ferric arsenate (a less toxic state), 
or the conversion and upgrade of arsenic into a usable form that could be sold. According 
to Royal Oak, “of these three options, the first two appear to have relatively high 
technical, environmental and/or economic risks.”96 Therefore, Royal Oak focused efforts 
on the third option, which appeared to have the most manageable risks. The Brodie 
Consulting report disagreed, stating the sale of arsenic was not economically viable, and 
some kind of long-term care and management would be required for residues and other 
contaminated soils.  
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  Leading up to the bankruptcy of Royal Oak in 1999, it was clear that all levels of 
government were unprepared to pressure the company into compliance with pollution 
controls or remediation planning and were focused on ensuring the continued operations 
of the mine.97 Despite suspicions that the mine would soon close, in 1998 the Land and 
Water Board renewed Royal Oak’s water license with a requirement to submit a full 
arsenic management plan by October 1999. Financial securities remained the same 
($400,000), but were to gradually increase to $7 million at the end of the term of the 
license. When Royal Oak went bankrupt the money wasn’t there and the arsenic 
management plan wasn’t finished. Falling ore prices were used as an excuse for slow 
action and limited funds put towards closure plans.98 After Royal Oak Mines Inc. filed for 
bankruptcy in February 1999, Miramar, the owner of the nearby Con Mine, was 
contracted by the federal government as an interim-receiver and was allowed to continue 
mining operations. When it could no longer cover the costs of mining, Miramar 
relinquished the property to DIAND on June 30, 2005.99 Permitting to allow for the 
complete decommissioning and remediation of the Giant Mine property then commenced 
and has yet to be finalized 12 years later. 
  
Conclusions 
 Piper compares industrial processes to bodily processes: “ores were the principle 
inputs, digested through the actions of industrial workers and machines, powered by fossil 
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fuels, and culminating in the production of wastes…”100 These wastes stayed in place, 
creating legacies in the waters and on the land, while the end products were shipped 
elsewhere: “This final divorcing of end products from local nature reflected the 
prerogatives and objectives of international capital rather than the inevitable 
consequences of industrial technologies and fuels.”101 At the Giant Mine, the majority of 
the people controlling mining, conducting research and making decisions were far away 
from the actual site, or did not live there year round. Decisions made from afar, based on 
abstractions that emphasized chemistry, geology and other scientific data over the 
relationships between different species proved inadequate, leading to environmental and 
social degradation. The traditional lands of the YKDFN were seen as lands that could be 
‘wasted,’ and in turn, the YKDFN were seen as people who could be ‘wasted.’102 
 This history of industrial, technocratic-based decision-making carried over into 
planning for remediation, restoration and long-term care. A lack of government regulation 
and enforcement was a key facilitator in allowing arsenic contamination at Giant.103 
Before the 1970s there were few regulations regarding mine environmental 
contamination, mine closure or remediation. Those that did exist focused on worker 
health risks.104 In addition, while regulations were introduced over the years, they were 
not necessarily enforced. It is evident through the Giant Mine public hearings since the 
1970s that the community was often at odds with regulators, scientists and mine 
management: people who were not from their community, and did not understand or 																																																								
100 Liza Piper, The Industrial Transformation of Subarctic Canada (UBC Press: Vancouver, 2009), 284. 
101 Ibid., 285.  
102 Voyles, Wastelanding.  
103 Sandlos and Keeling, Giant Mine: Historical Summary. 
104 Dance, “Northern Reclamation in Canada.” 
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acknowledge the communities’ fears, perspectives or knowledge, especially in regards to 
the YKDFN. Regulations, constructed by a colonial government, excluded Indigenous 
people, who in turn, became victims of the very policies that were supposed to protect 
their environment.105 Industry, employment and the economy were the main drivers for 
decision-making.  
 Throughout fifty years of mining operations at the Giant Mine, there were several 
specific flashpoints, or key concerns that were mentioned by community members in 
public hearings and that continue to be brought up by stakeholders today through their 
calls for environmental justice. These concerns include: justice for the death of the Dene 
child and for other unrecorded deaths and illnesses; the lack of sufficient health 
information regarding arsenic poisoning; the lack of communication and transparency 
regarding cumulative arsenic contamination; the contamination of water and food 
sources; the unwillingness of the Land and Water Board to address broader issues of 
colonialism, cumulative contamination and long-term care; and the inability of the 
government to meaningfully enforce regulations. These concerns went unaddressed, 
creating a monster of public mistrust, in addition to the arsenic monster underground. 
 Memories of arsenic contamination and a lack of government and industry 
transparency throughout the life of the mine are fundamental to the narrative surrounding 
remediation at Giant Mine today. According to one community member: “One way or 
another… Giant mine is a part of Yellowknife and people, I think, agree that Giant is and 
																																																								
105 Rebecca Tsosie, “Indigenous Peoples and the Ethics of Remediation: Redressing the Legacy of 
Radioactive Contamination for Native Peoples and Native Lands,” Santa Clara Journal of International 
Law 13, no. 1 (2015): 203-272.  
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will always be a part of Yellowknife, the good, the bad and the ugly.”106 Throughout the 
1940s, 1950s and 1960s, precedents were set that favoured industry, with governments 
ignoring evidence of health effects, downplaying local concerns and alienating the First 
Nations community from their traditional lands. Health and environmental studies 
conducted from the 1960s until the late 1990s served only to maintain this status quo. In 
addition, public hearings lacked transparency and worked within a colonial system that 
benefited government and industry. Local communities were given no chance to voice 
their opinions on mine operations or the definitions and objectives of mine closure and 
remediation. After the final closure of the Giant Mine in 2005, what may have initially 
been seen as a technically challenging contamination project quickly morphed into a 
much more complex and far reaching public discourse on the nature of waste, the 
relationship the community had to this contaminated site and how such problems should 
be dealt with far into the future. 
 
 
 
   
																																																								
106 Tyree Mullaney (Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board employee, Giant Mine file manager) in 
interview with author (June 8, 2016).  
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CHAPTER 4 
CONTAINING THE GIANT MINE MONSTER 
“I think [remediation] incorporates principles of risk management that… if we take a risk 
based approach it's about making sure that the harmful substance isn't available to a 
potential receptor, so essentially removing that pathway.” 
-Craig Wells, Giant Mine Remediation Project Team 
 
Introduction 
 Since the bankruptcy of Royal Oak in 1999, Canadian taxpayers have paid over 
$160 million to care for the Giant Mine site.1 Seventeen years later, the government’s 
projected costs for remediation are now estimated at over a billion dollars and the site will 
require perpetual care, which is estimated to cost up to $2 million per year indefinitely. 
With this kind of price tag, in addition to the social and environmental scars caused by 
mining, it is evident why the Yellowknife community was, and still is, very concerned. 
Initially however, community engagement processes received little attention from the 
Giant Mine Remediation Project Team (GMRPT), resulting in a technically focused Giant 
Mine Remediation Plan that was rejected by the community in 2007. This Giant Mine 
Remediation Plan proposed the ‘frozen block method’ as the best option for arsenic 
remediation at the Giant Mine.2 The ‘frozen block method’ uses thermosyphon 
technology to freeze the ground around the arsenic chambers, essentially sealing these 
																																																								
1 Kevin O’Reilly, “Liability, Legacy, and Perpetual Care: Government Ownership and Management of the 
Giant mine, 1999-2015,” in Mining and Communities in Northern Canada: History, Politics and Memory, 
ed. Arn Keeling and John Sandlos (Calgary, Alberta: University of Calgary Press, 2015). 
2 SRK Consulting, Giant Mine Remediation Plan, prepared for Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (2007).  
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areas off from the environment around them.3 This plan required that the site be 
monitored and maintained in perpetuity, although it did not address the implications of 
perpetual care. In addition, there are currently ninety-five hectares of contaminated mine 
tailings on the surface, eight open pits and numerous buildings and contaminated 
infrastructure.4 The 2007 Remediation Plan proposed that the project would cover and 
revegetate the tailings ponds, fence off the pits and continue water treatment and 
monitoring until such a time came that it was no longer necessary.  
 For several reasons, the community stakeholders were unsatisfied with this 
remediation plan.5 They were unsure of how the site would be monitored and maintained 
in the future, and they were unsatisfied with the level of consultation undertaken, the 
transparency of government decisions, and the lack of independent oversight. For these 
reasons, among others, in 2008 the Yellowknives Dene First Nations and Alternatives 
North, a social justice NGO in the NWT, petitioned the City of Yellowknife to request a 
mandatory referral of the remediation plan to Environmental Assessment (EA) from the 
Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board (MVEIRB).6 The EA, completed 
in 2013, led to the signing of the Giant Mine Remediation Project Environmental 
Agreement in June 2015.7 This agreement is a legally binding document that holds the co-																																																								
3 SRK Consulting Ltd., Final Report: Arsenic Trioxide Management Alternatives: Giant Mine, prepared for 
Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (December 2002). 
4 O’Reilly, “Liability, Legacy, and Perpetual Care,” 344. 
5 The community stakeholders include: The City of Yellowknife, the YKDFN, the North Slave Metis 
Alliance, and Alternatives North. The co-proponents are the Department of Indigenous and Northern 
Affairs (under various names) and the Government of the NWT. Other federal departments are also 
included in review and public hearing processes, including Environment Canada, Health Canada, the 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans, and the Department of Public Works. Observers and others involved 
include the Mining Heritage Society and the Dene Council.  
6 Office of the Mayor, Yellowknife, “Letter of Referral of Environmental Assessment from the City of 
Yellowknife” (March. 31, 2008).  
7 Giant Mine Remediation Project Environmental Agreement (June 9, 2015).  
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proponents, consisting of the federal and territorial governments, responsible to twenty-
six binding measures and sixteen suggestions, including consistent community 
engagement, the completion of a human health study, and the preparation of a perpetual 
care plan, among other things.8 This agreement also resulted in the establishment of the 
Giant Mine Oversight Board (GMOB), an independent oversight group responsible for 
continued research and education related to the Giant Mine Remediation Project.9 The 
Giant Mine is the only known mine in Canada to date where an environmental assessment 
and agreement have been carried out for a mine remediation process.10  
 This chapter recounts the research, consultations, and planning processes leading 
up to the rejection of the 2007 Giant Mine Remediation Plan, focusing on how the 
government chose to frame the Giant Mine Remediation Project early on and why the 
community ultimately rejected this remediation plan. I will then analyze the process of 
environmental assessment (EA) that followed, focusing on how this process provided a 
platform for community discussion and engagement. From this analysis, this chapter 
focuses on two, connected arguments. First, despite good intentions to clean up the Giant 
Mine, the initial focus on arsenic management deterred good research on the overall 
impacts and history of the Giant Mine. In addition, a risk management approach to 
remediation assumed that after ‘caging’ or ‘taming’ the underground arsenic monster in a 																																																								
8 MVEIRB, Report of Environmental Assessment and Reasons for Decision: Giant Mine Remediation 
Project.  
9 Giant Mine Oversight Board, Establishment Report (April 2017).  
10 One exampled of an environmental/economic agreement for remediation is the remediation of The 
Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, which is defined by four agreements. The first was signed in 1996 
between the Inuvialuit Settlement Region and the Department of National Defense (DND) for radar sites in 
the NWT and Yukon. The other three agreement were signed between 1998-2005 between DND and the 
Inuit, represented by Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated for radar sites in Nunavut: 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=the-distant-early-warning-dew-line-remediation-
project/hgq87xvs.  
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frozen block, the other aspects of remediation such as surface clean up, water monitoring, 
perpetual care and the restoration of Baker Creek would fall into place over time, as the 
tailings were capped, the buildings removed and nature ‘healed itself.’ The focus on 
containing the arsenic monster sidelined community concerns on mine legacies, perpetual 
care, surface remediation, future land uses and communication with future generations. 
Second, I argue that rather than using the environmental assessment process strictly for 
risk assessment, the community, having no other official venue or platform, used the EA 
structure and process as a mechanism to voice their broader concerns about community 
and environmental health, risk perceptions, environmental injustices, power relations, 
independent oversight, and perpetual care.  
 Through the EA process, the community attempted to hold the government 
accountable to these concerns. While little about the technical and material design and 
management of the site has changed, community stakeholders dramatically altered the 
process of how remediation is defined, discussed, and planned for. In this sense, the EA 
and the resulting environmental agreement set up an ongoing process for trust building, 
communication and social license; it introduced an ongoing discussion of how past 
injustices should be dealt with, how unequal power relationships should be recognized 
and overcome and how the community of Yellowknife might begin looking at the broader 
implications of mine waste, remediation and perpetual care. While the Giant Mine 
Remediation Project still has many faults and challenges, most community members 
came to a negotiated consensus through the EA process. And while they continue to be 
critical, there is at least a dynamic dialogue surrounding the question of how such a 
contaminated site should be remediated and cared for. 
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Defining Ownership, Boundaries and Responsibility at the Giant Mine (1999-2001) 
 In the years immediately following the bankruptcy of Royal Oak, public interests 
aimed at confronting remediation challenges were “always subservient to the economic 
interests at play.”11 Both the federal and territorial governments put importance into the 
continuance of the mine for both economic and political reasons. In a community built on 
mining, the loss of revenue, jobs and a sense of identity were difficult to overcome 
quickly. In addition, keeping the mine running gave the government more time to 
determine suitable remediation measures and funding. According to O’Reilly, there were 
two major developments resulting from the bankruptcy of Giant Mine. First, an 
agreement was signed on July 1, 2000 with Miramar Giant Mine Ltd., which owned Con 
Mine on the south side of the City of Yellowknife. This agreement allowed Miramar to 
continue mining the ore, while transporting it to Con Mine where it was processed. 
Second, within this agreement all levels of government agreed to provide subsidies and 
assistance in order to keep the mine operating.12 However, liability for environmental 
conditions existing prior to Miramar’s operation remained the responsibility of the federal 
government.13 DIAND also assumed responsibility for the preparation of the Arsenic 
Trioxide Project Description, which Royal Oak had failed to complete before bankruptcy. 
The YKDFN were not consulted in the negotiations for the Miramar agreement.  
																																																								
11 O’Reilly, “Liability, Legacy, and Perpetual Care,” 353. 
12 The Agreement Between the Government of the Northwest Territories and Miramar Giant Mine Ltd. (July 
1, 2000). The City of Yellowknife did so unwillingly. They did not receive taxes from the site during these 
years. The City of Yellowknife had previously agreed to lease the townsite and water front areas in lieu of 
property taxes owed with the understanding that these areas would be remediated to a residential or 
recreational standard. This has been a continuing point of contention with the City throughout the 
Environmental Assessment and remediation processes. See: O’Reilly, “Liability, Legacy, and Perpetual 
Care,” 354-355. 
13 The Agreement Between the Government of the Northwest Territories and Miramar Giant Mine Ltd. 
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 At the same time that the territorial and federal governments were facilitating 
continued mining and economic interests, they were also the defining the space of 
remediation without community engagement (Fig. 2). Between 1999 and 2001, the 
federal government remediation project focused on defining the material liabilities of the 
site and the options for arsenic management; community engagement was not considered 
a primary concern.14 Limited regulation throughout the majority of mine operations and a 
lack of transparency between the mine company and the government meant that there was 
little sufficient research to characterize contamination and remediation. To help fill this 
gap, the Yellowknife Arsenic Soil Remediation Committee was created in 1999 and 
included multiple community stakeholders such as the Yellowknives Dene First Nations. 
However, studies organized by this working group did not include traditional knowledge, 
extensive fieldwork or community consultation, and focused mainly on establishing 
thresholds for arsenic contamination. Additional research initiated by the federal Royal 
Oak Project Team (later to become the Giant Mine Remediation Project) focused entirely 
on arsenic management.15 Before 2002, no research was done on community values or 
perceptions of the Giant Mine remediation, and community members were not involved 
in setting the parameters for early arsenic management research. 
 
 
 																																																								
14 A Public Registry was set up in 2001 and open house information sessions were held on March 26 and 
27, 2001. However, the majority of public workshops and presentations did not begin until after the arsenic 
trioxide management alternatives had already been determined.  
15 SRK Consulting, Final Report: Arsenic Trioxide Management Alternatives: Giant Mine, prepared for the 
Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (December 2002).  
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1999 
 
Bankruptcy of Royal Oak 
 
2000 
 
Agreement between Miramar, the Federal Government and the GNWT 
 
2000-2001 
 
GMRP hires technical Advisor, SRK Limited and begins research for arsenic 
trioxide management. 
 
Mar, 2001 
 
GMRP initiates public communications, including: mine site tours, radio 
interviews etc. 
 
May 2001 
 
Arsenic Management Alternatives Study published 
 
Jun, 2001 
 
Workshop on Phase 1 of the Arsenic Trioxide Management Alternatives.  
 
Sep, 2001 Miramar published the Final A&R Plan 
 
Nov-Dec 2001 
 
Focus groups with the public on perceptions of arsenic trioxide. 
Jan, 2002 Lutra Associates publishes: “Awareness Testing: Findings from the Focus Group 
on Giant Mine and the Arsenic Trioxide” 
Feb-Mar, 2002 Open House in Yellowknife (Feb 2002); Public information meetings in Dettah, 
N'dilo and Yellowknife (March 2002) 
Mar, 2002 GeoNorth publishes the “Final Report for Developing Options and 
Recommendations to Establish and Operate a Giant Mine Community Liaison 
Committee.” 
 
Apr 2002 Yellowknife Arsenic Soil Remediation Committee publishes: “Human and 
Ecological Health Risks Assessments” and “Determining Natural or Background 
Arsenic Levels in Yellowknife” 
Dec 2002 SRK publishes: “Final Report: Arsenic Trioxide Management Alternatives” 
Jan 2003 
 
Public Workshop - presentation of the Final Report: Arsenic Trioxide Management 
Alternatives 
Feb-Apr, 2003 
 
GMRP website launched, display installed in the Center Square Mall, Giant Mine 
Community Alliance created 
Jan 2005 
 
Federal Contaminated Site Action Plan initiated 
Mar, 2005 
 
Cooperation Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government 
of the NWT respecting the Giant Mine Remediation Project 
Oct, 2005 
 
YKDFN publish: “Giant Mine - Our Story: Impact of the Giant Gold Mine on the 
Yellowknives Dene, A Traditional Knowledge Report” 
Oct, 2005 
 
GMRP publishes: “Final Draft - Giant Mine Remediation Plan” 
Dec, 2005 
 
Review of the Final Draft, Giant Mine Independent Peer Review Panel 
July, 2007 GMRP publishes: “Giant Mine Final Remediation Plan” 
Feb, 2008 MVLWB approve the Giant Mine Remediation Project for licensing.  
 
Fig. 2 Timeline of the Giant Mine Remediation Project 1999-2008 	
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 Initial communications from the federal government focused on reassuring the 
community that everything was under control regarding the clean up of the site. The first 
interactions that the Giant Mine Remediation Project had with the general public occurred 
in March of 2001, more than a year after DIAND took control of the site. This 
communication focused on media interviews, and was not a full-scale engagement 
process. The local radio station, CJCD broadcasted on March 22 that some clean up had 
been done on the surface, but further research was underway. Dave Nutter, the senior 
advisor with DIAND stated: “We’ve been cleaning up waste batteries, waste oil on 
surface. We’ve done a lot of soil sampling and drilling looking for contaminated waste 
sites.”16 Nutter also noted that the clean up of the underground, with the exception of the 
arsenic trioxide, shouldn’t take a considerable amount of time because most of the 
material can be sealed off.17 In an interview done with CBC around this time, Nutter 
emphasized that even if the water pumps stopped working underground, water flooding 
and contamination would not occur for four to five years: “so it’s a very, very slow 
leak.”18 In this way, the remediation at Giant Mine was presented as something ‘under 
control.’ There was no rush. However, there were limited opportunities for community 
members to actually express their questions, concerns and expectations regarding Giant 
Mine; communication was relatively one-way.  
 While the federal government was outlining the arsenic management objectives in 
isolation, the Yellowknives Dene were calling for a somewhat different approach. In a 																																																								
16 Media Transcripts, “Re: Giant Mine N1L2-0043, Media Tour Giant Mine to View Clean-Up Efforts,” 
CJCD Radio (March 22, 2001). 
17 Ibid.  
18 Media Transcripts, “Re: Giant Mine N1L2-0043, Update on Giant Mine Clean-Up,” CBC Radio (March 
23, 2001).  
	 105	
letter dated April 8, 1999, Chief Jonas Sangris of Dettah and Chief Fred Sangris of N’dilo 
wrote to the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs regarding the impending closure of 
Giant Mine. They called the government to confront the fact that Yellowknives Dene had 
never given consent for the creation of the mine and had not been consulted since: 
 No compensation was made to our members as a whole for the continued loss of 
direct and indirect revenue from the territory. The ongoing extensive damage to 
the social, cultural, and physical fabric of their lives and lands has never been 
addressed and there is an ongoing loss of their rights. Our members cannot 
continue to exercise their treaty and aboriginal rights as a result of the degradation 
of the lands and waters in and around the Yellowknives Dene traditional lands… 
This in our view constitutes a breach of the Crown’s trust obligation to the 
Yellowknives Dene and its members.19 
 
In this letter the Chiefs also acknowledged their hope that remediation plans could 
address legacy issues by working with the economic arm of the YKDFN, the Deton’cho 
Corporation: “We wish to be involved in reclaiming this important part of our territory.”20 
This letter represents an early call for environmental justice through recognition, 
community participation and capacity building. However, these calls were largely 
ignored, while the government focused on defining, controlling and containing the toxic 
material on site. 
 The federal government defined its responsibilities, boundaries and objectives 
very early on, without meaningful community participation. From day one, the federal 
remediation project determined what the community could comment on, and how they 
could become engaged. Not only did the government seek to contain the monster, by 
focusing on arsenic containment, the project contained and defined knowledge: what 
																																																								
19 Letter from YKDFN (Chief Jonas Sangris and Chief Fred Sangris) to Minister Jane Stewart, INAC, 
(EA0809-001: April 8, 1999), 2-3. 
20 Ibid., 3.  
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knowledge was and wasn’t relevant and how the community could be involved. 
Remediation objectives and boundaries were determined in isolation from the 
community, and then presented to stakeholders, who were expected to make informed 
decisions and choices without the resources or capacity to do so. Early project research 
culminated in Miramar’s Final Abandonment and Rehabilitation Plan and the federal 
government’s Arsenic Management Alternative Report in 2002. 
 
Defining Toxicity: Arsenic Management Alternatives, Miramar’s Final 
Abandonment and Rehabilitation Plan, and Community Consultation (2001-2007) 
 
Arsenic Management Studies (2001-2002) 
 In May 2001 the federal government completed its first major study of arsenic 
management, which would lay the groundwork for remediation planning for the next six 
years.21 The Study of Management Alternatives: Giant Mine Arsenic Trioxide Dust was 
clearly framed as a management study and was intended to contribute to the overall 
Remediation Project Description. The study outlined the scope of potential water and 
environmental contamination if nothing was done and the mine was allowed to re-flood. 
Using this ‘do nothing’ approach as a baseline, the technical advisors expanded on the 
arsenic management approaches established in the 1997-98 workshops, outlining four 
main themes that represented different options: in situ management of the dust by ground 
freezing; extraction of the dust and reprocessing to recover high purity arsenic and gold; 
extraction of the dust and reprocessing to stabilize arsenic; and extraction of the dust and 																																																								
21 SRK Consulting, Study of Management Alternatives: Giant Mine Trioxide Dust, prepared for Department 
of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (May 2001).  
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stabilization with cement. Of these options, the in situ management of the dust with 
ground freezing was by far the lowest cost alternative. According to the technical 
advisors, this alternative also posed lower risks to human and ecological health.  
  The federal government presented the results of this phase one arsenic study to 
the community stakeholders in June 2001.22 The mechanisms of how the government and 
technical advisors had evaluated different management options were unclear to many 
community members who attended the June 2001 workshop; they had not been involved 
in determining the objectives that directed management planning. Kevin O’Reilly, a 
former representative of Alternatives North and City Councillor, writes that:  
 Beginning in 2000 there was a series of successive workshops run as consultation 
sessions where the federal government and its consultants presented findings and 
options but with very little public input in-between and little or no involvement in 
the development of evaluation criteria and selection of preferred alternatives. 
Materials were often not provided a head of time, no participant funding was 
provided to help parties obtain independent technical advice, and there was very 
little flexibility shown by the government in fully assessing new or preferred 
alternatives as expressed by workshop participants. In no way could this process 
be compared to principles of free, prior and informed consent or consultation and 
accommodation in terms of the federal government’s fiduciary obligations to 
Aboriginal peoples.23 
 
Going into the June 2001 workshop, community members were given little background 
information and were simply presented with the ‘best options.’  
 Throughout the June 2001 workshop, several community members expressed their 
concern with how arsenic contamination, remediation and long-term care at the Giant 
Mine had been defined by the government project. Community members expressed 
																																																								
22 Terriplan Consultant Ltd., Workshop Report: Giant Mine Underground Arsenic Trioxide Management 
Alternatives Workshop, prepared for Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (Yellowknife, NWT, June 11-12, 
2001).  
23 O’Reilly, “Liability, Legacy, and Perpetual Care,” 355.  
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concern that none of the options offered a final, long-term solution, even though the 
workshop was presented as a ‘final management plan.’24 They had hoped that remediation 
would mean removal of the arsenic. One participant questioned: “What happens when the 
freezing thaws? How can the land be replenished? How will the land heal?”25 This 
question did not receive a response. Another participant then commented:  
 The in-situ alternative is not a final solution – at best it provides a temporary 
holding pattern, leaving the responsibility for final treatment to future generations. 
It is not a responsible act by this generation, who benefited from the gold mine, to 
leave a burden for future generations.26  
 
The technical advisors responded that there was no alternative that did not leave 
something for future generations. To the community members participating in the 
workshop, this plan was about management and monitoring the arsenic, not the final 
remediation or restoration plan that they were expecting.   
 Many community members also expressed their concern about accountability: 
“We need a regulatory process to ensure this situation will never happen again.”27 It was 
also suggested that, “the results of the scientific risk assessment would need to be 
considered by the decision makers in light of community values and the willingness to 
accept risk.”28 This raised a discussion about values, ethics and accountability. Leaving 
the responsibility for future generations was considered irresponsible:  
 There is a need for an on-going commitment from the federal government to not 
only manage the arsenic through both an interim solution but to also commit to 																																																								
24 Terriplan Consultant Ltd., Workshop Report: Giant Mine Underground Arsenic Trioxide Management 
Alternatives Workshop, prepared for Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (Yellowknife, NWT, June 11-12, 
2001).  
25 Ibid., 17. 
26 Ibid.  
27Terriplan Consultant Ltd., Workshop Report: Giant Mine Underground Arsenic Trioxide Management 
Alternatives Workshop, 18. 
28 Ibid., 21. 
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continue to aggressively research and assess technologies leading to a complete 
solution at some point in the future.29  
 
Some participants countered that it would be equally irresponsible to take on extreme 
levels of debt in order to find a complete solution when an in-situ freezing had few risks 
and considerably less costs. There was a general consensus that a multi-stakeholder group 
should be formed to provide advice and assistance on this project. These public forum 
transcripts illuminate community calls to collectively determine remediation definitions, 
values and objectives. However, in the coming years, official reports and plans did not 
respond to these calls for more meaningful engagement.   
 While the government promoted its arsenic management plan, the Yellowknife 
Arsenic Soils Remediation Committee (YASRC), created in 1999 and chaired by the 
Canadian Public Health Association, released its three final reports to the public, 
concluding the work of this committee. The purpose of YASRC was to “establish a 
region-specific remediation level for inorganic arsenic surface contamination for 
Yellowknife”30 in accordance with the Canadian Soil Quality Guidelines for Inorganic 
Arsenic: Environmental and Human Health.31 These reports included assessments of both 
the human and ecological health risks posed by the arsenic contamination in Yellowknife 
and a report establishing the ‘natural’ or background arsenic soil concentrations in the 
																																																								
29 Ibid., 23. 
30 Canadian Public Health Association, Yellowknife Arsenic Soil Remediation Committee Terms of 
Reference (1998), 1.  
31 Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment, Canadian Soil Quality Guidelines for Inorganic 
Arsenic: Environmental and Human Health (March, 1997).  
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area.32 Risklogic Scientific Services Inc. was hired to compile these reports and relied on 
existing data in addition to some limited fieldwork.33  
  In the initial health risk assessment studies done by YASRC there was a lot of 
discussion of pathways, flows, and receptors. Remediation was framed as a plan to plug 
the flows and pathways, limiting the accessibility that receptors had to contamination:  
 A pathway consists of a source, a transport medium, a human exposure point and 
an exposure route at the point of contact. The purpose of the exposure assessment 
is to develop a mathematical relationship between the contaminant source 
concentration in each relevant medium and the projected intake of the 
contaminant. This relationship is then used in conjunction with the applicable 
toxicity information to estimate the health risk.34  
 
Remediation was seen only as a mathematical relationship. Such an approach defined 
humans and animals as receptors to potential risks rather than bodies that had been 
subject to many risks over years of mining operations – bodies that had been defined and 
made by the land around them.35   
 The YASCR health risk assessment and background level reports were geared 
towards creating a threshold level, something definable and measurable in order to 
determine the extent of remediation needed. While establishing the background levels of 
arsenic was important to consider when setting initial goals for remediation, these reports 
focused solely on determining background levels on site and what would be numerically 
acceptable in regards to health risks. The background arsenic level report did not take into 																																																								
32 Risklogic, Human and Ecological Health Risk Assessments, prepared for YASRC (2002); Risklogic, 
Determining Natural or Background Arsenic Levels in Yellowknife, prepared for YASRC (2002).   
33 This reporting was supplemented by research done by the Environmental Sciences Group at the Royal 
Military College in Kingston, where there was ongoing research on arsenic levels and contamination in the 
soil around Yellowknife.  
34 Risklogic, “Determining Natural or Background Arsenic Levels in Yellowknife,” 19.  
35 Linda Nash, Inescapable Ecologies: A History of Environment, Disease and Knowledge (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2004).  
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account local perceptions of risk, cultural and historical understandings of contamination, 
or broader definitions of healing and restoration.36 In addition, continual references were 
made to residential, industrial and recreational remediation, without a definition of what 
these different levels of remediation might mean for the communities around the Giant 
Mine.  
 Following the June 2001 public consultations and the April 2002 YASRC reports, 
a Final Report: Arsenic Trioxide Management Alternatives was published by INAC in 
December 2002. The technical advisors noted that:  
 Segments of the local community have variously expressed reservations both 
about options that leave the dust in place and those that bring the dust to surface, 
the Technical Advisor recommends that at least two alternatives be taken through 
to public consultation. One of the alternatives carried forward should be the best 
in situ (“leave underground”) alternative, and one should be the best ex situ (“take 
it out”) alternative.37 
 
Of the fifty-six options originally presented to manage the arsenic trioxide, the technical 
advisors chose two preferred options that fit with these recommendations. The Technical 
Advisor chose the ‘frozen block’ method as the best in situ choice and the ‘extraction and 
encapsulation with cement’ as the best ex situ method. The Technical Advisor stated that: 
 The primary role of this report is to provide a basis for a program of intensive 
public consultation that will assist DIAND in selecting a preferred alternative for 
managing the arsenic trioxide dust… both DIAND and the Technical Advisor 
believe that an additional type of information, namely the opinions and concerns 
of local stakeholders, must be understood before a final selection can be made.38  
																																																								
36 Risklogic, “Determining Natural or Background Arsenic Levels in Yellowknife.” 
37 SRK Consulting Ltd. Final Report: Arsenic Trioxide Management Alternatives: Giant Mine, prepared for 
Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (December 2002), 7.  
38 Ibid., 117. 
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While this report noted the importance of other ‘types of information,’ the community 
consultation that followed seemed to focus on convincing the community that the ‘frozen 
block’ method was the only feasible option. 
   
Miramar’s Final Abandonment and Restoration Plan (2001) 
 In contrast to the arsenic management studies, surface remediation planning 
received almost no public attention and proceeded with little integration alongside 
underground management plans. Miramar’s Final Abandonment and Restoration Plan, 
published in September 2001 differed little from preceding remediation plans. It focused 
on removing what could be removed and containing what couldn’t. In summary, this plan 
aimed to “restore the mill area to a condition in which it could be reused as an industrial 
site and restore the remainder of the site such that it is physically and chemically 
stable.”39 This A&R plan also relied on the vague ideas of recreating or restoring a ‘more 
natural’ site: “reclaimed landscape on the site should be consistent or evolve in a way 
consistent with the natural landscape unless there are active care-and-maintenance 
programs in place to manage the change.”40  
 The Miramar A&R plan was fundamentally flawed because it was entirely 
detached from the arsenic trioxide management plan and because it did not include any 
discussion on the values associated with community heritage or future land use. This plan 
was predicated on the assumption that the mine would be maintained in a dewatered state 
for the foreseeable future, which contradicted the options outlined in the arsenic trioxide 																																																								
39 Golder Associates, Final Abandonment and Restoration Plan, prepared for Miramar Giant Mine Ltd. 
(Yellowknife, NWT, September 26, 2001) ii.  
40 Ibid., iii.  
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management study. While there were continual references to long-term maintenance and 
monitoring of arsenic, there was little indication of what this would actually look like. 
Throughout the report, the authors continually defer to the final arsenic trioxide 
management report without providing clear connections between the two plans.  
 Critiques of Miramar’s remediation plan were summarized in a review of the plan 
published by AMEC in June 2002. According to AMEC, there were no details given 
about which parts of the underground mine would be abandoned and which would be kept 
open. Questions about long term stability of shafts, underground workings and 
hydrogeological issues were also not addressed.41 The linkage between the A&R plan and 
the arsenic management plan was not articulated, making this A&R plan appear to be a 
work in progress, as opposed to a final plan; “Far more clarity on the issues of arsenic 
contamination is recommended. The plan needs to precisely denote what constitutes a 
contaminated situation and what does not.”42 This review also pointed out that many 
details, especially those dealing with long-term planning, appeared to conflict with the 
general objectives of the NWT Mine Closure Guidelines, which emphasized minimizing 
the need for intensive long-term care and maintenance.43 AMEC also points out the 
absence of a proper A&R schedule as a shortcoming of the report, as there was no clear 
demonstration of how progressive remediation or long-term care would unfold. 
Nevertheless, Miramar’s A&R plan was used in combination with INAC’s arsenic 
																																																								
41 AMEC, “RE: Technical Audit of Giant Mine Abandonment and Restoration Plan, N1L2-0043” prepared 
for the Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board (June 5, 2002).  
42 Ibid., 10. 
43 Northwest Territories Water Board, Guidelines for Abandonment and Restoration Planning for Mines in 
the Northwest Territories (September 1990).  
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management studies in the development of 2007 Remediation Plan, which was accepted 
by the MVLWB.44  
 
Community Consultations (2002-2003)  
 After the June 2001 arsenic alternatives workshop and the publication of initial 
remediation research, the federal government hired Lutra Associates to survey the 
public’s level of understanding of arsenic trioxide dust, where the gaps in knowledge 
were, and what people in the community thought of the arsenic at Giant Mine. This study, 
published in January 2002, acknowledged that many people in Yellowknife had a limited 
understanding of what arsenic trioxide is and how it could affect them; “The irregularity 
and poor presentation of information and apparent lack of willingness of industry and/or 
government to share information are reasons that local residents say they are not well 
informed or confident in their knowledge about Giant Mine or the arsenic/arsenic trioxide 
dust.”45 Lutra Associates concluded that few locals were aware of the ways that the 
arsenic trioxide dust was stored and managed. As a result, locals did not have adequate 
information to comment on preferences for long-term management of the site, but 
“instinctively, they feel that it should be removed now.”46  
 The Lutra focus group study made it very clear that although locals were unaware 
of the details of the arsenic trioxide storage and management, they felt that the situation 
wasn’t secure and that there were many potential risks for the community and the 																																																								
44 SRK Consulting, Giant Mine Remediation Plan, prepared for Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 
(2007).  
45 Lutra Associates Ltd., “Awareness testing: Findings from the Focus Groups on Giant Mine and the 
Arsenic Trioxide, Final Report,” prepared for the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development 
(Yellowknife, January 2002), i.  
46 Ibid. 
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environment. Lutra summarized that locals “lack confidence and trust in government to 
manage the arsenic trioxide dust in the best interest of the public and the environment 
[and]… They are unsure what ‘clean up’ entails, the methods and the implications of it.”47 
Lutra also noted that the Yellowknives Dene First Nations had additional concerns related 
to compensation and economic benefits. Again, these concerns were voiced by the 
communities early in the remediation process, but were not taken seriously, and were not 
directly addressed in the Final Arsenic Trioxide Management Alternatives Report, 
published in December 2002. 
 Locals, the report found, continued to “feel a sense of betrayal, abandonment and 
resentment about the history of Giant and the arsenic.”48 Feelings of stress and anxiety 
were also mentioned several times throughout the focus groups. Many residents 
questioned why the government wasn’t more transparent about the schedule for 
remediation: “The government doesn’t know what to do because the issue is so big,” … 
“The Feds are stalling for time, looking for the cheapest solution, but is the cheapest 
solution the best solution?” … “The whole issue is about money,” … “They (government) 
don’t want to take responsibility to clean it (arsenic) up,” … “They’re waiting for 
someone else to make a move because they don’t want to admit liability.”49 Such 
statements make the feelings of mistrust blatantly obvious. Residents argued that DIAND 
had the responsibility to deal with it in an “ethical, moral and competent manner,”50 but 
they felt that this wasn’t being achieved. 
																																																								
47 Ibid., ii. 
48 Ibid., 11.. 
49 Ibid., 3-26.  
50 Ibid., 20.   
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 Lutra recommended simplifying this situation by separating the arsenic trioxide 
issue from the Giant Mine issue: “This would mean that job loss, compensation, resource 
royalties, pensions and other ‘volatile issues’ associated with the operation of the Mine 
over the decades would not be a matter of discussion in the consultations.”51 Although it 
was practical for the remediation project to focus on certain topics at certain points in 
time, it was unrealistic to expect to be able to separate these concerns: the arsenic issue 
and the Giant Mine issue are one and the same. While it seemed like the project took this 
advice, or had already been trying to separate these kinds of discussions, it did not 
provide a mechanism to deal with the other ‘volatile issues;’ they never seriously 
addressed compensation, royalties, and legacies at the same level as they addressed 
arsenic management.  
 The concerns raised by the Lutra report were echoed by additional research 
undertaken by another federal government contractor, GeoNorth Limited, who was hired 
to research community liaison practices across Canada and present recommendations for 
best practices at the Giant Mine.52 During the June 2001 arsenic alternatives workshop, 
the need for a community liaison committee was established as one of the next steps 
necessary to help guide the management process. GeoNorth noted that, at the time, groups 
																																																								
51 Ibid., 23. 
52 GeoNorth Limited, Final Report for Developing Options and Recommendations to Establish and Operate 
a Giant Mine Community Liaison Committee, prepared for Giant Mine Remediation Team, Indian and 
Northern Affairs Canada (March, 2002). The GeoNorth report outlined examples of community committees 
at five other sites in Canada: the Five Island Lake Community Liaison Committee, Nova Scotia; the Joint 
Action Group for Environmental Cleanup of the Muggah Creek Watershed, Sydney, Nova Scotia; Trail 
Community Lead Task Force, Trail, British Colombia; the Independent Environmental Monitoring Agency 
(Ekati Diamond Mine), Yellowknife, NWT; Environmental Monitoring Advisory Board (Diavik Diamond 
Mine), Yellowknife, NWT. 
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such as the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee (CARC) and MiningWatch Canada53 
had documented the need for public input into the abandonment and reclamation phase of 
the mine: “Citing the previous failure of the Federal Government to ensure that there is 
zero public liability, the groups believe that the community members should be given a 
chance to contribute to the decision making process regarding the management plan for 
the Mine.”54 The GeoNorth report outlined possible structures for a community oversight 
committee that could help to ensure more meaningful, democratic engagement in the 
Giant Mine Remediation Project.  
 After conducting interviews with community leaders, GeoNorth concluded that 
community objectives for a community liaison committee included the responsibility to: 
manage the clean-up; make information available to the public; answer the ‘how did this 
happen’ question; perform a real cost-benefit analysis; guide further research and 
development regarding arsenic trioxide; and to ensure that a ‘permanent solution’ is 
found.55 Therefore, GeoNorth recommended that:  
 The mandate of the Committee includes serving as a communications bridge 
between government and the community, as well as advising government and the 
community regarding research, the future use of the Giant Mine site, reclamation 
options, and both underground and surface clean-up of the site. The Committee 
should report both to the community and to DIAND.56  
 
																																																								
53 CARC is a citizen led advocacy organization committed to the long-term social and environmental health 
in the Canadian North. CARC was created in response to the first Mackenzie Valley pipeline proposal 
http://www.carc.org/; MiningWatch Canada acts as a watch dog for Canadian mining companies at home 
and abroad http://miningwatch.ca/  
54 GeoNorth Limited, Final Report for Developing Options and Recommendations to Establish and Operate 
a Giant Mine Community Liaison Committee, 3. 
55 Ibid., 10. 
56 Ibid., 17.  
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The planned mandate of a liaison committee was to represent the community and key 
stakeholder groups in dialogue with DIAND. In response to GeoNorth’s 
recommendations, the Giant Mine Community Alliance was created and included 
members from the Yellowknife Chamber of Commerce, the North Slave Metis Alliance, 
the NWT Mining Heritage Society, the City of Yellowknife, the Northern Federation of 
Labour, a health representative, an environmental representative and a general public 
representative. The Giant Mine Remediation Project Team also pushed for more 
community consultation, including public workshops, a display in the local mall and the 
creation of a website.57 However, the Giant Mine Community Alliance struggled to have 
any meaningful role in the remediation planning process.58 The YKDFN was not a sitting 
member, rather an observer, leading to questions of the legitimacy and power inequalities 
of such a committee.  
  Despite research done by Lutra and GeoNorth and the government’s stated 
commitment to meaningful consultation, the focus of research and remediation remained 
in the technical sphere and consultation was inconsistent. After consultations were 
completed in 2003, little engagement occurred over the next three years before the 
publication of the Final Remediation Plan in 2007. By 2004 the only references to 
community engagement included the public registry and the link to a website. In addition, 
as mentioned above, the Giant Mine Community Alliance quickly went silent. At the end 
of the 2003 public consultations, the technical advisor again suggested that the plan for 																																																								
57 Giant Mine Remediation Project Team, “Status of Giant Mine Arsenic Trioxide Project: MVLWB 
Briefing,” submitted to the MVLWB (June 25, 2002). 	
58 Kevin O’Reilly (MLA and former representative of Alternatives North), interview with author (May 13, 
2016); Gordon Hamre (volunteer with Alternative North, former Environment Canada employee), interview 
with author (May 27, 2016).    
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freezing the arsenic underground go through an environmental assessment process.59 The 
government decided to push ahead and avoid these regulatory procedures. In 2004, 
according to the Giant Mine Remediation Project, based on community feedback and the 
recommendations of the Technical Advisor, the GMRP received approval to move 
forward with the development of a project description for ground freezing as the long-
term arsenic trioxide management alternative.60 It was unclear if or how community 
feedback actually supported this decision. 
   
Ongoing ‘Care and Maintenance’ and the Finalization of a Giant Mine Remediation Plan 
(2005-2007) 
 In March of 2005, the Giant Mine closed for good and the site was transferred 
entirely to INAC. 61 The Government of Canada and the Government of the Northwest 
Territories signed a cooperation agreement respecting the Giant Mine Remediation 
Project in March 2005.62 The City of Yellowknife and the YKDFN were not given 
substantial roles in the negotiation of this agreement. This agreement also limited the 
remediation project to industrial standards, within the lease boundaries.  
 Several months later, in December 2005 a draft of the Giant Mine Remediation 
Plan was published, with supporting documentation from the Independent Peer Review 
																																																								
59 SRK Consulting Ltd., Final Report: Arsenic Trioxide Management Alternatives: Giant Mine.  
60 Giant Mine Remediation Project, “Arsenic Trioxide Management Project – Progress Report, First Quarter 
2005,” prepared for Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board (April 29, 2005).  
61 Letter from Miramar to Environment Canada, “Request for Closure” (June 22, 2005). 
62 Cooperation Agreement Respecting the Giant Mine Remediation Project, between the Government of 
Canada, Indian Affairs and Northern Development and the Government of the Northwest Territories 
(March 15, 2005).   
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Panel (IPRP).63 The Panel, made up of technical experts, unanimously supported the plan 
presented. The IPRP concluded that the plan would ensure long-term human and 
environmental health and that it was technologically sound.64 There was no mention of 
healing historical legacies, communicating with future generations, or addressing broader 
community concerns about inequality, perpetual care and compensation. This is likely 
because the Independent Peer Review Panel included no one with expertise in Traditional 
Knowledge, history, community engagement or environmental justice. As with the 
cooperation agreement, the City of Yellowknife and the YKDFN were not given 
substantial roles in the review of the draft remediation plan.  
  In the fall of 2005, while the draft for the Remediation Plan was being finalized, 
with support from the GMRP, the YKDFN published Giant Mine – Our Story: Impact of 
the Giant Gold Mine on the Yellowknives Dene, A Traditional Knowledge Report.65 The 
objectives of this report were to provide information regarding the effects of the Giant 
Mine on the YKDFN; to help people understand the YKDFN sense of history and their 
viewpoints regarding the Giant Mine, and to “bring a satisfactory sense of closure to the 
YKDFN membership regarding the effects of the mine.”66 Another important objective of 
this report was to begin restoring relationships:  
 The Giant Mine legacy is coming full circle… the Traditional Knowledge Report 
adds one last step; that of helping to restore relationships with the land and giving 
back to the lands its story, and sharing that story with Yellowknife. Part of the 																																																								
63 The IPRP was created in 2002 to review the work of the Technical Advisor (SRK) and give 
recommendations to the Giant Mine Remediation Project Team.  
64 IPRP, Giant Mine Remediation Project: Review of the “Final Draft – Giant Mine Remediation Plan,” 
submitted to Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (Yellowknife, NT, December 2005).  
65 Yellowknives Dene First Nation Land and Environment Committee, Giant Mine – Our Story: Impact of 
the Giant Gold Mine on the Yellowknives Dene, A Traditional Knowledge Report, prepared for the 
Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Giant Mine Remediation Project (October 13, 2005).  
66 Ibid., 5. 
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restorative process provides a chronological narrative of the significant events that 
shaped the Yellowknives Dene view of the Giant Mine.67 
 
The Yellowknives Dene were never consulted and did not give their consent to have this 
mine built on their land. According to this report, they wanted to change the relationships 
of the past: “Giant Mine is a story of relationships between people and the environment, 
and between cultures learning to co-exist.”68 While this report was supported by INAC, 
such sentiments were not reflected in the main objectives of the final remediation plan. 
 Like the plans before it, the 2007 Giant Mine Final Remediation Plan’s objectives 
were to: manage the arsenic in a way that would minimize risks, to remediate the surface 
of the site to industrial guidelines, to minimize public and worker health and safety risks, 
to minimize the release of contaminants and to restore Baker Creek. Within these 
objectives, the 2007 Plan focused on twelve components: arsenic trioxide dust storage; 
underground mine components; open pits; waste rock, tailings; historic foreshore tailings; 
site waste management; Baker Creek; quarries, borrow pits and overburden piles; 
contaminated surficial materials; buildings and infrastructure; and waste storage and 
disposal areas.69 Again, these objectives do not mention community engagement, 
historical legacies, mistrust, compensation or apology. The report did include a small 
section on Traditional Knowledge and a summary of public consultation and 
communication initiatives undertaken in the past, but it is difficult to see how or where 
this knowledge was actually used. 70  
																																																								
67 Ibid., 6. 
68 Ibid. 
69 SRK Consulting, Giant Mine Remediation Plan. 
70 SRK Consulting, Giant Mine Remediation Plan, 1-24.  
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 Reactions to the 2007 Remediation Plan were varied. The City of Yellowknife 
asked to have a Working Group set up in order to review each section of the plan with 
stakeholders.71 The YKDFN called for a full impact review and public hearing.72 The 
City of Yellowknife also reminded the Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board 
(MVLWB) about the requirement through the NWT Waters Act for a public hearing to 
discuss water license updates.73 While the stakeholders varied in the detail of their 
responses, the general consensus was that a public review should take place. Community 
members were concerned that the Final Remediation Plan did not adequately address 
perpetual care concerns, did not lay out a clear monitoring plan, included no commitment 
to ongoing research, no mention of independent oversight and there were issues with the 
definition of ‘industrial remediation standards.’ These were all concerns that had been 
repeatedly expressed in previous public workshops, consultations and hearings stretching 
back to the 1970s, yet the Project continued to consider such concerns outside of scope, 
without allowing the community to have input on what exactly this ‘scope’ was. 
 Despite these public concerns, the MVLWB issued a renewal for Giant Mine’s 
water license. While the license was “sent out for public review,”74 there was no public 
hearing. The license was approved on February 20, 2008.75 However, a MVLWB “Staff 
																																																								
71 Letter from the Office of the Mayor, City of Yellowknife, “RE: Type “A” Water License Application 
(MV2007L8-0031),” to the Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board, (January 7, 2008). 
72 Letter from the YKDFN, “RE: Type “A” Water License Application/INAC Giant Mine Remediation to 
Mr. Willard Hagen, Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board (January 18, 2008). 
73 Letter from the Office of the Mayor, City of Yellowknife, “RE: Type “A” Water License Application 
(MV2007L8-0031),” to the Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board, (January 7, 2008). 
74 Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board, “Staff Report on Giant Mine Remediation Project” (February 
13, 2008), 1.  
75 Letter from MVLWB to Mr. William Mitchell, Manager, Giant Mine Remediation Project, 
“Contaminants and Remediation Directorate, INAC, MV2007-L8-0031 Not Referred to Environmental 
Assessment, Remediation, Giant Mine” (February 20, 2008).  
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Report” document from February 13, 2008, stated that the MVLWB staff had warned the 
Board that this application could be a cause of public concern:  
 Since the formation of a Giant Mine Working Group can only be developed after 
the Water License has been issued, it is recommended that the Board heed the 
concerns brought forward by the Yellowknives Dene First Nations and consider 
this project for Environmental Assessment based on the potential that this project 
might be a cause for public concern.76  
 
The MVLWB Staff had recommended that the Board refer this project to the MVEIRB 
for an EA. However, ultimately, the Board decided to approve the preliminary screening 
of the Giant Mine Remediation Water License, and to move on through regulatory 
processes without referring the project to an Environmental Assessment.77 The Board did 
agree that a Working Group should be put in to place “to address any remaining potential 
issues as well as to progressively discuss the implementation phases associated with the 
Giant Mine Remediation Plan.”78 
 The decision made by the MVLWB to bypass an EA was based on a technical 
review of the Final Remediation Plan document. In its “Reasons for Decision” document 
for this water license, the MVLWB stated that the Board “is unconvinced that further 
study of this project within an Environmental Assessment can substantiate any new 
information into the regulatory process… it is essential that Remediation of this site is 
done in a relatively prompt period of time.”79 The Board stated that they had considered 
the “long history of communications and consultation activities undertaken.”80 And yet, 
the question remained: despite staff recommendations to refer the project to an EA and 																																																								
76 Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board, “Staff Report on Giant Mine Remediation Project” (February 
13, 2008), 7.  
77 MVLWB, “Preliminary Screening Report Form: Remediation, Giant Mine,” 13.  
78 MVLWB, “Reasons for Decision: Remediation, Giant Mine, MV2007L8-0031” (February 2008), 4. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid.  
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continual community requests to do the same, why did the Board grant this license? As 
mentioned in a letter from the YKDFN to the Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board in 
March 2008:  
 It would appear that the Land and Water Board has issued a Water License 
without a forum of public input and in particular without the input of the 
Yellowknives Dene First Nation. In our view this is a breach of the fundamental 
duty owed to the Yellowknives Dene First Nation and shows a complete lack of 
understanding on behalf of the Land and Water Board along with a complete 
failure of the Board to fulfill its mandate in protecting the interests of the First 
Nation.81  
 
After seven years of consultation and research, community members were still asking for 
an environmental assessment. 
 
Trust Building, Environmental Justice and Perpetual Care: The Environmental 
Assessment Process (2007-2014) 
 
“Listen to the people and what they want. How they envision the future. Listen to the 
people who were born here, who have lived here, and who use the land traditionally as 
part of their history and their culture. Listen to the people who will die here, and be 
buried here. And whose future generations will remain on the land forever.”82  
-Chief Edward Sangris, YKDFN 
 
 On April 7, 2008 the federal government was forced into an environmental 
assessment after the City of Yellowknife made a mandatory referral under the Mackenzie 
Valley Resource Management Act, based on requests to City Council from Alternatives 
North, the YKDFN and a local MLA.83 According to several interviewees, this was the 																																																								
81 Letter from Yellowknives Dene First Nation to the Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board, “RE: Giant 
Mine, MV2007L8-0031” (March 11, 2008), 1.  
82 Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board, “Giant Mine Remediation Project 
Environmental Assessment Hearing, Part 1 of 5” (September 10, 2012), 93. 
83 Letter from the Office of the Mayor, City of Yellowknife to Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact 
Review Board, “RE: Contaminants and Remediation Directorate – INAC, Request for a New Type ‘A’ 
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first time a Chief of the YKDFN had directly addressed the City Council.84 A common 
concern for how remediation would be defined presented an opportunity to bring the 
community together and to begin to heal historically negative relationships: 
 This request for an environmental assessment represented an extraordinary 
convergence of interests and resistance from organizations and individuals that 
had not worked together effectively in the past. Ironically, these interests acted 
together in part because of their marginalization from the decisions making 
process surrounding the remediation of Giant Mine.85 
 
This was a pivotal moment in the Giant Mine Remediation Project. Concerned citizens of 
Yellowknife and the YKDFN used the available regulatory mechanisms to make sure 
their calls for public accountability were answered. 
 Throughout the remainder of 2008, public scoping sessions and hearings were 
hosted by the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board (MVEIRB) to help 
define the parameters for the Environmental Assessment (Fig. 4).86 Important questions in 
the scoping sessions included: “Which additional activities not currently identified in the 
GMRP need to considered inside the scope of development… [and] What are appropriate 
temporal (time) and geographic boundaries for the assessment of impacts during this 
EA?”87 Again, community stakeholders identified that there were concerns about the lack 
of understanding about the broad temporal and geographic legacies and cumulative 
effects of gold mining in the area: 
																																																																																																																																																																					
Water License MV2007LB-0031, Referral to Environmental Assessment by the City of Yellowknife” 
(March 31, 2008).  
84 Fred Sangris (YKDFN member and employee), interview with author (June 8, 2016); Todd Slack (former 
YKDFN employee), interview with author (May 26, 2016); Kevin O’Reilly (MLA and former 
representative for Alternatives North), interview with author (May 13, 2016).  
85 O’Reilly, “Liability, Legacy, and Perpetual Care,” 358.  
86 See minutes on the Giant Mine Remediation Environmental Assessment Public Registry: MVERIB 
“Meeting Notes from the Giant Mine Remediation Project, Issues Scoping Session,” (June 17, 2008). 
87 Ibid. 
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 A complete remediation on the Giant Mine site, in my mind at least, requires a 
‘permanent’ solution to the arsenic problem underground as well as other areas in 
and outside the lease area proper… It requires that the philosophy of the 
remediation plan be changed to focus on how to achieve a ‘permanent solution’ 
and not what is economical or technically ‘feasible’ as the main criteria.88 
 
Many other participants in these scoping hearings also made reference to impacts on local 
peoples’ psychology, well being and traditional practices due to the legacy of Giant Mine, 
and the worry associated with the unknowns of perpetual care.89  
 In spite of these public pleas, in setting the scope for the EA the Review Board 
largely limited consideration to technical questions surrounding the remediation project. 
It was decided that the EA would not include discussion on different options for the 
management of arsenic trioxide, it would be contained within the lease boundary and it 
would follow industrial remediation standards.90 The EA only reviewed the potential for 
environmental impacts from the development (remediation project) itself, and did not 
consider historical pollution or social legacy issues as a part of this impact.91 
  
 
 																																																								
88 Letter from Gary Vaillancourt to the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Review Board, July 22-23, 2008; 
similar sentiments were expressed repeatedly throughout the public hearings: MVEIRB, “Public Hearing 
Transcripts, Giant Mine Remediation Plan, Scoping Hearing” (July 22-23, 2008). 
89 MVERIB, “Public Hearing Transcripts, Giant Mine Remediation Plan: Scoping Hearing” (July 22-23, 
2008). See also: Letter from Kevin O’Reilly to Tawanis Testart, Environmental Assessment Officer, 
Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board, “RE: Follow-up to Giant Mine Remediation Plan 
Environmental Assessment Scoping Hearing” (August 8, 2008).  
90 Community members continued to question if this was in fact the best route for arsenic trioxide 
management. Throughout the public hearing for scoping, some community members made reference to 
remediation tactics at Con Mine, which included the use of an autoclave and were confused as to why such 
options could not be reviewed. See: Letter from Bruce MacLean to the Mackenzie Valley Environmental 
Impact Review Board (July 24, 2008).  
91 MVEIRB, Reasons for Decision in the matter of the scope of development and scope of assessment for 
the EA of the Giant Mine Remediation Plan (December 2008), 3.  
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Apr 2, 2008 
 
City of Yellowknife refers the Giant Mine Remediation Project to the MVEIRB 
Jun-Jul 2008 
 
Review Board conducts scoping sessions with stakeholders (parties) 
Dec 19, 2008 
 
Board issues reasons for decision on scope of assessment 
May 12, 2009 
 
Board releases final terms of reference and work plan for the Developers Assessment 
Report (DAR) 
Dec 14, 2009 
 
Developer requests extension: DAR submitted in April , 2010 
May 3, 2010 
 
Developer requests extension: DAR submitted in June 30, 2010 
Jun 30, 2010 
 
Developer requests extension: DAR delayed due to internal approvals 
Oct 27, 2010 
 
Developer submits DAR. 
Nov. 5, 2010 – 
Feb. 17, 2012  
 
Over the year, parties submit two rounds of information requests (IRs). The Developer 
requests multiple extensions. All IRs are responded to by Feb. 2012, after which a public 
hearing is scheduled for May 2012.92 
Mar 5, 2012 
 
Developer requests hearing delay 
Mar 15, 2012 
 
Party requests hearing delay: 60 day extension for technical reports and hearing 
July 9, 2012 
 
Technical reports submitted  
 
Sept. 10-14, 2012 
 
Public Hearings 
Feb 7, 2013 
 
Board issues IRs to developer 
 
Mar 8, 2013 
 
Developer requests extension for IR responses 
 
Mar 14, 2013 
 
Developer submits IR responses. 
Mar 24, 2013 
 
Parties respond to IRs. 
Jun 20, 2013 
 
Board releases Report of EA 
Minister initiates consultation to proposed modifications of measures.  
Dec 23, 2013 
 
Board holds consult-to modify meeting. 
Jan 20, 2014 
 
Final "Reasons for Decisions and Measures" Report 
June 9, 2015 Signing of the Environmental Agreement. 
 
 
																																																								
92 For a detailed timeline of all the information requests, responses and technical meetings, see the public 
registry for the Giant Mine Remediation Environmental Assessment: 
http://www.reviewboard.ca/registry/project.php?project_id=69  
Fig. 3. Timeline of the Giant Mine Remediation Project Environmental Assessment process 	
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 In its Reasons for Decision document regarding the scope of the EA, the Review 
Board stated it had not heard “any new evidence which convinced the Board that the 
investigation of alternatives to the frozen block method should be reinitiated.”93 
Therefore, the Review Board was not persuaded that it should “include an assessment of 
arsenic treatment alternatives in the EA.”94 In regards to off-lease contamination, the 
Board reasoned that: “the activities that led to the deposition of arsenic in locations away 
from the Giant Mine are not related to the activities proposed by the developer of this 
project, namely INAC. Also, the effects of these historical activities are not a component 
of the proposed development.”95 Based on information from the Project Team that 
remediation and freezing would be completed in 10 years, with 5 years of monitoring, the 
Review Boards decided to “focus its considerations on the impacts of this development 
on the first 15 years of its operation, or until the site is expected to reach the anticipated 
state of stability.”96  Finally, in regards to remediation standards and future land uses, the 
MVEIRB stated:  
 The remediation standard chosen is intended to improve physical conditions at the 
Giant Mine site. The standard of remediation is a matter of choice for the land 
owner, which is the GNWT. As a result, the Review Board has determined that 
the EA will not focus on the standard of remediation chosen.97  
 
Time and time again community members defined what they saw as important objectives 
for the remediation project, and time and time again various governments and regulators 
told them that these concerns were ‘out of scope.’ 																																																								
93 Ibid., 6. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid., 7. 
96 Ibid., 8. 
97 Ibid., 10. 
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 Following the scoping sessions, the MVEIRB published Terms of Reference and a 
Work Plan for the Giant Mine Remediation Plan on May 12, 2009.98 These documents 
directed the development of the GMRPT’s Developers Assessment Report, which was 
published in October 2010.99 According to many interviewees who participated in the EA, 
the government seemed unprepared to submit this document, which took an extra year to 
complete.100 The following two years of information requests, responses to these requests, 
and technical reports, culminated in the Giant Mine Remediation Public Hearings in 
September 2012. Until the public hearings, community stakeholders had received no 
funding to participate in scoping sessions or to organize independent research.101 Finally, 
in preparation for the public hearings, Alternatives North, the YKDFN and the NSMA 
received joint funding to support their participation in the public hearing process.102 
 
The Giant Mine Remediation Environmental Assessment Public Hearings 
 It was the public hearings that really allowed community participants to challenge 
technical definitions of remediation and to drive home the importance of long standing 
																																																								
98 MVEIRB, Terms of References for the Environmental Assessment of the Indian and Northern Affairs 
Giant Mine Remediation Plan, (EA0809-001: May 12, 2009); MVEIRB, Workplan for the Environmental 
Assessment of the Indian and Northern Affairs Giant Mine Remediation Plan (EA0809-001: May 12, 2009 
99 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada and the Government of the Northwest Territores, Developer’s 
Assessment Report (EA0809-001: October 2010). 
100 MVEIRB, Workplan for the Environmental Assessment;  David Livingstone (former INAC employee, 
GMOB Director) interview with author (May 13, 2016); Alan Erlich (Director of the MVEIRB) interview 
with author (June 2, 2016).  
101 As mentioned in the first scoping session meeting on June 17, 2008: “Review Board staff stated that 
currently there is no capacity to give out participant funding, but noted that it is an issues that is raised each 
year during negotiations between INAC and the Review Board. Review Board staff acknowledged that it is 
difficult for people to participate in EAs without financial assistance and affirmed that a response in writing 
to this concern would be sent soon.” 
102 O’Reilly, “Liability, Legacy, and Perpetual Care.” 
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issues of legacy, independent oversight, and perpetual care.103 The hearings stretched over 
five days in September 2012 and included presentations from the government project 
team, technical advisors, stakeholders and general community members.  
 At many points throughout the hearings it seemed as if the stakeholders and the 
Developer were talking about very different projects. All participants agreed that the site 
needed to be cleaned-up, managed, monitored and cared for, and most even agreed that 
the frozen block method was the most effective, in-term solution. However, going into the 
hearings there was no foundation, or common objectives for how remediation would be 
defined, how the community should be involved in deciding future land uses, and how 
perpetual care would be approached. First, the definition or ‘scope’ of the Environmental 
Assessment, and in turn, the definition of the remediation project itself was a continual 
source of contention amongst hearing participants. Second, negotiations for independent 
oversight had been stalled by the Project, which influenced some stakeholders’ trust in the 
EA process and the GMRP. Third, concerns for perpetual care and ongoing research were 
continually pushed aside as ‘out of scope.’ Finally, discussions on apology, compensation 
and reconciliation alongside remediation were entirely overlooked.  
 The government project team continually referenced the ‘scope’ of environmental 
assessment to limit the extent of government responsibility. The major point of 
disconnect came from the Project Team’s insistence that the Remediation Project posed 
no risks. According to Joanna Ankersmit, the Director of CARD, remediation as 
containment was inherently good because it would fix the site:  																																																								
103 For a full review of the public hearing transcripts and other documents from the public hearings, see the 
Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board’s public registry for the Giant Mine Remediation 
Environmental Assessment: http://www.reviewboard.ca/registry/project.php?project_id=69 	
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 Currently the Giant Mine poses risk to humans and the environment. By 
comparison, the remediation plan poses no significant environmental impacts. By 
improving the entire site, in terms of environmental and human health and safety, 
it is clear this remediation plan offers significant positive results.104  
 
However, in the eyes of many community members, this ‘scope’ of the environmental 
assessment went beyond the material acts of remediation; it was about discussing 
community-based remediation objectives and acknowledging responsibility for decades 
of pollution, contamination, and injustice. As Todd Slack stated:  
 We have a certain amount of faith in the position that they’ve adopted. However, 
this position was not based on objectives or goals as defined by the Yellowknives 
Dene… Right from the get-go, there was a disconnect between what they decided 
to do and what the Yellowknives wanted to see… assurances have not been 
forthcoming, and thus we’re forced to turn these issues over to the Board rather 
than arriving at a collaborative endpoint.105 
 
Even after community stakeholders continually outlined why remediation was a public 
concern, these concerns were again and again considered to be ‘out of scope’ in 
government responses, as the government again focused on technical clean up.  
 While the EA and public hearings were ongoing, certain aspects of the 
Remediation Project were considered separately as a part of a Site Stabilization Plan,106 
which was not open to public comment and community members were given little 
information on it.107 This plan outlined general maintenance of the site and included 
stabilization plans for ‘emergency measures’ such as taking down decaying structures. 
																																																								
104 MVEIRB, “Giant Mine Remediation Project Environmental Assessment Hearing, Part 1 of 5” 
(Yellowknife: September 10, 2012), 24.  
105 MVEIRB, “Giant Mine Remediation Project Environmental Assessment Hearing, Part 3 of 5” 
(Yellowknife: September 12, 2012), 167. 
106 See emails between Adrian Paradis and Kathleen Graham, Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board, 
“RE: Giant Mine Activities for Site Stability for Discussion,” posted to the MVLWB public registry 
(MV2007L8-0031: February 28, 2012).  
107 MVEIRB, “Giant Mine Remediation Project Environmental Assessment Hearing, Part 3 of 5” 
(Yellowknife: September 12, 2012), 50.  
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Throughout the public hearings, several stakeholders critiqued the separation between 
remediation and ‘care and maintenance.’108 Kevin O’Reilly argued that Alternatives 
North “does not object to any legitimate work that needs to be done at the site on an 
emergency basis as long as it’s communicated clearly to the public.”109 O’Reilly raised 
concerns that the Site Stabilization Plan was about “fast tracking a lot of this work while 
the environmental assessment was going on and under – in my opinion, undermining your 
authority as a Review Board and this process.”110 Again, the parameters of what was 
included in ‘scope’ of the Remediation Project and the EA were continually debated 
throughout the public hearings.  
 Stemming from a lack of common understanding, the need for independent 
oversight continued to be a point of contention throughout the EA public hearings. 
Leading up to the public hearings, the Giant Mine Remediation Project and the 
community stakeholders had been negotiating independent oversight.111 Ultimately, 
before the public hearings, the government dropped out of this process. This incident 
highlighted a hidden disconnection between the local Project Team and government in 
Ottawa. While local government employees saw the need for community oversight, 
Ottawa was unwilling to implement this unless the EA forced it.112 Todd Slack and Kevin 
																																																								
108 See public hearing presentations on surface remediation from Alternatives North, NSMA, YKDFN; 
MVEIRB, “Giant Mine Remediation Project Environmental Assessment Hearing, Part 3 of 5” 
(Yellowknife: September 12, 2012).    
109 MVEIRB, “Giant Mine Remediation Project Environmental Assessment Hearing, Part 3 of 5” 
(Yellowknife: September 12, 2012), 202-203 
110 Ibid. 
111 Kevin O’Reilly (MLA and former representative for Alternatives North), interview with author (May 13, 
2016); Adrian Paradis (former Giant Mine Remediation Project manager) interview with author (June 7, 
2016). Todd Slack (former YKDFN employee), interview with author (May 26, 2016); David Livingstone 
(former INAC employee, GMOB Director), interview with author (May 13, 2016).  
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O’Reilly reflected that they felt led on by these negotiations; for them, the government 
dropping out of negotiations for independent oversight drastically changed the tenor of 
the public hearings.113 Community stakeholders had no way to hold the government 
accountable for promises or to independently track remediation progress. They were 
afraid that the government, with vague mentions of commitments to engagement and 
perpetual care, could easily disregard these promises at the end of the day.114  
 Many community members, including the YKDFN and North Slave Métis, 
repeatedly demanded that independent oversight be included in binding EA Measures.115 
But when concerns about independent oversight were raised in the public hearings, the 
government focused on the role that the Giant Mine Community Alliance could play in 
the future as some form of oversight. However, Bob Bromely, a local MLA, who had 
been involved in the Community Alliance, stated, “I became disillusioned with the lack of 
commitment from the proponent/regulators to public oversight. And in protest on this 
issue, I declined further participation on the coalition, but alas, for little result.”116 
Another MLA, Wendy Bisaro added to this sentiment:  
 Communication is another area of concern for me. I believe the Developer has 
addressed this in presentations, but I feel little comfort in their plans. Describing 
the Giant Mine Alliance as a successful communication tool is not correct… I see 
little from the Alliance. I don’t feel it has a good track record to date and I don’t 
have any expectations that it will improve.117  
 																																																								
113 Todd Slack (former YKDFN employee), interview with author (May 26, 2016); Kevin O’Reilly (MLA 
and former representative for Alternatives North), interview with author (May 13, 2016). 
114 MVEIRB, “Giant Mine Remediation Project Environmental Assessment Hearing, Part 1 of 5” 
(Yellowknife: September 10, 2012), 47. 
115 Ibid., 96-98. 
116 MVEIRB, “Giant Mine Remediation Project Environmental Assessment Hearing, Part 2 of 5” 
(Yellowknife: September 11, 2012), 370. 
117 Ibid., 378.  
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Stakeholders, including Alternatives North, the YKDFN, NSMA and the City of 
Yellowknife were adamant that some kind of independent oversight would be necessary 
to ensure meaningful engagement, to provide a structure for ongoing research and 
communication and to ensure that the Project Team would be held accountable.  
 Community stakeholders, particularly City of Yellowknife representatives, also 
repeatedly expressed their concerns about a lack of planning for future land use. Jeff 
Humble, a City of Yellowknife planner, stated: “It’s the City’s position that a land use 
plan was part, or should have been part, of the remediation plans. And here we are, at the 
end of a twelve-year process, and only now is this issue coming to the surface… I’ve 
been a planner for more than ten years, and I’ve never seen a land use plan come at the 
tail end of a process.”118 The lack of future land use planning is also connected to 
perpetual care and long-term management, which was a focal point of the public hearings, 
including presentations from all stakeholders on their perceptions of perpetual care over 
the fourth and fifth day of the hearings.119 Alternatives North had also contracted a report 
from Joan Kuyek, entitled, “The Theory and Practice of Perpetual Care of Contaminated 
Sites,” which outlined examples of other perpetual care sites.120 The developer did 
propose a vision of perpetual care that included “building a positive value into a closed 
mine” and are committed to working together with the stakeholders in the future to figure 
																																																								
118 MVEIRB, “Giant Mine Remediation Project Environmental Assessment Hearing, Part 3 of 5” 
(Yellowknife: September 12, 2012), 44. 
119 MVEIRB, “Giant Mine Remediation Project Environmental Assessment Hearing, Part 4 of 5” 
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out the best way to design a comprehensive perpetual care plan.121 However, community 
stakeholders did not trust these vague promises and wanted a binding measure to ensure 
perpetual care planning would happen and that long-term funding would be secured. 
Suggestions for perpetual care included discussions on cultural perceptions of time, 
building a database or library with records, developing specific land regulations, ensuring 
consistent funding and communicating with future generations. The developer continually 
stated that there is time to figure these things out and their concern is to first get the site 
stabilized, but as Todd Slack points out:  
 Considering the project has had thirteen years and the Baker Creek remediation 
plan is not in place, and there’s no real ETA attached to that, what language would 
the proponent find acceptable for a binding measure to ensure that the transition 
and perpetual care plans are going to be completed within an appropriate 
schedule?122  
 
Dr. Ian Gilchrist, a former Chief Medical Officer of Health and member of the NWT 
Water Board stated:  
 It sounds to me like a good thing, the perpetual care of the Giant site. I would 
suggest that that title, that topic, needs to be accompanied by another one, which 
is: perpetual caring, perpetual caring for people. And I think it leads you to go 
beyond some of the very physical, technical stuff that we have seen here.123 
 
Again and again, the community stakeholders pushed for binding measures regarding a 
perpetual care plan that would care for the community and the land. 
 Throughout the public hearings, there was a continual disconnect between what 
the Project Team was presenting and what the community stakeholders were asking for. 
																																																								
121 MVEIRB, “Giant Mine Remediation Project Environmental Assessment Hearing, Part 4 of 5” 
(Yellowknife: September 13, 2012), 82.  
122 Ibid., 125.  
123 Emphasis added, MVEIRB, “Giant Mine Remediation Project Environmental Assessment Hearing, Part 
5 of 5” (Yellowknife: September 13, 2012), 37.  
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Community stakeholders understood that the frozen block method was the best option at 
the time and there was general acceptance that the site was being monitored and that good 
science was being done. However, this was not the issue; to many community 
participants, remediation was about accountability, independent oversight, and ensuring 
responsibility long into the future: 
 On the one side you have the engineering/physical work side of the project. We 
think they’ve done most of the reasonably well. There’s still some concerns. But 
on the human and social side, apology and compensation, we don’t have that. 
Local political support for the project, not there. Ongoing research and 
development, not there. Independent oversight, not there. Long-term funding 
arrangements, not in place. Full disclosure of information and records, not there. 
No thoughts about site designation, land use controls. No comprehensive 
perpetual care plan. No environmental agreement. And finally, no social license or 
contract for this project to proceed.124 
 
Even if every community member was not outwardly expressing their concern loudly at 
the hearings, looking back, interviewees remembered feelings of stress and anxiety: 
“psychologically when you live next to something that’s there all the time… it weighs in 
the back of your mind but you still have to go about your life and so you don’t act like 
you’re expecting it to go off at any second, but it doesn’t mean that it’s not in your 
mind… at a conscience or at least subconscious level.”125 Person after person stood up to 
question the project team and the board, through “pouring thunderstorms and power 
failures… there were reasons why the board reached its conclusions about widespread 
public anxiety.”126  
																																																								
124 MVEIRB “Giant Mine Remediation Project Environmental Assessment Hearing, Part 1 of 5” 
(Yellowknife, September 10, 2012) 113-114.  
125 Alan Erlich (Director, Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board), interview with author 
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 The public hearings revealed the incredible lack of trust in the government-lead 
remediation process. Instead of listening, and putting in place mechanisms to develop 
trust, the project stuck to their project mandate without compromise. Randy Freeman, an 
employee of the YKDFN Lands and Environment Department stated, “This is a matter of 
trust. When we hear statements like, we’re developing this information, or… that the 
project is exploring the issue or that research is required, what we hear is that our 
concerns are not and will not be addressed.”127 Time and time again, Joanna Ankersmit, 
the Director of CARD, stated that she did not see any need for substantial community 
concern. Even at the end of day five of public hearings, after hearing long lists of 
concerns, questions and fears from community members, when questioned, the Director 
of CARD refused to acknowledge the public concern.128 What became obvious was that 
the local project team did not have the authority or resources to facilitate public concerns 
and that the federal government had been dragged through this process with little good 
will. While community concerns were not openly addressed in the scoping documents or 
in the DAR, the public hearings did result in a Reasons for Decision document that was, 
to some, quite shocking, and quite different from any remediation documents before it. 
 
The Giant Mine Remediation Report of Environmental Assessment 
 The community directed EA process resulted in a Board decision that was quite 
different from the initial decision to bypass an environmental assessment. The Report of 																																																								
127 MVEIRB “Giant Mine Remediation Project Environmental Assessment Hearing, Part 3 of 5” 
(Yellowknife, September 12, 2012), 165. 
128 MVEIRB, “Giant Mine Remediation Project Environmental Assessment Hearing, Part 5 of 5” 
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Environmental Assessment and Reasons for Decision, published on June 20th, 2013 
outlined a vision of remediation that would drastically alter how the project was 
approached over the coming years. This report concluded, against the Project Team’s 
many arguments, that the remediation project was “likely to cause significant adverse 
impacts on the environment, including cumulative impacts arising from the potential 
effects of the Project in combination with the effects of past activities.”129 Referencing 
Chief Sangris, the Review Board stated that, “the concerns expressed related directly to 
project-specific and cumulative aspects of the proposed Project… the YKDFN view both 
the historical contamination and the proposed clean-up as separate wrongs.”130 The 
Review Board rejected the Project Team’s argument that community concerns were 
linked to historical mining, and therefore were not within the mandate of the remediation 
project. However, the Report of EA (REA) failed to provide any guidance on ways to 
address calls for apologies and compensation regarding historical legacies. According to 
the Review Board, “there is an apparent gap between the Developer’s view of community 
concerns and of the actual concerns expressed by community residents.”131 
 The REA outlined twenty-six measures that, if approved by territorial and federal 
ministers, would be legally binding. These measures addressed the majority of concerns 
raised over the four years of environmental assessment, including perpetual care 
(Measures 1 and 2 and Suggestion 4), ongoing research (Measure 3 and 4), funding 
(Measure 3, 5 and 7 and Suggestion 5), independent oversight (Measure 3, 7 and 8 and 
																																																								
129 Mackenzie Valley Review Board, Report of Environmental Assessment and Reasons for Decision: Giant 
Mine Remediation Project (EA0809-001: June 20, 2013), i. 
130 Ibid., 27. 
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Suggestion 6), health effects on people (Measure 5, 9 and 10 and Suggestion 7 and 8), 
Baker Creek (Measure 11 and Suggestion 9), water quality and the diffuser (Measure 12-
17, Suggestion 10), management of underground arsenic by ground freezing (Measure 18, 
19), surface reclamation (Measures 20-26, Suggestions 11-15), traditional land use 
(Suggestion 16), community engagement (Suggestion 1), and communicating with future 
generations (Suggestions 2 and 3).132 The Review Board did not recommend any binding 
measures specifically addressing traditional land use, community engagement or 
communicating with future generations, but these themes appeared throughout measures 
directed at perpetual care, oversight, health effects, and consultation for surface design. 
The Report of EA (REA) also shifted the timeframe of the project; the frozen block 
method was framed as an interim solution rather than a final solution. According to the 
Review Board, limiting the project to 100 years would “facilitate ongoing research in 
emerging technologies towards finding a permanent solution.”133 
 Over the following year, stakeholder parties and the project team submitted 
comments on this Report to the MVEIRB and federal ministers. Most parties, including 
the YKDFN, Alternatives North, the NSMA, the City of Yellowknife and local MLAs 
expressed their desire to have the binding measures accepted and implemented as soon as 
possible.134  According to the YKDFN:  
 Comparing the initial Project proposal and the Measures and Suggestions from the 
Board, we feel that the deficiencies of the proposal have been remedied. It is 
imperative that the Crown implement the Suggestions provided in the REA to 																																																								
132 Mackenzie Valley Review Board, Report of Environmental Assessment and Reasons for Decision: Giant 
Mine Remediation Project.	
133 Ibid., i.  
134 See several letters from the YKDFN, Alternatives North, NSMA, the City of Yellowknife and local 
MLAs on the Giant Mine Remediation Environmental Assessment Registry, filed between August 2013 and 
November 2013 under Post-Report Materials.  
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address all of the YKDFN’s concerns… YKDFN views implementation of the 
Suggestions as instrumental to satisfying the Crown’s duties.135   
 
In an earlier letter to the relevant federal ministers, the YKDFN also stated that: 
 We know that there are many people within your organization that will want to 
excise portions of the decision. However, we ask that you keep the decision as is – 
it gives us a good path forward and will provide a site that is of use to the people 
who live here. This path forward takes one of the greatest environmental disasters 
and creates conditions that will let us turn it into a site that provides great 
opportunity and benefit for future generations.136 
 
 The Project Team on the other hand, submitted a letter that expressed their 
disagreement with the Report of Environmental Assessment: “We have concluded that 
the potential impacts of the Review Board’s recommendations are significant with respect 
to each of the project scope, schedule and cost.”137 The Project Team’s first major 
concern expressed in this letter was a delay in the project due to the requirement to fulfill 
some measures before application for a water license. They stated that: “the first impact is 
that a delay leaves in place a dangerous and deteriorating status quo that will expose the 
community and the environment to continued or increased risk.”138 They also rejected the 
requirement for an environmental agreement, as outlined in Measure 7:  
 A distinct issue with recommended Measure 7 is that it essentially hands each of 
the members of the Oversight Working Group a veto of the commencement of 
‘major project activities’. The recommended measure would do so by making 
successful conclusion of negotiations of the agreement with (at a minimum) all the 																																																								
135 Letter from the YKDFN to Matt Spence, Director General of the Northern Projects Management Office. 
“RE: Invitation to Provide Comments on the Giant Report of EA” (August 15, 2013).  
136 Letter from Chief Edward Sangris, Yellowknives Dene First Nation (Dettah) to Bernard Valcourt, 
Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development, Gail Shea, Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, 
Leona Aglukkaq, Minister of Environment and Michael Miltenburger, GNWT Environment and Natural 
Resources, “RE: Giant Mine Report of Environmental Assessment” (August 2, 2013).  
137 Letter from Joanna Ankersmit, Executive Director of the Contaminated Sites Program, Aboriginal 
Affairs and Northern Development and Ray Case, Assistant Deputy Minister, Corporate and Strategic 
Planning, GNWT to Mr. Matthew Spence, Director General, Northern Projects Management Office, 
Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency, “RE: Proponent’s Response to Correspondence in the 
Report of Environmental Assessment of the Giant Mine Remediation Project” (November 1, 2013), 3.  
138 Ibid., 4.  
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members of the Oversight Board a condition precedent to major Project activities. 
This would create a wholly unbalanced negotiation environment. For every 
negotiation point, the Project Team (ultimately the Crown) would be forced to 
choose between conceding the point or delaying the Project. As a result, 
recommended Measure 7 would be problematic for timely decisions making, 
particularly decisions related to addressing urgent risks.139  
 
The Project Team’s response to the EA report caused a lot of frustration amongst 
community stakeholders, who regarded the environmental agreement as a basis for 
building community trust in the project.140 According to one local MLA, Bob Bromley, 
the Project team rejected “any need for an environmental agreement or independent 
oversight.” He goes one to state that, “City council, the Yellowknives Dene, the NWT 
Legislative Assembly, unions, church groups and private citizens all came out and said 
support this, implement it… Now the project team says, ‘trust us, we don’t need to 
implement these requirements.’”141 As Mr. Bromley points out, without these 
requirements the project would have no community trust going forward.  
  Despite the public concern that was recorded by the Land and Water Board in 
2007, despite the ongoing grievances and stories shared by passionate and committed 
community members throughout the EA process, and despite the final report of EA that 
supported these concerns, the government project continued to reject community 
concerns. After a year of further correspondence, the measures outlined in the REA were 
modified slightly by the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development in 
correspondence with the community stakeholders and the project, but in the end, were 
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approved and implemented in August 2014.142 At this point, the Project was forced into 
an environmental agreement. This was a watershed moment for community stakeholders. 
However, they had to fight to get there and many still find it hard to trust a project that 
was forced into an agreement in the first place.   
 
Conclusion 
 The Environmental Assessment represented a turning point in the Giant Mine 
Remediation process and has empowered the community to have a stronger voice in how 
remediation is carried out. The issues raised throughout the Environmental Assessment 
and formalized in the Environmental Agreement were a culmination of over a decade of 
debate on how to contain the Giant Mine Monster. Initial agreements made between the 
federal government, the GNWT and Miramar were not open to community consultation 
and the resulting arsenic and surface remediation research was defined in isolation from 
community concerns. The studies and planning done by INAC, SRK, YASRC and 
Miramar between 1999-2007 presented remediation as a specific measurement goal, 
something that could be quantifiably attained and then put aside: a checklist of 
‘acceptable’ toxic thresholds based on mathematically determined potential risks rather 
than on a discussion of what the community itself deemed ‘acceptable.’ Such a threshold 
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management approach did not account for the social and political effects of mining – the 
social ‘waste’ or ‘debris’ was not included.  
 The community was not involved in defining remediation objectives or the 
borders of contamination, and therefore did not have a say in what space was ‘worth’ 
being remediated or how remediation would progress. There was no public discussion of 
how off-site contamination would be managed. In addition, Miramar’s surface 
remediation plan was separated from arsenic management plans and there was no public 
forum provided for discussions on surface design, future land use or long-term care and 
maintenance. All community consultations focused on educating the public about what 
was the best option for managing underground arsenic on site. In this sense, the Giant 
Mine Remediation Project contained knowledge about remediation to technical 
definitions of arsenic management within the lease site. 
 Throughout the early years of research, consultation and remediation planning, the 
Project Team was also dealing with a materially complex and dynamic site; decisions had 
to be made in order to ensure safety. While the arsenic trioxide management studies 
defined the final remediation plan, everything else was relegated to ‘care and 
maintenance’ or ‘stabilization’ plans. Only certain aspects of remediation, such as arsenic 
management, were presented to the public. And even these discussions were limited to 
two technical options. Quarterly reports and applications for water license renewals report 
a lot of ongoing repair, maintenance and care of the site.143 The government, perhaps 
unintentionally, used the ‘care and maintenance’ or ‘emergency actions’ guise to 																																																								
143 See the Giant Mine Remediation Project, “Arsenic Trioxide Management Project- Progress Report,” 
submitted to the Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board between 2001-2005. These were quarterly 
reports submitted to the MVLWB under the water license N1L2-0043.  
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implement certain management practices and ‘ongoing remediation’ without consulting 
the community before the publication of the final remediation plan. These day-to-day 
actions and care plans were not considered in public presentations or planning documents.  
 The Lutra and GeoNorth studies done in 2002 and community workshops 
throughout 2002-2003 show community members’ desire for recognition, participation 
and capabilities within the remediation planning process. More specifically, community 
members expressed a desire for independent oversight and a say in how remediation 
would be defined. However, initial community consultations were limited to one-way 
presentations and despite the GMRP’s stated commitment to community engagement, 
information was again limited to the technical management of underground arsenic 
trioxide. The creation of the Giant Mine Community Alliance also failed to provide any 
kind of meaningful independent oversight. After 2003, communications and engagements 
went relatively dark. While these early community engagement processes did provide 
some level of communication, they failed to gain the trust of the community because 
stakeholders had not been involved in setting remediation objectives from day one.  
 The lack of discussion about what remediation was, what actions it would include 
and how it would be connected to day-to-day and long-term care and maintenance led to a 
disconnected Final Remediation Plan that overlooked the links between the large arsenic 
containment project, the more general surface remediation and design, and the long term, 
ongoing care of the site. Despite recommendations from technical advisors, the Land and 
Water Board staff, the YKDFN and other community stakeholders to put the 2007 
Remediation Plan through an environmental assessment, the Land and Water Board 
approved the plan for licensing. Again, this decision was based on a technical assessment 
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of the plan and assumed that since the frozen block method was the best available 
method, it was the only way forward. This decision did not take into account community 
stakeholders’ opinions on the morals and values of remediation or their concerns about 
future land uses, independent oversight or perpetual care. In seeking to contain the 
underground arsenic monster, the GMRP sidelined what the community considered to be 
important ‘matters of concern’ and ‘matters of care;’ all of the opinions involved in the 
Giant Mine Remediation Project were not considered equally.   
 Many Yellowknife city citizens and the YKDFN did not feel that the 2007 
Remediation Plan would keep their community safe for generations to come. The 
cumulative human and ecological health risks due to historical, present and future 
exposures, along with the effects of stress, marginalization, and injustice could not be 
easily measured, charted or placed in formulas. The technical information presented could 
not be translated into everyday effects and everyday practices of repair, restoration and 
care over the long term. The realities of this complex site and the potential for slow 
violence and perpetual care that it presented were not communicated or discussed in a 
meaningful way through initial planning processes, resulting in the marginalization of the 
voices most affected. When the community stakeholders forced the GMRP into an 
environmental assessment, they were not simply rejecting the frozen block arsenic 
management alternative, rather, they were also rejecting the way in which that plan was 
reached.  
 Typically, an environmental assessment is not thought of as a social trust building 
process, but rather a technical, risk assessment process. Environmental assessments are 
set up to assess the potential risks that a development might pose to environmental and 
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human health; they are not necessarily social assessments.144 It is not necessarily set up to 
address independent oversight, off-site contamination, historical legacies or 
reconciliation. At the beginning of the Giant Mine Environmental Assessment, the scope 
of the Project was again limited to the remediation project to on-site contamination. It did 
not look at alternatives to the frozen block method and it did not directly address the 
legacy of the Giant Mine. In addition, environmental assessments are a difficult process 
to navigate and stakeholders initially received no funding to participate: “Yellowknives 
[Dene] aren’t keen on the Land and Water Board system, but if they don’t navigate there 
then they don’t have a say.”145 However, through the public hearings specifically, 
community stakeholders used the EA platform to begin redefining remediation as 
something that should be based on community engagement and should include 
independent oversight,  
 Community concerns finally began to be addressed in the Reasons for Decisions 
document published by the MVEIRB and the resulting Environmental Agreement. And 
while the remediation project is still limited to on-site contamination and the frozen block 
method, the Environmental Agreement sets in place structures for continued community 
engagement, meaningful independent oversight and ongoing research for better 
remediation alternatives in the future. Another important result of the EA is the shift from 
thinking about the frozen block as the best solution (and possibly the final solution), to 																																																								
144 Patricia Fitzpatrick, A. John Sinclair, and Bruce Mitchell, “Environmental Impact Assessment Under the 
Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act: Deliberative Democracy in Canada’s North?” 
Environmental Management 42 (2008): 1-18; Stephen Ellis, “Meaningful Consideration? A Review of 
Traditional Knowledge in Environmental Decision Making,” Arctic 58, no. 1 (2005): 66-77; Derek R. 
Armitage, “Collaborative environmental assessment in the Northwest Territories, Canada,” Environmental 
Impact Assessment Review 25 (2005): 239-258.  
145 Todd Slack (former YKDFN employee), interview with author (May 26, 2016).  
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thinking about this as an interim solution – the temporality of the project shifted. Most 
importantly, this change emphasized the ongoing process of remediation and perpetual 
care. It is not an end point or end solution, but rather a continual process of monitoring, 
maintenance, experimentation, tinkering, negotiation, and research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 148	
CHAPTER 5 
CONFRONTING AND CARING FOR THE GIANT MINE MONSTER 
“These stories are still alive and there’s never been an inquiry. There’s never been a 
commission, investigation, nothing. To our people that’s… like a homicide; who done it 
and why it happened, unanswered questions still today. We’re still thinking about it. It 
never goes away. Now our children and grandchildren are going to hear about those 
stories as well because we’ve written it. We’ve written about it and we tell stories about 
it.”1 – Fred Sangris, Former Chief of the YKDFN 
 
Introduction 
 After seven intense negotiation sessions over six months, on June 9, 2015, the 
Giant Mine Remediation Project Environmental Agreement was signed by six stakeholder 
groups: the YKDFN, the North Slave Métis Alliance, Alternatives North, the City of 
Yellowknife, the Government of the Northwest Territories and the Government of 
Canada. This agreement marked a major milestone in the story of remediation at Giant 
Mine. As the first environmental agreement to be signed for the remediation of an 
abandoned mine, this agreement has the potential to influence future remediation projects 
across Canada. The Giant Mine Environmental Agreement was modelled after the 
environmental agreements signed for the development of diamond mines in the 
Northwest Territories, which established independent oversight boards and environmental 
monitoring programs.2 Following a commissioned report on independent oversight 
																																																								
1 MVEIRB, “Giant Mine Remediation Project Environmental Assessment Hearing, Part 1 of 5,” 
(Yellowknife, September 10, 2012), 247-248. 
2 William Couch, “Strategic resolution of policy, environmental and socio-economic impacts in Canadian 
Arctic diamond mining: BHP’s NWT diamond project,” Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 20, no.4 
(2002): 265-278.  For more information on the development and signing of the environmental agreements 
for diamond mines in the NWT, see Ellen Bielawski’s, Rogue Diamonds, 2003. The Environmental 
Agreements at Ekati and Diavik were signed in 1997 and 2000 respectively, setting a new standard for 
independent oversight, environmental agreements and impact benefit agreements between local 
communities and resource developments in the NWT. During the set up of these committees, the 
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completed for the Environmental Assessment in 2011, the parties to the Agreement 
sought to develop an oversight board and reporting structure that created and preserved 
public trust in the Remediation Project.3  
 In addition to the creation of an oversight board, funded by the Government of 
Canada, the Giant Mine Environmental Agreement provides a structure for the 
development of a coordinated, collaborative approach to the Review Board Measures, 
including an extensive public reporting structure.4 Objectives outlined in the 
Environmental Agreement include: protection of the environment and the way of life of 
Aboriginal peoples and other residents, the elimination or mitigation of risks, an 
integrated eco-system approach to monitoring and management, the minimization of 
perpetual care requirements, effective communications with future generations, and 
meaningful participation of the public in the implementation of the Agreement and the 
Review Board Measures.5 According to Kevin O’Reilly of Alternatives North:  
 This has been a long struggle for our community to have a more meaningful role 
in the remediation of Giant Mine… this agreement is for the life of the project, or 
basically forever, and sets out an integrated approach to a social license for the 
remediation to move forward.6 
 																																																																																																																																																																					
environmental degradation, toxicity and political mess of Giant Mine was mentioned several times. 
Although these committees have their own faults and challenges, they did set a precedent for such processes 
in the NWT at the same time that Giant was closing. The Independent Environmental Monitoring Agency 
was created through the 1997 Environmental Agreement negotiated for the Ekati Diamond Mine. Along 
similar lines, the Environmental Monitoring Advisory Board was created in 2000 for the Diavik Diamond 
Mine.  
3 Natasha Affolder, Katy Allen, and Sascha Paruk, Independent Environmental Oversight: A Report for the 
Giant Mine Remediation Environmental Assessment, submitted to the MVEIRB public registry (February 
2011).  
4 Alternatives North, “News Release on Giant Mine Environmental Agreement,” (June 17, 2015). 
5 Giant Mine Remediation Project Environmental Agreement, between Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 
the Government of the Northwest Territories, the Yellowknives Dene First Nations, the City of 
Yellowknife, Alternatives North and the North Slave Metis (June 9, 2015).  
6 Alternatives North, “News Release on Giant Mine Environmental Agreement,” 1. 
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The Giant Mine Remediation Project Environmental Agreement solidified the measures 
of the Environmental Assessment in a legal document that is now used to direct the 
remediation project based on community objectives.  
 The Giant Mine Environmental Assessment, the resulting measures and the 
Environmental Agreement represented a turning point in remediation at the Giant Mine. 
Not only was the Project Team forced to redefine remediation in correspondence with the 
twenty-six EA measures, but it was also challenged to move beyond remediation as 
simply technical, towards a relational approach to remediation. This chapter first outlines 
how the Giant Mine Remediation Project has changed since the EA and the signing of the 
Environmental Agreement. Through the Surface Design Engagement workshops, regular 
Giant Mine Working Group meetings, and the creation of the Giant Mine Oversight 
Board (GMOB) there has been a move towards a more consistent, ongoing discussion and 
engagement with stakeholders. This is not to suggest that the Giant Mine Remediation 
Project no longer faces communication challenges. Fundamentally, remediation continues 
to be technically directed, due to the very scientifically complex, contaminated nature of 
the site. However, there is now space for the community stakeholders to demand answers, 
to provide feedback on planning and to be directly involved in setting project objectives. 
According to interviewees, the relationship between the Project Team and the community 
stakeholders has become more reciprocal, if not entirely equal.7   
																																																								
7 Johanne Black (Director of the YKDFN Land and Environment Department), interview with author (June 
8, 2016); William Lines (Giant Mine Committee Liaison for the YKDFN), interview with author (May 18, 
2016);  Kevin O’Reilly (MLA and former representative for Alternatives North), interview with author 
(May 13, 2016); Natalie Plato (Head of the Giant Mine Remediation Project Team), interview with author 
(May 17, 2016).  
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 Using thematic interview data, this chapter will then explore various stakeholder 
reflections on the Giant Mine Remediation Project, and in doing so highlights points of 
contention and convergence about what remediation means at the Giant Mine. The varied 
definitions and experiences of remediation at Giant showcase a diversity of complex 
relationships with the mine site and between stakeholders. A majority of interviewees’ 
reflections on the history and process of remediation at Giant focused on the theme of 
(mis)trust and (mis)communication.  These ongoing issues shape community concerns 
about the definitions of remediation, off-site contamination, future land use, perpetual 
care, and apology, compensation and reconciliation. This chapter will delve into each of 
these overlapping themes and how they connect to concerns about trust, communication 
and care. While there is a general community consensus that the Environmental 
Assessment, and even more so the Environmental Agreement and the creation of the 
GMOB, improved trust and communication between the project and the community, 
many community members continue to express concern (or lack of trust) in the 
government to meaningfully address reconciliation and perpetual care.8  
 Bringing together the analysis of the Giant Mine Remediation post EA, and the 
reflections of stakeholders, I argue that the Giant Mine Monster is much more than just 
arsenic; it is a legacy of relationships; it is a troubled history of degradation and 
marginalization; and it is an accumulation of multiple forms of contamination that stretch 
beyond the mine site itself. While the Environmental Assessment, the Environmental 																																																								
8 Several interviewees did express the feeling that the Environmental Assessment did not necessarily benefit 
the community of Yellowknife because it prolonged the Remediation process. However, most interviewees 
did agree that this process improved communication between the project and the community. See: Adrian 
Paradis (former Giant Mine Remediation Project manager) interview with author (June 7, 2016); Walt and 
Diane Humphries (volunteers with Mining Heritage), interview with author (May 17, 2016); Rob Lok (City 
of Yellowknife employee), interview with author (May 9, 2016).  
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Agreement and the creation of the Giant Mine Oversight Body have pushed discussion on 
the Giant Mine Remediation beyond a technical clean up and containment approach, the 
project has yet to officially recognize and confront the issues of apology, compensation 
and reconciliation for the YKDFN. According to the YKDFN, caring for the Giant Mine, 
the land, and the community in perpetuity requires an official government 
acknowledgement of calls for apology and compensation. For the community to heal, 
there needs to be recognition of responsibility for past harms. 
 
Confronting the Monster: The ‘New’ Giant Mine Remediation Project 
 This section focuses on how the community has re-defined remediation at Giant 
Mine since the signing of the Environmental Agreement. The Giant Mine Monster is now 
being confronted using multiple perspectives through processes such as the Surface 
Design Engagement process and the ongoing health and environmental studies that are 
now being undertaken by the GMRPT. Second, the Giant Mine Oversight Board has been 
fundamental in providing a structural, consistent mechanism to continue to confront and 
care for the Giant Mine Monster over the coming decades. Therefore, this section will end 
with a reflection of the role of GMOB and a summary of their first year in operation. 
According to most interviewees, this ‘new’ Giant Mine Remediation Project has led to a 
more positive feeling in the community about remediation; it is an ongoing story of 
community perseverance, passion and care for their land, their neighbours and their 
future.  
Surface Design Engagement Evaluation Workshop 
 The Surface Design Engagement Process reoriented the Giant Mine Remediation 
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Project Team’s approach to community engagement in order to better align the Project 
with the EA Measures and Environmental Agreement, which called for direct community 
engagement in the design of remediation options. However, this engagement process did 
not include discussion about alternative remediation strategies for the underground 
arsenic, as the Environmental Assessment solidified underground freezing as the accepted 
‘in-term’ solution. Unlike the process used to determine arsenic trioxide management 
options, community objectives and definitions for surface remediation were established 
before engineering designs were completed. These options were then used to evaluate the 
performance of various remediation options during the February 2016 Surface Design 
Engagement Evaluation Workshop.9  
 Preparations for the February 2016 Surface Design Workshop began almost a year 
earlier in consultation with the newly formed Giant Mine Working Group, an 
organization that now meets monthly, is hosted by the GMRPT and includes 
representation from all stakeholder groups. Throughout May 2015, Bill Slater, a technical 
advisor hired to assist the Giant Mine Working Group met with each stakeholder group in 
order to identify objectives for surface remediation.10 These stakeholder meetings asked 
questions such as: “What vision do you have for the site… [and]… what are the important 
values that could be affected by the project.”11 This was followed by an ‘options 
definition workshop’ in June 2015, which coincided with the signing of the 
Environmental Agreement. Dr. Arn Keeling attended this workshop on behalf of the 																																																								
9 Memorandum from Bill Slater, Technical Advisor to the Giant Mine Working Group, “RE: Giant Mine 
Remediation Project – Objectives” (January 28, 2016).  
10 SRK Consulting Ltd., “Giant Mine Remediation Project Surface Design Engagement Options Evaluation 
Workshop: Draft Report,” prepared for Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada (April 2016), 4.  
11 Ibid., italics added.  
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Toxic Legacies project, at the invitation of the YKDFN. The ‘options definition 
workshop’ was used to identify, discuss and define the possibilities for remediation of 
Baker Creek, pits, tailings ponds, contaminated soils and infrastructure on site. 
Participants were asked to list their ideas of how remediation of these various surface 
components might happen, and were then asked to develop a ‘complete vision’ for 
surface remediation.12 Finally, participants were asked to discuss ideal forms of 
stewardship and long-term care of the site. Two major themes for surface remediation 
emerged from the June workshop: “some of the groups wanted to keep the site ‘grey and 
ugly’ to discourage people from going to or using the site, and some of the groups wanted 
people to be able to use some or all of the land in some way.”13 One common theme 
expressed by all groups was the inclusion of some kind of monument, interpretive centre 
or research centre that would document the Giant Mine’s legacy and effect on the 
YKDFN. Using these visions for surface remediation, consultants designed six options 
for surface remediation.14 The risks of these options, and of surface remediation in 
general, were then reviewed in a follow-up workshop in December 2015.15   
 A year of planning and engagement culminated in the final Surface Design 
Engagement Options Evaluation Workshop held in Dettah from February 16-19, 2016. 
The results of this workshop were summarized in the “Draft Report for Surface Design 
																																																								
12 SRK Consulting Ltd., “Appendix B-Options Definition Workshop, Giant Mine Remediation Project 
Surface Design Engagement Options Evaluation Workshop: Draft Report,” prepared for Indigenous and 
Northern Affairs Canada (April 2016).  
13 Ibid., 6-7. 
14A summary of these option is include in: SRK Consulting Ltd., “Giant Mine Remediation Project Surface 
Design Engagement Options Evaluation Workshop: Draft Report.” 
15 Ibid. 
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Engagement,” which will now direct the Project Team’s final Remediation Plan.16 
Participants in the Surface Design Workshop included representatives from Alternatives 
North, the North Slave Métis Alliance, the Giant Mine Remediation Project Team, the 
City of Yellowknife, the NWT Mining Heritage Society, government regulators 
(Environment Canada, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Health Canada and the 
GNWT), technical experts, GMOB Board Members and three tables of YKDFN staff, 
members, and elders. With the permission of the YKDFN, I also participated in the 
Surface Design Evaluation Workshop, sitting alongside Alternatives North and observing 
the evaluation process. This experience opened my eyes to the level of commitment and 
care that community stakeholders, consultants and project team members alike have 
poured into this remediation process. It was obvious that this workshop was an 
accumulation of hours of research, meetings, communications, struggles, disagreements 
and compromises.  
 Throughout the Surface Design Workshop, three days were spent reviewing and 
evaluating each of the six surface remediation options (Fig. 4). On the fourth and final 
day, we summarized our opinions and feedback and were asked to choose our favourite 
options. It was a long and exhausting process. The workshop facilitator, Daryl Hockley of 
SRK Consulting, presented the details of each option before time was given for questions 
and evaluation. This was then followed by a presentation of each group’s feedback. 
 
 																																																								
16 SRK Consulting Ltd., “Giant Mine Remediation Project Surface Design Engagement Options Evaluation 
Workshop: Draft Report.” 
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 Using a five point ranking system from ‘strongly agree,’ to ‘strongly disagree’ 
participants determine whether the option under review fulfilled (or did not fulfill) each 
of the 16 objectives developed during the previous June workshop.17 Each group’s 
ranking was then compiled and presented alongside the ranking of other groups. This 
facilitated discussion on the areas where certain groups agreed or disagreed. It also 																																																								
17 See the SRK Consulting Ltd., “Giant Mine Remediation Project Surface Design Engagement Options 
Evaluation Workshop: Draft Report” for a graphic description of this rating process.  
Fig. 4. Examples of Surface Remediation Design Options: The majority of participants’ favoured 
options 2 and 6. Option 6 would revegetate the covers on the tailings and pits and would remediate 
the waterfront to a residential standard. Option 2 does not include revegetation or residential 
remediation. 	
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allowed the Project Team to determine topics where further consultation might be needed. 
At the end of the workshop participants were asked to rate their preferred options and 
provided advice for how these options could be adapted or merged to form the ideal 
solution.18 
 Some of the most important points of contention throughout the Surface Design 
Workshop were: off-site contamination, the remediation of Baker Creek, surface soil 
remediation, future land use, tailings covers, and communicating with future 
generations.19 The issue of off-site contamination and offshore tailings was brought up 
multiple times throughout the Surface Design Evaluation Workshop.20 According to 
workshop participants and interviewees, this is a persistent source of mistrust.21 The 
remediation of Baker Creek and the restoration of fish populations in the area are also 
connected to this issue of off-site contamination. As was mentioned several times 
throughout the workshop, Baker Creek is continually re-contaminated by sources 
upstream and fish may swim through contaminated areas, and then out into Great Slave 
Lake. In this way, participants in the workshop questioned how surface remediation 
would be connected to a broader geography of the cumulative impacts of mining.  																																																								
18 SRK Consulting Ltd., “Giant Mine Remediation Project Surface Design Engagement Options Evaluation 
Workshop: Draft Report,” 26. 
19 These are my own impressions, summaries and notes taken from my participation in the Giant Mine 
Surface Design Engagement Options Evaluation Workshop (February 16-19, 2016). Conversations with 
interviewees after the workshop have also influenced these impressions. Reflections from interviewees are 
discussed later in this chapter.  
20 Since the original 2007 Remediation Plan, there seems to have been little meaningful discussion on the 
controversy of remediating only within the lease boundary. This seems to be a decision that was made early 
on without consultation. Even in the Environmental Assessment, during scoping sessions, it was decided 
that remediation would be contained within the lease boundary – this was not up for debate throughout the 
EA. See the Giant Mine Remediation Plan (2007); Developers Assessment Report (2010).  
21 Personal notes from the Surface Design Workshop; Johanne Black (Director of the YKDFN Land and 
Environment Department), interview with author (June 8, 2016); Erica Janes (former manager for the Giant 
Mine file with Alternatives North), interview with author (May 16, 2016).  
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 Among the most contentious topics at the workshop were the questions of surface 
soil remediation standards, tailings ponds and future land use at the site.22 As summarized 
in the Options Evaluations Draft Report: “The extent to which future land use should be 
allowed remains an issue where groups disagree.”23 The standard to which the soil is 
remediated could limit future uses. The tailings ponds, being the largest surface 
‘footprint’ on site, also became an important point of contention; should they be re-
greened, used as sports fields, or left as rocky, unwelcoming landscape scars? While the 
Developers Assessment Report and the Environmental Assessment clearly stated that the 
site would be remediated to an ‘industrial standard,’ one of the options included 
remediating the old town site to residential standards (Fig 4) and there was discussion of 
developing the space for tourism, hiking trails and other recreational uses.24 Definitions of 
standards for remediation included ‘industrial,’ ‘recreational’ and ‘residential,’ but the 
exact details of how these standards are determined were unclear throughout the Surface 
Design Workshop. Participants agreed that soils, sediments and tailings ponds should be 
remediated to standards that pose minimal risk under any future land use. But at the same 
time, there was disagreement about whether or not to allow for future use.  
 Many workshop participants wanted to plan for future land uses and perpetual 
care, and then to shape surface remediation around these ideas. Technically, however, the 
																																																								
22 CBC News, “No consensus yet on use of Giant Mine lands after cleanup,” CBC New North (Feb 18, 
2016), accessed July 2017, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/giant-mine-remediation-plans-1.3453698  
23 SRK Consulting Ltd., “Giant Mine Remediation Project Surface Design Engagement Options Evaluation 
Workshop: Draft Report,” 30. 
24 See Options 5 and 6 in SRK Consulting Ltd., “Giant Mine Remediation Project Surface Design 
Engagement Options Evaluation Workshop: Draft Report.” It was decided that Option 5 would not be 
reviewed in depth, as it was very similar to Options 2 and 6. Participants agreed that carrying it through a 
full evaluation would not be of any additional value. In addition, the City of Yellowknife is particularly 
interested in the potential to develop the waterfront area and the old town site.  
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Project Team is taking an approach that remediates and then plans for future land use 
based on the limits of the final remediated site. For several workshop participants, 
planning for surface design and future land use now is extremely important to how this 
site will be communicated to future generations. According to YKDFN members, if the 
site is left ugly, in the future, children will ask, ‘why is that big scar there?’25 According 
to Randy Freeman, a traditional knowledge specialist for the YKDFN, ‘grey and ugly’ 
tailings ponds could be a ‘jumping off point’ – a way to experience the story of Giant 
Mine in future.26 Many workshop participants saw surface remediation as a way to shape 
how the site will be remembered and used in the future.  
 While the Project Team and their consultants preferred to focus on the material 
design of the site and the various options of how tailings could be moved, covered and re-
vegetated, the community participants continually questioned how material remediation 
would affect future land use options and perpetual care, and how it could help to heal past 
scars. These were topics that the community stakeholders brought to the table, with their 
own expertise and experience. Rather than having these concerns dismissed, through the 
Surface Design Engagement Evaluation Workshop, the various stakeholder groups had 
the chance to select, change and make recommendations on options that reflected their 
values for remediation, future land use and perpetual care. While the consultants reviewed 
the technical aspects of each option, participants translated this information, combined it 
with their own values and motivations and selected options that made compromises 
between technical science and their own ideals. Several workshops participants and 																																																								
25 William Lines (Giant Mine Committee Liaison for the YKDFN), interview with author (May 18, 2016) 
26 Randy Freeman (YKDFN employee), interview with author (May 19, 2016).  
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interviewees stated that the Surface Design Workshop was pivotal in ensuring more 
meaningful community engagement and an ongoing process of oversight and 
communication between stakeholders.27  
   
The Giant Mine Oversight Board 
 The Giant Mine Oversight Board opened its doors on Franklin Avenue, the main 
street in Yellowknife, in January 2017. The office provides a space for the public to drop 
in with questions about Giant Mine, and it features models of the underground freezing 
process.28 As mentioned earlier, the GMOB is modelled after the independent oversight 
boards established for diamond mines in the Northwest Territories. It is an autonomous 
body made up of a six-member Board of Directors appointed individually by the parties 
to the Giant Mine Remediation Project Environmental Agreement. As outlined in the 
Environmental Agreement, the role of the Oversight Board is to promote public 
awareness of the project, promote public engagement with the project, provide 
independent advice on the management of the project, and manage a research program 
toward a permanent solution for dealing with arsenic trioxide.29 GMOB’s vision is “that 
the remediation of the Giant Mine site, including the subsurface, is carried out in a 
manner that is environmentally sound, socially responsible, and culturally appropriate.”30 
																																																								
27 Personal notes from discussions with participants throughout the workshop. In addition, several 
interviewees identified the Surface Design Workshop as an example of successful engagement: Johanne 
Black, Kevin O’Reilly, Erica Janes, William Lines, Gordon Hamre, and Tony Brown among others.   
28 Mitch Wiles, “Looking for new ways to clean up toxic mess: Giant Mine Oversight Board opens doors,” 
CBC News, (January 19, 2017). 
29 Giant Mine Remediation Project Environmental Agreement.  
30 GMOB, Establishment Report July 2016-December 2016 (April 2017), 6.  
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 Within the first six months of its operation, the GMOB has reviewed the 2015-
2016 Annual Report for the Giant Mine Remediation Project and has published the 
GMOB Establishment Report. In these two documents, the GMOB explains its role in the 
Remediation Project, introduces preliminary plans for a research program and outlines its 
main concerns with the Remediation Project going forward. The majority of the GMOB’s 
concerns with the 2015-2016 Annual Report centered on the fact the there are no 
mechanisms to track performance measures or community concerns and whether or not 
these concerns are being addressed. According to the GMOB, without such mechanisms, 
it is difficult to evaluate the Remediation Project and ensure accountability.  The GMOB 
review also pointed out smaller details. For example, 2015-2016 Annual Report does not 
reflect what the criteria are for work to be categorized as an ‘emergency measure’ versus 
‘care and maintenance.’ Also, there is no mention of how new remediation technology 
might be incorporated. Such an extensive review is a useful resource for community 
members who do not have the time or resources to review such documents themselves.  
 Building on the review of the 2015-2016 Annual Report, the GMOB’s 
Establishment Report, published in April 2017, looked beyond the details of technical 
remediation and emphasized the need to address social harms. The Establishment Report 
provides the basis for a long-term structure of community-based remediation practices 
and sets up strategies to track and evaluate the Project in a more meaningful way. The 
twelve recommendations outlined in this report were based on the following principles: 
trust, transparency, communication and engagement, reconciliation, social license, 
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culture, knowledge (western scientific and Indigenous), and community well-being.31 The 
principles of remediation outlined in the Establishment Report contrast drastically with 
the risk management principles outlined in earlier remediation plans. More specifically, in 
regards to community engagement, the GMOB noted that the Surface Design Workshop 
seemed to be effective, but other engagement strategies seem less so. The GMRP website 
is out of date, there is no plain language work plan, and the Project Team has no 
publically open office space. The GMOB Establishment Report points out that fewer 
resources have been directed towards these communication efforts than towards technical 
remediation ‘on the ground.’  
 Following the publication of its Establishment Report, the GMOB held its first 
annual public meeting on May 16, 2017 at the Tree of Peace in Yellowknife.32 After Dr. 
Kathleen Racher, the Chair of the GMOB, outlined the role of the GMOB and its initial 
review of the Giant Mine Remediation Project Annual Report, the floor opened up to 
questions. The public was also invited to chat with the various board members after the 
formal presentation. Throughout the evening, the same issues of off-site contamination, 
perpetual care, and apology and compensation continued to be brought up. Multiple 
people expressed their concerns that there was no signage and a general lack of awareness 
around contaminated lakes, trails and recreational areas around Yellowknife. Concerns 
were expressed about arsenic trioxide hotspots in N’dilo near the school and one 
																																																								
31GMOB, Establishment Report July 2016-December 2016; GMRP, “Responses to Recommendations from 
Giant Mine Oversight Board Establishment Report” (May 2017).  
32 I was a participant observer at the GMOB’s first annual public meeting.	
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community member questioned why these spots had not yet been addressed.33 One 
audience member stated that when it comes to contamination and the environment, there 
is no such thing as off-site. Throughout the meeting there was a continual push to deal 
with the off-site issue and the reconciliation issue.  
 However, GMOB plays a strictly advisory role; all they can do is recommend that 
the GMRPT coordinate with the federal government, the GNWT, the City of Yellowknife 
and the YKDFN in order to promptly respond to these concerns.34 This advisory role is a 
challenge for the GMOB; there are few mechanisms to actually enforce their 
recommendations; they have “no contractual means to tell [the Project] that they have to 
do something.”35 Additional challenges that GMOB will face include distinguishing 
themselves as separate from the Giant Mine Remediation Project Team. Tony Brown, a 
GMOB Director, said that the board has been struggling with several challenges in 
starting up and in defining their role more specifically: “there’s this awkwardness where 
we have a storefront in Yellowknife, but the project doesn’t. And we’re going to 
understandably become the face for the project… and I’m a bit concerned about that 
because I think that it shifts the perception of responsibility from the project team to 
us.”36 The GMOB is also not responsible for remediation itself, which some community 
members find confusing.  
																																																								
33 Multiple audience members at the GMOB public meeting expressed these concerns and questions, which 
were also reflected in an interview with Johanne Black. For a summary of some of the concerns expressed 
at the public meeting, see: Richard Gleeson, “Off site arsenic contamination a growing public concern in 
Yellowknife,” CBC News, (May 17, 2017).  
34 Personal notes from participation in the GMOB’s First Annual Public Meeting (May 16, 2017). 
35 David Livingstone (former INAC employee, GMOB Director), interview with author (May 13, 2016) 
36 Brown, Tony (GMOB Director), interview with author (May 25, 2016). 
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  As of this writing, both GMOB and the Giant Mine Remediation Project are 
currently focused on the Health Effects Monitoring Program and the Human and 
Environmental Health Risk Assessment. The monitoring program will determine current 
baseline levels of arsenic exposure and will then monitor exposures throughout the 
remediation process.37 While the monitoring program will evaluate possible changes in 
exposure as a result of the remediation project, it is unable to determine past exposure, or 
the possible harms that have accumulated as a result of exposures over a long period of 
time. In addition to these ongoing health studies, the GMRPT is directly involved in 
monthly meetings with the Giant Mine Working Group and the YKDFN’s Giant Mine 
Advisory Council. There is also work being done towards a socio-economic plan that will 
help to ensure local employment and training throughout the remediation process.38  
 The Giant Mine Remediation Surface Design Options Evaluation Workshops, the 
creation of the GMOB and the ongoing community engagement and health monitoring 
efforts are reflective of a drastic change in the tenure of remediation planning at the Giant 
Mine. This ‘new’ remediation project, is one that most interviewees reflected on as 
something that is more community driven and transparent. However, as the GMOB points 
out in its review of the 2015-2016 Annual Report, while the Project team is logging more 
consistent community engagement hours, there is no process to track this engagement or 
to evaluate whether or not community concerns are actually being dealt with through 																																																								
37 The Health Effects Monitoring Program is lead by Dr. Laurie Chan from the University of Ottawa. It will 
include participants from Yellowknife, N’dlo and Dettah and will begin data collection in the fall of 2017. 
See their website for more details: http://www.ykhemp.ca/  
38 This is all outlined in the GMRP’s 2015-2016 Annual Report (January, 2017). See also the “What’s 
Happening at Giant” Newsletters for more details about community engagement initiative including 
industry fairs, job fairs, public meetings, displays etc.: https://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1374777790923/1374777851043  
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engagement processes. The community is being heard, but it can sometimes be difficult to 
see where these comments go. 
 
Confronting the Giant Mine Monster: Reflections on the Giant Mine Remediation 
Project  
 
“This is not a remediation plan; it’s a stabilization plan. It’s about managing risks… 
when we’ve heard about the objectives of this plan from the Developer, I think it’s clear 
that they don’t really reflect the needs or wants of this community. Whether it’s folks 
uptown, people in Dettah and N’dilo, the community – the objectives of this plan do not fit 
our needs.”39 –Kevin O’Reilly (Alternatives North).  
 
 The Giant Mine Remediation Project is now in a ‘new’ era of planning and many 
community stakeholders continue to look back on what has happened at Giant as they 
move forward. This section focuses on stakeholders’ reflections on the Giant Mine 
Remediation planning process to date and includes an investigation of how perceptions of 
the Giant Mine differ, what interviewees’ definitions and values of remediation are, and 
where they hope to see the remediation project go in the future. As discussed earlier, 
interviewees included people from all community stakeholder groups, government 
employees, regulatory officers, and consultants (Appendix I). Some have lived in 
Yellowknife all their life, some for several years, and some for just the last two years. 
Interviewee reflections on the Giant Mine and the Remediation Project are diverse and 
nuanced and many participants contextualized their experiences within a broader history 
of settlement, industrialization and colonization.  
																																																								
39 MVEIRB, “Giant Mine Remediation Project Environmental Assessment Hearing, Part 4 of 5” 
(Yellowknife, September 13, 2012), 24.  
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 Throughout the interview analysis process, I found it difficult to separate 
participants’ reflections on the Giant Mine Remediation from their experiences of the 
Giant Mine more broadly. Historical narratives and opinions of the mine’s operational 
days were interwoven with details about remediation. Interviewees’ opinions about the 
Giant Mine Remediation Project were often times largely based on their past experience 
with mining companies and government regulators. My attempts to order interviewee 
reflections into some kind of chronological sequence quickly fell apart as participants 
constantly referenced historical events in association with present day remediation 
struggles. Community members used their knowledge of historical legacies to confront 
and question the ways in which remediation had been framed as ahistorical and apolitical. 
In this sense, interviewees’ historical experiences and memories of the Giant Mine cannot 
be detached from their reflections on the Remediation Project and the Environmental 
Assessment. Rather, this section will begin by outlining interviewees’ experiences of the 
Giant Mine legacy and how such experiences are linked to the perspectives and values 
that have driven stakeholder engagement throughout the Environmental Assessment, 
Surface Design Engagement and ongoing planning.  
 
The Giant Mine Legacy  
 Divergent perspectives on the history of Giant Mine are directly related to many 
of the contentious issues that were continually brought up throughout initial community 
consultation, the Environmental Assessment, and current day engagement. In many ways, 
people in Yellowknife are divided between seeing the history of the Giant Mine as a 
‘good’ story or a ‘bad’ one: “There’s a lot of bad that came with it, there’s a lot of good 
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that came with it. Does that bad outweigh the good? Depends on who you talk to.”40 For 
many the mine was an opportunity for a job and the creation of the community: “and so 
we have to recognize the heritage of the community in terms of what those mines meant 
to the community.”41 Nevertheless, as the current Major of Yellowknife stated, “it is 
important that we now change our attitude to a degree about what these mines mean now 
for the community.”42  
 For several interviewees, their experiences of the Giant and Con Mines were ones 
of community building; the Giant Mine represented a job opportunity, economic stability, 
and a place to raise a family. As one community member stated: “there’s probably a 
couple generations of people who worked out at Giant Mine, or even Con Mine. I mean, 
it meant something else… cause it was what led us… my parents… it gave my immigrant 
parents a job and gave my father training… and in so provided for our family… and 
there’s a lot of positive stories around the community.”43 This community member goes 
on to summarize the benefits of Giant Mine, including the construction of hospitals and 
the development of the city of Yellowknife. When speaking about the ‘environmental 
mess’ that is Giant Mine, several community members mentioned that the ‘standards of 
the day’ weren’t good anyway, and that people should understand that and move on.44 
																																																								
40 Adrian Paradis (former Giant Mine Remediation Project manager) interview with author (June 7, 2016). 
41 Mark Heyck, (Mayor of Yellowknife), interview with author (May 10, 2016). 
42 Ibid. 
43 Tom Hoefer (Director of the NWT and Nunavut Chamber of Mines), interview with the author (June 3, 
2016).  
44 Craig Wells (Head of the Giant Mine Remediation Project Team, Ottawa Office), interview with author 
(May 16, 2016); Tom Hoefer (Director of the NWT and Nunavut Chamber of Mines), interview with the 
author (June 3, 2016); Adrian Paradis (former Giant Mine Remediation Project manager) interview with 
author (June 7, 2016); Walt and Diane Humphries (volunteers with Mining Heritage), interview with author 
(May 17, 2016); Ken Hall (former Giant Mine employee, GMOB Director), interview with author (June 7, 
2016).  
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Some stakeholders claimed that the majority of Yellowknifers feel impatient; the mine is 
closed, and they want to see the site remediated as quickly as possible.45 According to one 
GNWT employee, “a lot of people didn’t understand the impacts of the work they were 
doing and the impacts it had on the environment.”46 Several stakeholders expressed a 
general community feeling that the mines are the backbone of the community, an 
important, often positive part of labour and community heritage.  
 By contrast, the YKDFN shared little in this ‘good’ story and they have little faith 
in the Remediation Project to keep them safe in perpetuity. Environmental contamination 
around Yellowknife fundamentally changed a way of life for the YKDFN. They were no 
longer able to use an area that provided hunting, fishing and gathering opportunities: 
“they shut our roads, sled dog trails… they shut it down. I’ll never get there anymore. 
And many people lost their sled dogs. They’ve never been compensated.”47 In 
combination with other developments and settlements in the NWT, and resulting changes 
in the environment, fish and caribou started to disappear: “So if your cultural identity 
depends on that whole cycle of existence… the whole cycle of things just sort of crashed 
to an end.”48 The Giant Mine legacy continues to influence the Yellowknives’ day-to-day 
lives and traditional practices. According to one YKDFN member, pollution and 
																																																								
45 Adrian Paradis (former Giant Mine Remediation Project manager) interview with author (June 7, 2016); 
Walt and Diane Humphries (volunteers with Mining Heritage), interview with author (May 17, 2016); Mike 
Auge (City of Yellowknife employee), interview with author (May 17, 2016). Both Kevin O’Reilly and 
Erica Janes mentioned that the majority of Yellowknifers do not pay attention to the Remediation Project. 
46 Lisa Dyer and Erika Nyyssonen (GNWT Environmental and Natural Resources and the GMRPT), 
interview with author (May 31, 2016).  
47 Fred Sangris (YKDFN member and employee), interview with author (June 8, 2016); Yellowknives Dene 
First Nation Land and Environment Committee, Giant Mine – Our Story: Impact of the Giant Gold Mine on 
the Yellowknives Dene, A Traditional Knowledge Report, prepared for the Department of Indian and 
Northern Affairs Giant Mine Remediation Project (October 13, 2005).  
48 Randy Freeman (YKDFN employee), interview with author (May 19, 2016). 
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environmental destruction was the “driver of the demise of the Yellowknives in terms of 
keeping their traditions alive.”49 YKDFN interviewees reflected that remediation must 
deal with the cumulative consequences of the Giant Mine legacy. 
 With these varying perspectives on history in mind, remediation at the Giant Mine 
becomes a question of what stories are told, and which stories are dominant. As Ben 
Nind, Executive Director of the Giant Mine Oversight Body stated:  
 What stories do we want to tell? Can we think about the community that was built, 
the positive aspects of the community that was built as a result of that activity… 
do you want to dismiss that story? You can’t dismiss that story because that’s 
peoples’ lives… that’s generations of lives that are here.50  
 
At the same time, these good stories, directly and indirectly caused a lot of harm, even if 
it wasn’t known or publically acknowledged at the time. Some interviewees want the 
Remediation Project to address these historical issues directly. As Randy Freeman stated:  
 It’s a real division within the community… I saw that coming out in the 
environmental assessment. You know, why aren’t we recognizing the good that 
the mine did? Well was it really good? From the perspective of the Yellowknives 
Dene it certainly wasn’t. And it wasn’t just the mine putting arsenic into the 
water; it was you know, the creation of the city, the other mines.51 
 
The ‘good’ story is important, but can also be a method of obscuring responsibility for the 
past. According to several interviewees, responsibility for the legacy of Giant Mine 
should be confronted and dealt with through remediation; reconciling with the history of 
the Giant Mine is an essential part of the Remediation Project story. For the YKDFN and 
																																																								
49 Johanne Black (Director of the YKDFN Land and Environment Department), interview with author (June 
8, 2016) 
50 Ben Nind (Executive Director of GMOB), interview with author (May 31, 2016). 
51 Randy Freeman (YKDFN employee), interview with author (May 19, 2016). 
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Alternatives North trust in the Project and transparent community between stakeholders 
will continue to be hindered unless responsibility for mining legacies is acknowledged.52  
 Questions around remediation and future land uses intersect with ideas of heritage 
and remembrance surrounding the Giant site. Some would prefer that the site include 
some formal heritage aspects, such as a museum, interpretive trails, libraries and the 
development of education programs. The YKDFN have also discussed the creation of a 
story or legend about the Giant Mine based on their traditional knowledge. Some YKDFN 
members have struggled with this idea, as legends are not simply ‘made up’ and must 
come from tradition and consultation with elders.53 According to Erika Nyyssonen, a 
GNWT employee: “I think it’s important that it’s not forgotten… all the good and the 
bad… some sort of recognition out there… my personal opinion would be that there be 
some sort of memorial, museum type of center to document the history.”54 Space for an 
interpretive center was included in the surface design workshop options, but the details of 
how this might unfold have not yet been discussed. In this case, negotiating history, and 
the values and morals portrayed will be an important part of community engagement in 																																																								
52 Johanne Black (Director of the YKDFN Land and Environment Department), interview with author (June 
8, 2016); William Lines (Giant Mine Committee Liaison for the YKDFN), interview with author (May 18, 
2016); Kevin O’Reilly (MLA and former representative for Alternatives North), interview with author 
(May 13, 2016); Gordon Hamre (former Environment Canada employee and volunteer with Alternatives 
North) in interview with author (May 27, 2016); Randy Freeman (YKDFN employee), interview with 
author (May 19, 2016); Todd Slack (former YKDFN employee), interview with author (May 26, 2016);  
Fred Sangris (YKDFN member and employee), interview with author (June 8, 2016); Erica Janes, (former 
manager for the Giant Mine file for Alternatives North), interview with author (May 16, 2016); Shin Shiga 
(Environmental manager for NSMA), interview with author (May 27, 2016). 
53 Johanne Black (Director of the YKDFN Land and Environment Department), interview with author (June 
8, 2016); William Lines (Giant Mine Committee Liaison for the YKDFN), interview with author (May 18, 
2016); Randy Freeman (YKDFN employee), interview with author (May 19, 2016) 
54 Lisa Dyer and Erika Nyyssonen (GNWT Environmental and Natural Resources and the GMRPT), 
interview with author (May 31, 2016). Several other interviewees mentioned possible perpetual care 
scenarios: David Livingstone, Walt Humphries, Dennis Kefalas, Natalie Plato, and Todd Slack. Johanne 
Black and William Lines both mentioned the possibility of creating a Dene story about Giant Mine, but 
have yet to formally discuss such a project with community elders and leaders.  
	 171	
future remediation and care and maintenance of the Giant Mine site. As one city 
employee states, “You want to keep the history, you don’t want history to repeat itself… 
So long as we say here is the impact it did have on the City positively and here’s what 
negative impacts it had and here’s how we tried to mitigate the negative impacts.”55 
 
(Mis)trust and (mis)communication 
 According to Horowitz, trust in scientific information is often “contingent upon 
trust of whoever has generated the science and whoever will be implementing its 
recommendations… trust depends… on the reciprocal perception of, and interaction 
between, these parties. These relationships, in turn, are not fixed… but fluid, continuously 
‘evolving,’”56 Horowitz goes on to state that trust “arises through repeated reciprocal 
exchanges and the mutual development of care and concern.”57 Fundamental to 
stakeholder trust, is the “ability to control information-generating processes; the 
inclusivity of research… can play a large role in acceptance of results, as ‘stakeholders,’ 
who were excluded from the dialogue may reject scientists’ findings.”58 In this way, trust 
is developed through continual engagement, participation and co-development of 
concerns and cares between all stakeholders, developers, community members and 
government regulators. From the 2000 bankruptcy through the publication of the 2007 
																																																								
55 Dennis Kefalas (City of Yellowknife employee), interview with author (May 10, 2016).  
56 Leah S. Horowitz, “’Twenty years is yesterday: Science, multinational mining and the political ecology 
of trust in New Caledonia,” Geoforum 41 (2010): 617-626, 617.  
57 Ibid., 618.  
58 D. W. Cash, W.C. Clark, F. Alcock, N.M. Dickson, N. Eckley, D.H. Guston, J. Jger and R.B. Mitchell, 
“Knowledge systems for sustainable development,” proceedings of the National Academy of Science 100, 
no. 14 (2003): 8086-8091, 8088; taken from Horowitz, “’Twenty years is yesterday,” 618.  
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Remediation Plan, the call to EA, the scoping sessions and creation of the Developers 
Assessment Report, the GMRP did little to build trust or reciprocal relationships. 
 When interviewees reflected on the benefits, challenges and process of the Giant 
Mine Remediation Project and the Environmental Assessment, they spoke little about 
technical details. Rather, issues of trust and communication were mentioned in almost 
every interview: “it takes time to build trust, but… trust will fall apart if you don’t move 
things forward as well.”59 According to several interviewees, engagement before the EA 
was inconsistent, and information was not transferred effectively between stakeholders.60  
The initial reluctance of the GMRP to meaningfully fulfil its duty to consult with the First 
Nation and its reluctance to negotiate for independent oversight added to these feelings of 
mistrust. In addition, several community members expressed a lack of trust in the Project 
to take perpetual care seriously: “I just don’t have a lot of faith in institutional controls 
being passed on and people being kept safe.”61 Looking back, many interviewees 
considered the Environmental Agreement as part of a trust-building process; one that 
focused on confronting (mis)trust and (mis)communication. 
 Interviewees identified several points of contention that reflected the project’s 
failure to engage meaningfully prior to the EA. According to one technical advisor:  
 I have long been of the view that Giant might have been under construction if they 
had gone into the [EA] process at the very front end… But they naively believed 
that they could get the project done without it and therefore didn’t prepare 
themselves for it and when they were told they had to go into it, then they were 
two years delayed to put together the applications.”62 																																																								
59 Bill Slater (Giant Mine Working Group technical advisor), interview with author (June 23, 2016). 
60 Almost every interviewee mentioned that community engagement before the EA was not sufficient. 
61 Erica Janes, (former manager for the Giant Mine file for Alternatives North), interview with author (May 
16, 2016). 
62 Bill Slater (Giant Mine Working Group technical advisor), interview with author (June 23, 2016). 
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Interviewees also discussed several other steps that could have changed the initial tenure 
of the EA, including funding the construction of a new pipeline for the City’s water 
supply, or facilitating some kind of organization around off-site concerns, or addressing 
legacy concerns of the YKDFN.63 Most interviewees remembered a feeling of 
dissatisfaction prior to the EA that their concerns, advice and opinions were not being 
taken seriously. In addition there were many different views of what should or shouldn’t 
be done: “people did not have the same view at all… and to me that was an indication that 
people had not reached a common understanding.”64 As one project team member stated: 
“If I had to guess some of the frustrations people had is they would take the time to raise 
issues or raise certain things, but they didn’t necessarily… I think they were heard, but 
there was just no feedback for them to know that… those things had been considered or 
how they’d been considered.”65 
 In regards to negotiations for independent oversight at the beginning of the EA, 
David Livingstone remembered that “the Feds withdrew basically and said look, we’re 
going to wait until the outcome of the impact assessment process is in black and white 
and the we’ll decide whether to get engaged or not.”66 After initial negotiations the 
project team decided that it was better to finish the EA before committing to an 
																																																								
63 Dennis Kefalas (City of Yellowknife employee), interview with author (May 10, 2016);  
Mark Heyck, (Mayor of Yellowknife), interview with author (May 10, 2016); Todd Slack (former YKDFN 
employee), interview with author (May 26, 2016); Johanne Black (Director of the YKDFN Land and 
Environment Department), interview with author (June 8, 2016); Kevin O’Reilly (MLA and former 
representative for Alternatives North), interview with author (May 13, 2016). 
64 Bill Slater (Giant Mine Working Group technical advisor), interview with author (June 23, 2016). 
65 Craig Wells (Head of the Giant Mine Remediation Project Team, Ottawa Office), interview with author 
(May 16, 2016). 
66 David Livingstone (former INAC employee, GMOB Director), interview with author (May 13, 2016) 
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agreement, leaving the stakeholders frustrated and feeling betrayed.67 Former YKDFN 
employee Todd Slack reflected that if they had said yes to some kind of independent 
oversight at the beginning of the EA, “it would have totally changed the tone of the 
EA.”68 The failure to negotiate in good faith on independent oversight was a missed 
opportunity to build trust with both the YKDFN and the wider Yellowknife community.  
 Communicating the details of such a large project, across different kinds of 
knowledge has also been a continual challenge: “All these people, it’s just that they all 
have these very encapsulated roles that are not necessarily communicating with each 
other and the net effect of that… from the outside looking at it, is that it’s hard to trust it 
sometimes.”69 In addition, for a long time, community consultation was approached as 
one-way presentation and education, rather than what one GNWT employee calls 
“knowledge transfer”70 in multiple directions. It was thought that if the Project and its 
consultants could educate the community on what the best practices were, the project 
would be approved.  
 However, as mentioned, community stakeholders all had very different 
experiences of the Giant Mine: “They live in the same spot, the same dust is blowing in to 
their life and one person says I’m not worried about that and the other person says that’s 
going to kill people in my community.”71 As one technical advisor points out with respect 
to First Nations, “you are speaking to a group of people that the federal government put 																																																								
67 Kevin O’Reilly (MLA and former representative for Alternatives North), interview with author (May 13, 
2016); Todd Slack (former YKDFN employee), interview with author (May 26, 2016). 
68 Todd Slack (former YKDFN employee), interview with author (May 26, 2016). 
69 Erica Janes, (former manager for the Giant Mine file for Alternatives North), interview with author (May 
16, 2016). 
70 Lisa Dyer and Erika Nyyssonen (GNWT Environmental and Natural Resources and the GMRPT), 
interview with author (May 31, 2016).  
71 Bill Slater (Giant Mine Working Group technical advisor), interview with author (June 23, 2016). 
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into residential schools, and you think they’re just going to believe you.”72 YKDFN 
members mirror these sentiments saying:  
 Since the 1930s the Yellowknives Dene had no trust with the federal government. 
First with the treaties; the violation of the treaties. They basically lied. And there’s 
residential school. And then there’s racism. And now they have this mining clean 
up... there’s never been trust.73  
 
In the 2007 remediation plan, the government did little to “facilitate, or reconcile, or 
address any of these legacy issues in any way, but the EA did… it did provide an 
opportunity… to get together to talk about this and work together on it.”74  
 Community perceptions of trust and communication have changed drastically 
since the EA: “My impression now is that there’s a genuine willingness and interest from 
the proponents of the project to engage effectively with the community and to understand 
what they want to achieve.”75 This shift has a lot to do with a better understanding of the 
value of local and traditional knowledge and recognition of the need for community 
support in remediation projects. One project team member reflected on her own shift in 
thinking:  
 I think if somebody tells me it’s proven scientifically, that this will not hurt you, I 
believe it. So I was having a very hard time grasping that, but then, I think it was 
Johanne Black, looked at me and said, you know what… yes, but seeing that dust, 
no matter what’s in it, it could be baby powder, I don’t care, it causes me stress 
and you know stress causes ill effects. It was like a waking moment for me… I get 
it now.76 
 
Community engagement in the Remediation Project is not just about what scientific 
studies have shown, it is about belief, and trust and history: “I’m not a person who 																																																								
72 Ibid.  
73 Fred Sangris (YKDFN member and employee), interview with author (June 8, 2016).  
74 Kevin O’Reilly (MLA and former representative for Alternatives North), interview with author (May 13, 
2016). 
75 Bill Slater (Giant Mine Working Group technical advisor), interview with author (June 23, 2016). 
76 Natalie Plato (Head of the Giant Mine Remediation Project Team), interview with author (May 17, 2016). 
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believes that simple solves the communication challenge. I think the big issue is an issue 
of trust.”77 And while stakeholders continue to be critical, and there are continued 
challenges for communication, many interviewees had the impression that the general 
public has trust that the project team is now working in the community’s best interest:78  
 I think one of the primary motivations of remediation is to provide a degree of 
peace of mind… I think that within CARD there is a real sort of ethical 
commitment to address the need, expectations, wants and address the fears of the 
community members even if there wasn’t scientific evidence to back that up… 
you know, FCSAP is really there to… the money is intended to improve 
environmental conditions, not social perspectives, so in the absence of those 
technical drivers… there has been a bit of creativity used to push some of these 
projects through.79 
 
The EA did not simply bring about total trust in the project, but it was a community 
driven process, that gave stakeholders the opportunity to hold the government project 
accountable. 
 Many interviewees, in discussions on trust and community engagement for 
remediation, referenced the Colomac Mine remediation project. Colomac, an abandoned 
gold mine located 200 km northwest of Yellowknife, in the Tlicho First Nation’s 
territory, was also owned by Royal Oak, and along with Giant, went into receivership in 
1999.80 Several interviewees had experience working on the Colomac remediation 
project, which is now considered to be finished, and is in the monitoring and maintenance 
																																																								
77 Bill Slater (Giant Mine Working Group technical advisor), interview with author (June 23, 2016). 
78 Ben Nind (Executive Director of GMOB), interview with author (May 31, 2016); Brown, Tony (GMOB 
Director), interview with author (May 25, 2016).  Shin Shiga (Environmental manager for the NSMA), 
interview with author (May 27, 2016).  
79 Tony Brown (GMOB Director), interview with author (May 25, 2016).  
80 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Colomac Site Remediation Plan: Final Report, Contaminated Sites 
Office (Water License MV2000L2-0018, March 2004).  
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phase.81 The Colomac remediation was conducted through the federal government’s 
Contaminants and Remediation Directorate (CARD), while Giant, being such a large 
project, had its own, separate Project Team. The remediation of this site is often 
considered a community engagement success: “Colomac was a really good example I 
think of getting early community buy in… Giant, for whatever reason, didn’t do that in 
the beginning.”82 Initial engagement with the Tlicho for the Colomac remediation 
included creating objectives and options, then rating these options.83 One interviewee 
stated that, while working on the Colomac Mine remediation, there was a lot of time and 
resources put into community engagement at the front of the project, which saved money 
in the long run; it was “a part of the social license cost… it serves that trust issue, there’s 
community support… all of those things, sometimes tangible, sometimes not.”84 When 
the Colomac remediation plan was published and an application for water license was 
submitted, the project was backed by community support and no environmental review 
was necessary.85  
 Horowitz writes that in colonial or post-colonial settings, legacies of domination 
of indigenous groups by companies or governments that are now “attempting to influence 
their behaviour through provision of ‘information,’”86 may result in suspicion and 
mistrust, “especially if it prescribes restrictions similar to those imposed previously by 																																																								
81 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Colomac Mine Remediation Project: Post Reclamation Monitoring 
and Residual Hydrocarbon Remediation Management Plan (September, 2012).  
82 Adrian Paradis (former Giant Mine Remediation Project manager) interview with author (June 7, 2016). 
83 David Livingstone (former INAC employee, GMOB Director), interview with author (May 13, 2016); N. 
VanderKlippe, “Caribou shielded from toxic tailings,” Edmonton Journal (Oct 17, 2003).    
84 David Livingstone (former INAC employee, GMOB Director), interview with author (May 13, 2016) 
85 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Colomac Site Remediation Plan: Final Report, Contaminated Sites 
Office (Water License MV2000L2-0018, March 2004); Dillon Consulting Limited, Remedial Action Plan 
Overview – Colomac Site Final Report, 2005-2007 (March 2005).  
86 Horowitz, “’Twenty years is yesterday,” 617.  
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colonial governments.”87 In connection to Dillon’s argument that systems of 
marginalization can be perpetuated through remediation and clean-up processes, a lack of 
trust in relationships can also be perpetuated. Looking back on the Giant Mine 
Remediation Project, interviewees reflected that, initially, little was done to build trust. 
Community stakeholders were not directly involved in directing the science of 
remediation, and their concerns and cares were not discussed meaningfully. Many 
interviewees identify this lack of trust as the main motivator in stakeholder decisions to 
call the Giant Mine Remediation to EA; there was no trust that the Project would move 
forward with the social, economic and environmental interests of the communities in 
mind. The Environmental Agreement, for many interviewees, represents a formalized 
stepping-stone in the process of trust building. However, as one interviewee remarked, 
community members must always keep one eye watching, as relationships of trust are re-
negotiated.88 The next section will review some of the aspects of remediation and trust 
that community stakeholders are continuing to negotiate. 
 
Confronting the Monster: Community Definitions of Remediation, Future Land 
Use, Communicating with Future Generations and the Reclamation of Value 
 
Remediation is a newer field and a lot of it has been focused on simply physical, chemical 
stabilization. During my time with Giant and… since I started working in the North in the 
early 2000s, it’s moved from just that physical stabilization to incorporating local 
values.89 – Adrian Paradis (former regulatory manager for the GMRPT) 
 
 
																																																								
87 Ibid.  
88 Fred Sangris (YKDFN member and employee), interview with author (June 8, 2016). 
89 Adrian Paradis (former Giant Mine Remediation Project manager) interview with author (June 7, 2016). 
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Definitions of Remediation 
 Community perceptions and definitions of remediation were not directly 
addressed throughout early planning processes at Giant. Historically, plans for closure 
included terms such as abandonment, restoration and rehabilitation.90 Since the federal 
government took responsibility for the site, there has been limited discussion about the 
use of the term remediation for the Giant Mine. As mentioned in the theoretical section of 
this thesis, using the term remediation can limit project definitions, goals and mandates to 
the clean-up and containment of pollution, rather than addressing larger questions of 
morals, values and relationships with the degraded environment.91 As argued in the 
previous chapter, at Giant a remedial approach that focused on containment of arsenic 
also acted to contain knowledge and define what kinds of knowledge were considered 
relevant. Project definitions of remediation as containment and risk management 
sidelined community perceptions of what it meant to ‘clean’ and ‘heal’ the Giant Mine 
area. However, visions of remediation, what values it entails, and how land and people 
can be protected far into the future present diverse opportunities for discussion and 
debate. Recently, through the Surface Design Workshop, concepts of remediation and 
future land uses have been constructively discussed with community stakeholders.  
 Interviewees articulated multiple definitions and expectations of remediation. 
Most of these definitions and expectations fell within the following themes: 1. Safety, 
stability and risk management of the site; 2. Fixing, repairing, or restoring to a defined 																																																								
90 Giant Yellowknife Mines Limited, “Abandonment and Restoration Plan for Yellowknife Division 
Operations,” (October 16, 1985); Royal Oak Mines Ltd. Yellowknife Division, “The Giant Mine 
Abandonment and Restoration Plan” (September, 1992) 
91 Arn Keeling and John Sandlos (ed.), Mining and Communities in Northern Canada (Calgary: University 
of Calgary Press, 2015); Robert L. France (ed.), Healing Natures Repairing Relationships: New 
Perspectives on Restoring Ecological Spaces and Consciousness (Vermont: Green Frigate Books, 2008). 
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standard; 3. Communication and intergenerational planning; and 4. Returning some kind 
of value to the site, be it social, economic, environmental, historical, reconciliatory or 
justice-related. Most of the interviewees’ definitions of remediation also included 
discussions on future land use and perpetual care. The variety of perspectives and 
expectations of remediation expressed by stakeholders warrants further discussion on 
what remediation at Giant really means.  
 In official reports and project team communications, technical, containment-based 
definitions of remediation prevail. Most technical definitions of remediation at Giant 
focus on ideas of safety, stability and risk mitigation,92 and indeed, this is how the 
government project has framed its mandate.93 As Craig Wells, co-director for the Giant 
Mine Remediation Project Team, stated:  
 For me it’s the question of is risk management a subset of remediation or is 
remediation one way to go about risk management. It’s a chicken and egg 
question… all risk management is sort of saying is you need three elements… you 
need a contaminant or source, you need a pathway and you need a receptor. So if 
you remove any one of those three things you’ve eliminated the risk… and it’s a 
balance of risks, right? So we looked at the arsenic trioxide as the single biggest 
issue at the site and through consultations and studies and years of working and 
analyzing the situation there’s still nothing we can do to remove that source that 
doesn’t pose a greater risk than what we’re looking at doing now, which is 
encapsulating it at least until something better comes along.94 
 
This definition reflects a risk management approach to remediation, where blocking off 
‘flows’ mitigates the harmful effects of pollution. 																																																								
92 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada and the Government of the Northwest Territories, Giant Mine 
Remediation Developer’s Assessment Report, submitted to the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact 
Review Board as a part of the Giant Mine Remediation Project Environmental Assessment (EA0809-001, 
October 2010). 
93 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Giant Mine Remediation Plan, prepared by SRK Consulting and 
SENES Consultants Limited (2007).  
94 Craig Wells (Head of the Giant Mine Remediation Project Team, Ottawa Office), interview with author 
(May 16, 2016). 
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 In some ways, it does make sense to limit definitions of remediation. As it stands, 
the project team does not have the resources or authority to dictate future land uses, or to 
plan for thousands of years in the future; it is concerned with safety and getting the 
project done. As Natalie Plato, a co-director for the GMRP, stated, it is not her right to 
decide how that space will be used in the future:  
 I want to see it remediated to the applicable standards so health and safety is 
protected… But in terms of how the land is used… from my government position, 
it’s not my decision… It’s such a big beautiful piece of land; it would be a shame 
that people couldn’t use it. But then I also get the perspective like lets not forget 
what’s there. It was a mine site.95   
 
At the end of the day, future land use should be a community-based decision, but how the 
remediation is completed impacts future land uses. In addition, communities should not 
be responsible for providing resources to facilitate further remediation or restoration once 
the Project is ‘finished.’ As Johanne Black argued, the Project should not be allowed to 
“pass the buck on to other entities.”96   
 Some interviewees, building on risk management approaches, spoke about 
remediation as a form of repair or rehabilitation, with multiple levels and standards. 
While all interviewees recognized that the site could not be restored to some kind of 
‘natural’ state, and therefor must be ‘managed,’ some questioned how the ‘end state’ or 
‘level’ of remediation would be determined. Dennis Kefalas, a City of Yellowknife 
employee, mentioned that remediation can never mean total restoration, and that “the end 
use is very limited in what you can do,”97 therefore it is important to discuss the ‘level’ of 
																																																								
95 Natalie Plato (Head of the Giant Mine Remediation Project Team), interview with author (May 17, 2016). 
96 Johanne Black (Director of the YKDFN Land and Environment Department), interview with author (June 
8, 2016). 
97 Dennis Kefalas (City of Yellowknife employee), interview with author (May 10, 2016).  
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remediation, repair or restoration that is actually achievable. Erica Janes of Alternatives 
North asked how much repair, restoration or remediation is enough:  
 In a discussion before the surface design workshop, the translators said they 
couldn’t use the word remediation because it means to ‘fix something,’ and by the 
very nature of the site, it’s not fixable… it’s not going to go back to the way it 
was. Then you come to okay, well, how much is enough and those questions are 
obviously, they’re really hard to answer.98 
 
Furthermore, many interviewees discussed and questioned the material, temporal and 
geographic limits of remediation, asking questions such as: “Well what’s cleaning up? To 
what standard?”99 As of yet, the GMRP has not discussed what different standards of 
remediation might mean and how that could be measured.100 Also, as mentioned in the 
recent GMOB Establishment Report, there is no way to track the progress of remediation, 
because no context-based, standardized measuring mechanisms have been established.101 
 In addition to questions of the ‘clean up’ standard, the Giant Mine site will have to 
be monitored and maintained in perpetuity. Technical definitions of remediation usually 
end when the site is contained and do not encompass the reality of perpetual monitoring 
and care, despite the fact that most closed mine sites will require some form of active 
water treatment, maintenance of tailings dams, and monitoring long into the future.102 At 
Giant Mine, the remediation is defined in phases. Phase one is ‘care and maintenance,’ 
																																																								
98 Erica Janes, (former manager for the Giant Mine file for Alternatives North), interview with author (May 
16, 2016).  
99 Tom Hoefer (Director of the NWT and Nunavut Chamber of Mines), interview with the author (June 3, 
2016). 
100 The projects mandate is to remediate to an ‘industrial standard.’ This was a decision that was made in 
the initial Giant Mine Remediation Plan. In the Environmental Assessment, it was determined that the 
underground freeze and industrial standard of remediation would not be up for debate. However, the level 
of remediation around the town site/water front has been discussed. 
101 GMOB, Establishment Report.  
102 Joan Kuyek, “The Theory and Practice of Perpetual Care of Contaminated Sites,” Alternatives North 
submission to the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board (July 2011). 
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which will end once the remediation plan has been approved, a water license is granted, 
and remedial activities begin. Phase two is the actual act of remediation, which includes 
soil treatment, installing tailings covers, and revegetating, among other things. Phase 
three is long term monitoring.103 This phased approach to remediation doesn’t define 
perpetual care beyond monitoring: “In this case it might be something different because 
we are not just monitoring, we will have to treat water right so, it’s not just monitoring. 
So we’re not really done.”104 The questions of how much clean-up is enough and what the 
temporality of the project is, or what responsibility the Co-Proponents will have in 
perpetuity has yet to be defined and community stakeholders are worried this will be 
overlooked.  
 Many interviewees connected definitions of remediation to the challenges of 
intergenerational communication and environmental justice; they want the site to be 
remediated to a state where future generations will know how to manage and take care of 
the site and will remember what happened there. Within this theme, several interviewees 
discussed how the land could be remediated and regulated to ensure that it is somehow 
‘special;’ that people cannot live there, but at the same time, that the space is not 
forgotten about. According to George Lafferty, a community coordinator for CARD: 
 It’s not only clean-up – the clean up process fits with a way of life. We want to 
clean this up, but they want to clean it up so that it’s usable for future generations. 
Not remediation only – an approach of retaining a way of life. It is about retaining 
land for future generations. Not just talking about the site, but about all land, all 
water, all air. It is okay if the scientific and the indigenous approaches are 
																																																								
103 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada and the Government of the Northwest Territories, Giant Mine 
Remediation Developer’s Assessment Report.  
104 Natalie Plato (Head of the Giant Mine Remediation Project Team), interview with author (May 17, 
2016). 
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different or somewhat separate – but they need to acknowledge each other equally 
and build off each other.105  
 
In this sense, it is important to incorporate history and traditional land use practices into 
definitions of remediation of Giant Mine. According to Randy Freeman, “There was a 
fear that future generations won’t know the story… For there to be traditional 
knowledge… being passed to generations, knowledge of the dangers of that mine, there 
have to be visual reminders… other things that trigger the story.”106 As mentioned earlier, 
many interviewees argued that it is important to tell the stories of the Giant Mine and the 
Remediation Project and to incorporate the YKDFN’s Traditional Knowledge into how 
these stories are told.  
 How this site will be used and cared for by future generations is directly affected 
not only by how remediation is defined, but also by how the Giant Mine site is officially 
regulated. While the Surface Design Engagement process did take into account values 
and objectives for future land use, it is still unclear how this with fit into technical 
remediation planning or government regulation. Once the federal remediation project is 
complete, the Giant Mine site will revert to the status of Commissioners Land, controlled 
by the GNWT. However, the mine site is physically within the City of Yellowknife 
limits, meaning that the City can apply to lease and develop it. To many community 
members it makes sense to first set objectives for land use and communicating with future 
generations and to remediate using these community-based standards. However, there 
have been few discussions about how such community-based standard would fit within 
regulatory control of the site after remediation is ‘complete.’ There are ideas, as Rob Lok, 																																																								
105 Emma Pike and George Lafferty (INAC employees, CARD), interview with author (May 31, 2016).  
106 Randy Freeman (YKDFN employee), interview with author (May 19, 2016). 
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a City of Yellowknife employee explains: “It’s not so much that you put policies in place 
to prevent houses, you just put policies in place to ensure another use. So, you would 
zone it as park and recreation or nature preserve, or we might create something new for 
Giant Mine, which is you know, the Giant Mine overlay.”107 Community stakeholders are 
interested in creating a new ‘space’ for Giant Mine. However, discussions on these ‘post 
remediation’ issues are rarely included in definitions of remediation. At the Surface 
Design Workshop and throughout interviewees, community stakeholders were often 
unsure of how the Remediation Project is planning for future land use, perpetual care or 
communicating with future generations. 
  Across the various definitions of remediation, including discussions on risk 
management, remedial standards, future land use and communicating with future 
generations, almost all interviewees spoke about how remediation could create, or re-
create value. While some interviewees focused on the value of communicating a complex 
history (leaving it grey and ugly),108 some saw value in developing hiking trails, an 
interpretive centre, sports fields and other recreational or even residential areas.109 Several 
interviewees talked about remediating the site to a recreational or residential standard so 
that it could be used for such purposes: “I think the option that remediates the tailings 
ponds, vegetates… fills in or otherwise deals with the pits… and can be remediated to a 
recreational standard. I would like to see wildlife return and berries can be harvestable 
																																																								
107 Rob Lok (City of Yellowknife employee), interview with author (May 9, 2016).  
108 William Lines (Giant Mine Committee Liaison for the YKDFN), interview with author (May 18, 2016). 
Johanne Black. Also, Erica Janes and Kevin O’Reilly 
109 See interviews with Dennis Kefalas, Mayor Mark Heyck, David Livingstone, and Todd Slack.  
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again.”110 The City of Yellowknife hopes to have some opportunities for development on 
site: “I do think there is a possible mixture of uses in terms of perhaps some industrial, 
some low impact recreational and some residential in the future in those areas.”111 
William Lines, a YKDFN’s Giant Mine Community Liaison, argued against any kind of 
recreational use of the site saying: “We’ve said it a hundred times… we do not want that 
site to be used. We don’t want it to be disturbed. We just want the monster underground 
to be left and not released.”112  Johanne Black, the Director of the YKDFN Land and 
Environment stated that, perhaps the Giant Mine site is a communication piece in itself; 
restoring the surface would remove this communication: “the site can serve that purpose 
in a big capacity if we continue to let it look like a scab in the ground that people will 
question why does it look like that… if we make it green and pretty, people will begin to 
use it and they’ll identify it in the future as a recreation area instead of a contaminated 
site.”113 The project continues to stick to the mandate of cleaning up to an industrial 
standard, without saying what the possibility of future land uses might be under such a 
standard.  
  While the details of future land use are contested, there is consensus that further 
discussion on the social values of remediation needs to happen. GMRP’s Adrian Paradis 
talked about how Giant was originally envisioned to become a physical stabilization 
project: “Through the environmental assessment… a lot of the thought process changed 
from… only physically and chemically stable. It also needed to incorporate a lot of the 																																																								
110 David Livingstone (former INAC employee, GMOB Director), interview with author (May 13, 2016). 
111 Mark Heyck, (Mayor of Yellowknife), interview with author (May 10, 2016). 
112 William Lines (Giant Mine Committee Liaison for the YKDFN), interview with author (May 18, 2016). 
113 Johanne Black (Director of the YKDFN Land and Environment Department), interview with author 
(June 8, 2016).  
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values from the community.”114 As Alan Ehrlich, Manager of Environmental Impact 
Assessment at the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board, stated:  
 I used to think of plant reclamation particularly because I think that’s where my 
education went more. But now I see [remediation] as being… I want to say 
returning the site to a state that is acceptable by the people who use it and value 
it… So that’s where the acceptability threshold comes in. A smart developer will 
spend time not just talking about what they can do, but about what’s acceptable to 
the communities around them… how much change is too much… what is okay… 
and use that to create thresholds that they will use as a basis for design.115  
 
Todd Slack, a former employee of the YKDFN, points out that remediation needs to be 
seen as an opportunity to take something negative and turn it in to something positive: “to 
turn that around and make that site a value… that’s a great success and that is the goal we 
should be setting, because this is not an industrial project where the bottom line is dollars 
and cents, this is a civil society project.”116   
 A movement towards a broader reclamation of some collectively determined value 
can be seen in INAC’s Mine Site Reclamation Policy for the Northwest Territories117 and 
in the MVLWB’s Guidelines for the Closure and Reclamation of Advanced Mineral 
Exploration and Mine Sites in the Northwest Territories.118 In this latter document, 
reclamation is described as: “the process of returning a disturbed site to its natural state or 
which prepares it for other productive uses that prevents or minimizes any adverse effects 
																																																								
114 Adrian Paradis (former Giant Mine Remediation Project manager) interview with author (June 7, 2016). 
115 Alan Erlich (Director, Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board), interview with author 
(June 2, 2016). 
116 Todd Slack (former YKDFN employee), interview with author (May 26, 2016). 
117 Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, Mine Site Reclamation Guidelines for the Northwest 
Territories (January 2007).  
118 Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board, Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development, Guidelines for 
the Closure and Reclamation of Advanced Mineral Exploration and Mine Sites in the Northwest Territories, 
November 2013. 
	 188	
on the environment or threats to human health and safety.”119 This document goes on to 
describe remediation as: “the removal, reduction, or neutralization of substances, wastes, 
or hazardous material from a site in order to prevent or minimize any adverse effects on 
the environment and public safety now or in the future.”120 This document also outlines 
closure and reclamation concepts, how an objectives-based approach should be 
established between companies, government, regulators and community stakeholders and 
how closure plans should be continually updated throughout operations. However, these 
guidelines have not been directly applied to abandoned mines such as Giant, and are only 
used to direct new developments. They also tend to focus on the restoration or 
reclamation of economic value, instead of a discussion on social value. In addition, no 
large-scale mines have yet to entirely go through this new guideline/regulatory process.121 
 The communities of Yellowknife, N’dilo and Dettah have been asking for the 
GMRP to move beyond remediation for a long time now, and have been discussing this 
Project in terms of future land use, perpetual care and value, while the government clung 
to its mandate of waste containment and clean-up, without recognizing responsibility for 
broader, reclamation or restoration based practices. When defining what remediation 
meant to them, many interviewees spoke about something that goes beyond containment 
and management. Interviewees recognized the material limitations; the Giant Mine site 
will never be restored to a pre-mining state. However visions and definitions of 
remediation and future land uses ranged from grey and ugly scars, to golf courses, hiking 																																																								
119 Emphasis added, ibid, 8.  
120 Ibid., 9. 
121 The diamond mines such as Diavik and Ekati have a similar closure planning structure, but were 
developed before these guidelines were implemented. Gache Kue mine will be the first large scale 
development to go through this process. See Bielawski, Rogue Diamonds for more information on the 
regulatory processes for diamond mines in the NWT.  
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trails and museums; all reflections on remediation centered on the creation of some kind 
of value. A lot of discussion fell within what might be described as stewardship and care. 
And so, while the Giant Mine Project continues to be focused on remediation, the 
community is calling for the reclamation of some kind of social value, and care for future 
generations. 
 
Caring for the Monster: Perpetual Care, Environmental Justice and Reconciliation 
 
The real long term interests in the site are in the people around there and the people who 
use it and the people who value it… that can be more than just a utilitarian connection…  
it can be a very personal and spiritual connection. And so the standards of what’s 
acceptable change from worldview to worldview and it’s really important that you’re 
using the worldview of the people who value the site.122-Alan Ehrlich (Director at the 
Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board) 
  
 The potentially very long-term storage of arsenic at Giant Mine raises difficult 
conceptual and practical issues around the perpetual care of the Giant Mine site. As one 
community member stated: “It is scary, but I don’t know… that’s where people get to… 
that’s one thing that people can agree is a problem and people get to be creative.”123 In 
addition to the storage of arsenic on-site, there are pockets of contaminated soils and lake 
sediments surrounding the Giant Mine site. Community members are also asking that 
these areas be cared for and communicated more effectively.124 Three prominent themes 
																																																								
122 Alan Ehrlich (Director, Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board), interview with author 
(June 2, 2016). 
123 Shin Shiga (Environmental manager for the NSMA), interview with author (May 27, 2016).  
124 Alternatives North and the Yellowknives Dene First Nations, From Danger to Wisdom, Perpetual Care 
and the Future of the Giant Mine: A Report on a Community Workshop (Chief Drygeese Centre, Dettah, 
September 26-27, 2011).  
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emerged in discussions of perpetual care at Giant Mine: financial and regulatory 
responsibility, geographies of care, and temporalities of care.  
 As was mentioned several times in the GMOB’s first annual public meeting and 
throughout interviews, community stakeholders have a lot of uncertainty about the 
reliability of funding over the next 100 years or more.125 One interviewee said: “Forever 
is a lot of money.”126 While the project team sees this issue as something that can be 
discussed and decided upon once the surface remediation and underground freeze are 
complete, many community members think that perpetual care planning should be 
happening alongside technical remediation, so that these discussions can inform the 
material nature of clean-up and planning for long-term funding and stewardships 
programs.127 There is an underlying concern that once the technical remediation is 
complete, responsibility to plan for future land uses and communicating with future 
generations will be forgotten or considered less important. 
 Perpetual care will also entail the management of the cumulative effects of 
mining, including off-site contamination. As discussed above, the remediation project is 
contained to the lease boundary. While the scope of the project is limited to the lease site, 
an increasing amount of research, awareness and news articles about off-site 
contamination has led many stakeholders to argue that more should be done off-site:128 “if 
																																																								
125 Taken from my personal notes, May 16, 2017.  
126 Ryan Fequet (Director of the Wek’eezhii Land and Water Board), interview with author (June 6, 2016).  
127 The City has been pushing for the development of a Land Use Plan alongside the remediation planning 
process, but nothing has been finalized. The City of Yellowknife completed a Land Use Plan. The City is 
focused on development the lakeshore area. However, the YKDFN do not agree that the site should be 
developed at all in the future.  
128 M.J. Palmer, J.M. Galloway, H.E. Jamieson,  R.T. Patterson, H. Falck and S.V. Kokelj, “The 
concentration of arsenic in lake waters in the Yellowknife area,” Northwest Territories Geological Survey, 
Department of Industry, Tourism and Investment (NWT Open File: June, 2015); Heather Jamieson, “The 
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they’re going to earn people’s trust I think they’re going to have to go further. Like 
they’ve gone far and that’s great, but there’s more and the more people find out about it, 
the more people are going to be aware of this arbitrary lease boundary and how crazy that 
is.”129 Contamination does not recognize lease boundaries, and remediation plans should 
be structured around the geography of the contamination, rather than arbitrary lease 
boundaries. As one YKDFN members stated: “the contamination will always be there 
cause they’re not going to clean up outside the lease and so clean fish go in, dirty fish 
come out.”130 
 However, recognizing the limits, scope and mandate of the Giant Mine 
Remediation Project today, in order to address off-site contamination, “there will have to 
be some negotiated arrangement.”131 As of yet, there has just been what one board 
member on the GMOB, calls an “awkward silence,”132 when community members and 
stakeholders question who will have responsibility for off-site contamination and how 
this will be managed. Several interviewees called on the GNWT to act and while the 
GNWT has released health advisories, and has provided some information and 
recommendations on contaminated lakes, the parameters of determining what authorities 
will be responsible, and whether a remediation or risk management, or a combination 
																																																																																																																																																																					
Legacy of Arsenic Contamination from Mining and Processing Refractory Gold Ore at Giant Mine, 
Yellowknife, Northwest Territories, Canada,” Reviews in Mineralogy and Geochemistry, 79 (2014): 533-
551; Joshua Thienpoint, Jennifer Korosi, Kathryn Hargan, Trisha Williams, David Eickmeyer, Linda 
Kimpe, Michael Palmer, John Smol, Jules Blais,“Multi-trophic level responses to extreme metal 
contamination from gold mining in a subarctic lake,” Proc. R. Soc. B 283 (2016). 
129 Erica Janes, (former manager for the Giant Mine file for Alternatives North), interview with author (May 
16, 2016). 
130 William Lines (Giant Mine Committee Liaison for the YKDFN), interview with author (May 18, 2016). 
131 David Livingstone (former INAC employee, GMOB Director), interview with author (May 13, 2016). 
132 Tony Brown (GMOB Director), interview with author (May 25, 2016) 
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approach is needed, is still unclear.133 As Shin Shiga, the environmental manager for 
NSMA, remarks, “It’s not a Giant Mine problem, it’s a much higher up problem.”134 
While it may not be the project team’s direct responsibility to clean up this site, in regards 
to gaining and maintaining the trust of community members and stakeholders, the GMOB 
recommends that some kind of negotiated decision seems to be in their best interests.135  
 In connection to the broader geography of contamination around Giant Mine, the 
remediation project is also difficult to conceptualize temporally. Not only are there 
important historical legacies that have not been addressed through the GMRP, the thought 
of perpetual care and oversight is difficult to reckon with. The project team, 
understandably, is most concerned with getting through the next two or three years, “to 
actually get a license and everything and actually get into construction… the longer it 
goes the more things change.”136 While there is a rush to ensure the site is contained and 
managed as soon as possible, there is also a push to ensure that this is done right, and that 
all stakeholders and rights holders have power over future land uses, and perpetual care 
and management. Some project team and community members find it hard to determine 
the best order of priorities:  
 I think that what’s happened though is people who have… become part of this 
body of communicating with future generations almost have it reversed. Like they 
think, hey we need to make decisions so that we can communicate them to future 
generations and really we need to make decisions and then decide how it gets 
communicated… that was a really strong message that we had to deliver at surface 																																																								
133 Interviews with: David Livingstone (former INAC employee, GMOB Director), interview with author 
(May 13, 2016); Brown, Tony (GMOB Director), interview with author (May 25, 2016); Erica Janes, 
(former manager for the Giant Mine file for Alternatives North), interview with author (May 16, 2016); 
Kevin O’Reilly (MLA and former representative for Alternatives North), interview with author (May 13, 
2016).  
134 Shin Shiga (Environmental manager for the NSMA), interview with author (May 27, 2016).  
135 Tony Brown (GMOB Director), interview with author (May 25, 2016); GMOB, Establishment Report.  
136 Adrian Paradis (former Giant Mine Remediation Project manager) interview with author (June 7, 2016). 
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design as well, that regardless… the decisions come first and then how you 
communicate it comes second.137  
 
It is difficult to balance the need to ‘get things done’ and the need to plan for a perpetual 
problem without marginalizing stakeholders. The project team has yet to confront what is 
means to care for a mine site in perpetuity. Financial and regulatory responsibility for 
perpetual care is uncertain. Going forward, the GMOB has the potential to play an 
important role in facilitating discussion on perpetual care and it provides a structure for 
research and communication over the next 100 years.138 
   
Reconciliation 
 Not only does perpetual care imply planning for the care of the Giant Mine site, it 
also implies care for relationships between people and their environment. As mentioned 
earlier, if remediation is to bring about environmental justice, it must be seen as a process 
of rebuilding relationships. Tsosie writes that reconciliation is defined as the “restoration 
of friendly relations.”139 Reconciliation is particularly important in the colonial context of 
resource extraction in Northern Canada, as it related to the historical and contemporary 
relationships between settlers and Indigenous communities. According to Tsosie, 
reconciliation makes space for Indigenous memories and accounts of harm to be 
meaningfully addressed and for Traditional Knowledge to be taken seriously.140 
Remediation, within the context of reconciliation, offers an opportunity to not only 																																																								
137 Sharon Low (Giant Mine Remediation Project Team, community engagement officer), interview with 
author (May 17, 2016).  
138 GMOB, Establishment Report.  
139 Rebecca Tsosie, “Indigenous Peoples and the Ethics of Remediation: Redressing the Legacy of 
Radioactive Contamination for Native Peoples and Native Lands Indigenous Peoples and the Ethics of 
Remediation,” Santa Clara Journal of International Law 13, no. 1 (2015): 271. 
140 Ibid.	
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restore or repair contaminated land, but to restore relationships and to implement better 
forms of care. As Murphy argues, reconciliation can be initiated through official 
apologies, which document historical injustices, acknowledge responsibility, restore 
relations and offer a path forward to trust and respect.141 
 The YKDFN see the remediation process as intertwined with land claims, 
reconciliation and calls for apology and compensation. According to Fred Sangris: “The 
land claim will cover compensation for the loss of the land at the mine. But it’s not going 
to compensate the loss of the people, the death, the grief, and for many years of sadness in 
this community. And we can never fish on this bay again. We can’t go and eat berries 
here. For us, it’s lost forever.”142 Tony Brown, a GMOB Director, spoke about how the 
Akaitcho land claims process is “such a huge silent element in the back of the room with 
this project.”143 The project team continually argues that apology and compensation is not 
a part of their mandate, but as Brown mentions: 
 I get it, they don’t deal with it, but it’s affecting their project and I’m surprised 
that there isn’t more clear you know institutionally that there isn’t a linkage there 
Maybe there is behind closed doors where they talk about how to deal with these 
things, but certainly on the surface, it’s… looking at it cynically… the divide and 
conquer type thing. It’s obviously frustrating for the YKDFN.144 
 
Community stakeholders want the Project Team to plan for remediation within the 
broader context of reconciliation processes.145  
 Remediation also has the potential to offer economic opportunities that could be 
seen as a part of the reconciliation process. Adrian Paradis stated that: “There’s a lot of 																																																								
141 Michael Murphy, “Apology, Recognition and Reconciliation,” Human Rights Review 12 (2010): 47-69. 
142 Fred Sangris (YKDFN member and employee), interview with author (June 8, 2016).  
143 Tony Brown (GMOB Director), interview with author (May 25, 2016). 
144 Ibid. 
145 Bill Slater (Giant Mine Working Group technical advisor), interview with author (June 23, 2016). 
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money to be made on Giant… it’s a short term economic stimulus to the local economy in 
times where there’s… especially right now when the mining sector has been slower, 
Giant can be a stopgap. The real thing we were challenged… we were trying to discuss, 
we that we really want to ensure the best training opportunities for locals here in the 
community, especially First Nations, it’s part of Aboriginal Affairs mandate.”146 
However, a lot of these opportunities will be short term, or seasonal contracts: “it’s a 
struggle to figure out how you marry those lofty goals, or good goals of getting the best 
possible training out of it with just the way the contracting works.”147 According to the 
YKDFN, job and contract opportunities with the Giant Mine Remediation Project, and 
monitoring or maintenance after remediation is complete is an important part of working 
towards reconciliation, apology and compensation; it is a way to “get something out of 
that site that is good.” According to Johanne Black, the Director of Land and 
Environment for the YKDFN: “in terms of the wellness of the people… I believe that the 
project can help us… that project alone can help us in terms of making our people well. 
We’ve had a lot of impacts in the past, we’ve had a lot of social dysfunction… a whole 
host of problems that could be alleviated out of the economies that come out of Giant.”148  
Black also stated that, “those economies will be forever, in terms of remediation and then 
eventual monitoring. Monitoring is going to be forever,” and the YKDFN should play a 
prominent role in that long-term care and the economic benefits of remediation itself.149 
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148 Johanne Black (Director of the YKDFN Land and Environment Department), interview with author 
(June 8, 2016). 
149 Ibid. 
	 196	
 Throughout the four days of the Surface Design Engagement Evaluation 
Workshop in February, 2016, multiple people from both the YKDFN and the broader 
Yellowknife community made references to the importance of reconciliation as a part of 
the remediation process. These sentiments were reflected in the GMOB’s Establishment 
Report, published in April 2017:  
 The Project Team has not effectively and meaningfully responded to the 
YKDFN’s continuing demand for a formal apology and compensation for past 
harm from the Giant Mine operations. These demands seem to have been largely 
ignored despite the Government of Canada’s current commitment to reconciliation 
with Indigenous peoples. The GMOB is of the view that a formal apology would 
help to heal the harms of the past and greatly facilitate the ability of the Parties to 
move forward together. Failure to address the issues of a formal apology and a 
commitment to compensation are likely to affect the success of community 
engagement and the future of the remediation project.150 
 
Since the government took over the Giant Mine site, there has been little movement 
towards reconciliation through the Giant Mine Remediation Project and there has never 
been an official apology. 
 Within the context of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), 
reconciliation, apology and compensation are an important precedent for the project to 
set.151 The TRC is about honouring the past, and negotiating a better future, similar to 
what many YKDFN members have asked for at the Giant Mine.152 For one YKDFN 
member, to date, the remediation project has not unfolded with reconciliation in mind 
because the project was forced through environmental assessment and an environmental 
agreement – the governments were dragged through this process by the community, and 
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did not voluntarily enter into agreements. According to Johanne Black, “it would be sad if 
at the end of the remediation project if the Yellowknives are still… they’re not in a better 
state in terms of our social well being. That will be really sad, because the opportunity 
could have been available.”153 While there are now annual healing ceremonies at the 
Giant Mine supported by the GMRP,154 this is not enough: “We have a feeding the fire 
ceremony. In our culture we feed the fire with food, tobacco and we say our own prayer. 
And that promotes healing. It also promotes communication… it’s a good relationship 
building with the project. It’s a good ceremony, but in terms of healing, there needs to be 
more than just a once a year ceremony.”155  
 Can remediation be seen as a reconciling act in itself?  Reconciliation questions 
surrounding Giant Mine include many other mechanisms, such as: land claims, legal 
compensation, an official apology, and future management and land use of the site. It is a 
multi-faceted issue. The Project Team itself often seems stalled because of their limited 
mandates; it does not have the authority to discuss issues of land claims, apologies, 
compensation or reconciliation. These discussions happen with other federal departments, 
and communication between these processes is often unclear. The fact that there has been 
no official apology, or compensation, or that the off site-contamination has not been 
addressed, or that the perpetual care of the site is still uncertain – all of these issues 
damage trust between community, First Nations and the project team. While the project 
team itself does not have the capacity to deal with all these issues on its own, the 																																																								
153 Johanne Black (Director of the YKDFN Land and Environment Department), interview with author 
(June 8, 2016). 
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155 Johanne Black (Director of the YKDFN Land and Environment Department), interview with author 
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community seems to be calling on other federal departments, and the GNWT to take 
some responsibility at Giant. The GMRPT often repeats that anything related to 
compensation needs to be discussed through the land claims processes. However, as Todd 
Slack, a former employee of the YKDFN, stated, “when we talked to negotiators, it’s not 
clear and part of that failure is with the negotiations to make that abundantly clear as to 
where this lies and who has the action… whose court the ball is in.”156 The YKDFN have 
yet to finalize a land claims agreement. The uncertain nature of this agreement limits the 
YKDFN’s resources to make decisions regarding Giant, and continues to be a large 
hurdle in the way of reconciliation and planning for future land uses and perpetual care. 
  
Conclusion 
 Since the signing of the Giant Mine Remediation Environmental Agreement in 
June 2015, the GMRP and the community stakeholders have begun to work together to 
confront and care for the Giant Mine Monster. After a long history of injustice, 
marginalization and environmental degradation, community stakeholders are now more 
closely involved in the remediation planning process. The Environmental Agreement 
provided a roadmap of community-based objectives for remediation and the GMRP has 
been changing to fit these objectives. The frozen block method is also now seen as an 
interim solution. Community stakeholders, in conjunction with the Giant Mine Oversight 
Board will continue to have a role in the remediation and care of the Giant Mine as more 
research is done and the remediation project is regularly reviewed over the next 100 
years. This new approach to remediation was epitomized in the Surface Design Workshop 																																																								
156 Todd Slack (former YKDFN employee), interview with author (May 26, 2016). 
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help in February 2016. In this workshop, stakeholders were able to set objectives for 
surface remediation, evaluate options, and provide comments on how to improve the 
options. In addition, the GMRPT now holds regular, monthly meetings with both the 
Giant Mine Working Group (which includes all stakeholder groups) and the Giant Mine 
Advisory Council (hosted by the YKDFN). Moving forward, the Human Environmental 
Monitoring Program and the Health Impact Assessment will provide valuable research 
and opportunities for ongoing monitoring. These processes have all contributed to a 
remediation project based on more consistent, ongoing discussion with community 
stakeholders.  
 The Surface Design Engagement process was ground-breaking in the sense that it 
was the first opportunity for community stakeholders to have a say in the design of 
remediation options. More specifically, the surface design process highlighted the need 
for more discussion on future land uses, as stakeholders had different expectations for 
what the land will be used for in the future. As Francaviglia and Robertson argue, due to 
differences in historical experiences and community values, landscape identities can be 
fractured and controversial.157 While healing the past, remediation must also foster a new 
sense of place and a new sense of value.158 Negotiations about future land uses are 
fundamental to healing the past and will require a consensus on what kind of story will be 
told and how the Giant Mine site will be remembered. According to Ben Nind, this is 
about cleaning up a mess that is “very close to colonization,” or even “cleaning-up 																																																								
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colonization.”159 It is about making the connections between physical healing and 
community healing: “If we had a process that people trust, that results in multiple 
communication tools: digital, monuments, arts… each one is a step towards people 
coming together.”160 This is a site of a great intersection of interest, history, present 
tensions, and future possibilities: what happens on site has an affect on community 
psychology. Therefore, many interviewees saw the remediation project and the GMOB as 
a great opportunity for hope, and to make something positive happen.  
 In connection to the Surface Design Engagement process, the GMOB provides a 
space for community discussion. Independent oversight of the GMRP facilitates an 
environment of accountability and trust building. In addition, the GMOB is essential to 
concerns about perpetual care, as it is mandated to provide oversight and funding for 
ongoing research for at least 100 years. Mayor Mark Heyck stated that:  
 We now have a forum where we all have a seat at the table, including First 
Nations and Métis people, which I think is really important from that aspect of 
having a longer term vision for the community, which again is stepping away 
from the technically scientific side of things, but understanding how we will work 
together with these other parties that occupied this area long before the rest of us 
did.161 
 
However, since the GMOB is strictly an advisory body, going forward it will be 
important that the GMRP meaningfully responds to recommendations in order to ensure 
continued trust.  
 Today, community stakeholders seem to have more trust in the GMRP. However, 
as interviewees reflected on the Giant Mine Remediation Project, four themes continually 																																																								
159 Ben Nind (Executive Director of the Giant Mine Oversight Board), interview with author (May 31, 
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arose: independent oversight, off-site contamination, perpetual care and 
apology/reconciliation. While the Environmental Agreement and the GMOB have set up 
structures for independent oversight and have facilitated discussion on perpetual care, the 
issues of off-site contamination and apology/reconciliation have yet to be confronted. 
These concerns will need to be addressed in order to build and maintain trust. As several 
interviewees expressed, the legacy of the Giant Mine cannot be fully addressed until there 
is responsibility taken for off-site contamination and there is an apology and move 
towards reconciliation for the YKDFN. Discussion on legacy, environmental justice, off-
site contamination, apology and reconciliation situates the Giant Mine Remediation 
Project on a broader temporal scale and recognizes the cumulative, ongoing impacts of 
not only the mine waste, but also the relationships developed around this waste. Building 
reminders of this history into the remediation process – be that through an interpretive 
center, an ‘ugly’ landscape, a memorial, a park, a library or an official apology – is 
essential to what community stakeholders see as a broader ‘healing’ of the Giant Mine 
site and the surrounding environment.
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION: REMEDIATION AS RELATIONAL 
“For many people, Giant Mine is an engineering problem. For me, Giant Mine is a story 
of relationships failed: relationships towards people, the land, and especially future 
generations. Trust has been eroded, and it will take many years for it to be restored, if 
ever.” 
-Frances Benoit (Giant Mine Remediation Public Hearings, Sep. 2012) 
 
 In 2005, as a part of its Traditional Knowledge Report for the Giant Mine 
Remediation Plan, the YKDFN stated: “The Giant Mine Legacy is coming full circle. 
From the discovery of gold, to its extraction and refinement, to the mine’s closure and 
reclamation.”1 The Report’s stated aim was to “add one last step; that of helping restore 
relationships with the land and giving back to the land its story, and sharing that story 
with Yellowknife.”2 This last step has yet to be realized. There is still a tendency to frame 
the Giant Mine Monster in technical terms; as numbers, figures and risk assessments that 
can be contained and managed. Increasingly, through the insistence of the YKDFN and 
other Yellowknife community members, the Giant Mine Remediation Project is 
beginning to be conceptualized as a “story of relationships between people and the 
environment, and between cultures learning to co-exist.”3  
 In this thesis I traced the historical geography of arsenic trioxide contamination 
and its remediation at Yellowknife’s Giant Mine. Through archival documents, reports, 
news articles, interviews and participant observation this study illuminated the story of 
																																																								
1 Yellowknives Dene First Nation Land and Environment Committee, Giant Mine – Our Story: Impact of 
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2 Ibid. 
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the Giant Mine Remediation Project, from the creation of the Giant Mine Monster, to the 
containment of the Monster, to the confrontation and care of the Monster. The Giant Mine 
was created within a broader colonial, industrial context that favoured settler-based, 
economic development and marginalized First Nations. Specifically at the Giant Mine, 
the government and the mining company, setting a precedent of secrecy, largely ignored 
early signs of health risks and pollution. Throughout operations, while pollution controls 
and regulations increased, community concerns about arsenic trioxide and environmental 
degradation were continually downplayed in favour of maintaining the status quo. 
Remediation plans were minimal and focused on the economic value a company could 
extract from a site after closure.  
 When Royal Oak went bankrupt in 1999, it left the communities of Yellowknife, 
Dettah and N’dilo with feelings of bitterness and mistrust over past injustices. However, 
when the federal and territorial governments took over, they did little to heal these 
injustices, but rather continued operating within a system of marginalization, while 
focusing only on the containment of the underground arsenic trioxide. Again and again, 
community members were told that their concerns were not within the scope of the Giant 
Mine Remediation Project, which focused on technical containment. Early attempts at 
community consultation were fragmented and those who did participate were again 
disappointed to see that their concerns were not reflected in the 2007 Remediation Plan. 
These failures at effective communication exacerbated feelings of mistrust that lingered 
from the days of mining operations. It is during these initial years of government 
remediation planning that three prominent community concerns began to take shape: 
independent oversight, off-site contamination and perpetual care. The failure of the 
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GMRP to cooperate with community stakeholders in addressing these concerns pushed 
stakeholders to force the Project through an environmental assessment. 
 Finally, through a long and gruelling environmental assessment process, 
community concerns began to be recognized. Again, the Environmental Assessment 
began with a limited, technical scope. However, community stakeholders relentlessly 
fought for a broader definition of remediation that included independent oversight, a 
discussion about the cumulative effects of mining off-site, and perpetual care. In the 
public hearings, all community stakeholders recognized the importance of a 
comprehensive technical solution, and that the frozen block method might be the best 
available option. However, the community was saying, and had being saying for over a 
decade, that their cause for concern was that remediation needed to be defined and 
negotiated within a local, community-based context in order to address the political 
structures that allowed for such destruction in the first place. Containment of the monster 
wasn’t enough; the community demanded that the legacy of the Giant Mine be 
confronted, and that, going forward, the relational aspects of remediation be cared for. 
The Environmental Agreement and the creation of the GMOB provide a roadmap for 
community stakeholders to direct remediation projects and to create value in a degraded 
environment. 
 Typically, the story of the Giant Mine has been characterized as a toxic monster, a 
story of contamination, degradation, injustice and marginalization. However, through the 
hard, relentless work of concerned community members and the YKDFN, their demands 
for justice, and their discussion of perpetual care, it has become a story of hope. This 
hope does not diminish the very real, ongoing issues that continue to haunt this 
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community, such as off-site contamination and reconciliation, but rather acknowledges 
the good that has been done, the relationships that have been built and the systems that 
have begun to be put in place in order to ensure a better future. In order to recognize the 
capacity, ability and care of the community for this land and for the people in relationship 
with this land, care, hope and relationships must be continually re-evaluated in the 
context of perpetual care. The Giant Mine Monster is much more than just arsenic. It is a 
legacy of relationships that will require continual care. 
 While remediating the Giant Mine site may go a long way towards regaining a 
feeling of safety, how the remediation is done is very important to the community 
because of the conflictual history of the mine. Open discussions on how the mine is fixed, 
who will fix it, who will care for it far into the future, and how the objectives of 
remediation are determined can go a long way towards addressing larger social issues of 
mistrust, colonial relationships, racism and marginalization; in these ways, remediation is 
historical and political. In addition, a gap in existing laws and regulations continues 
despite improvements as both mining and environmental laws assume that there is a 
responsible party available and that financial securities will be sufficient. The laws 
implicitly presume that abandoned mines simply do not come into existence and there are 
no mechanisms to address them besides an emergency response led by the government.4 
 In 2007, right before the publication of the Giant Mine Remediation Plan, there 
was an unauthorized water discharge from the water treatment facility with elevated 
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levels of arsenic.5 The new care and maintenance operator, Deton’Cho/Nuna Logistics 
Joint Venture was unfamiliar with how this particular valve worked, meaning that it had 
not been closed properly and water was unknowingly discharged.6 Incidents such as this 
illuminate the day-to-day difficulties of remediating and caring for such a site. Small 
human errors, the challenge of passing down intimate, experiential details of site 
maintenance and care from one person to another, and the changing nature of the site and 
the people who work there, can cumulate into disastrous effects for the surrounding 
environment and community. Over the decades and centuries, the day-to-day care, repair, 
remediation and restoration activities on this site will change. What many Yellowknife 
community members and local First Nations are worried about is that this site will 
become unknown, forgotten about, abandoned, and that their history of contamination 
will be forgotten as well. In this sense, the Giant Mine Remediation Project represents an 
opportunity to confront the historical legacies of contamination and colonialism, to come 
together to contain, manage and care for the land that was destroyed and to look forward 
for ways to ensure this site is cared for in perpetuity and that relationships are rebuilt. 
 Rethinking remediation as something relational is to see remediation as the day-
to-day care of a contaminated space. Recognizing care, the relationships created through 
land, and the maintenance of that land can “reframe how we approach material 
vulnerability, not as something to be avoided, dismissed or repaired, but as something to 
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think more responsibly.”7 This responsibility, in the case of the Giant Mine Remediation 
Project, has had a lot to do with re-building trust through consistent community 
engagement. In connection to environmental justice theory, and as Horowitz argues, the 
ability to control the objectives of research and the institutions that implement research is 
fundamental to trust, “as trust is intimately linked to peoples’ own capacity to influence 
and alter these institutions.”8 In general, the Giant Mine case shows that engagement for 
mine closure needs to start with a definition of remediation objectives on a community 
level. There needs to be a basis of common understanding and recognition of the 
importance of local and traditional knowledge. Since communities will live with mine 
wastes in perpetuity, it becomes especially important to ensure that the community 
defines how this process happens from day one. A commitment to daily care can be 
incorporated into broader community engagement goals and is important for 
Yellowknifers and the YKDFN to take a hold of. Community stakeholders should have 
structural and financial support in determining future land uses and perpetual care. 
 Healing landscapes and relationships means rethinking remediation in 
combination with restoration, justice and perpetual care. Anna Storm, in her book Post-
Industrial Landscape Scars uses ‘scabbing and scarring’ metaphors to investigate 
processes of landscape and community healing. She argues that ‘scabs’ are unhealed 
landscapes that represent unsettled, contested meanings. A landscape ‘scab’ is open to 
interpretation and struggles over hierarchies and can remain scabs for a long time if there 
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is no space for healing and recovery.9 The Giant Mine Remediation Project has remained 
a scab for such a long time because, with a focus on arsenic management alone, there has 
been no space for healing and recovery. The Project did not confront the multi-faceted 
monster that is the Giant Mine. Rethinking remediation alongside concepts of restoration, 
justice and perpetual care implies an ongoing process of negotiation of hierarchies, 
morals, values and objectives. Therefore, remediation is a creative opportunity to 
negotiate how the space will be remembered, valued and cared for in the future.  
 In mining, a space that is abandoned has been un-carefully treated.10 Care is not 
only about day-to-day maintenance, but also about an ethical obligation to care for things 
and take responsibility for our technologies and our waste.11 As Puig de le Bellacasa 
states, “it is not a technology that is unethical if it fails or becomes a monster, but rather 
to stop caring about it, to abandon it as Dr. Frankenstein abandoned his creation.”12 We 
need to care for and take responsibility for our technologies, even if they seem to have 
failed us. Caring for the Giant Mine and the relationships it has created presents a 
creative, reflexive, dynamic addition to the technical waste management practices that 
already exist and offers new ways to think about approaches to remediation, restoration 
and long-term care of contaminated sites. As Dr. Gilchrist stated in the Giant Mine 
Remediation public hearings not only does perpetual care planning need to investigate 
technical methods of long-term maintenance, it also needs to consider: “perpetual caring, 
perpetual caring for people… beyond some of the very physical, technical stuff that we 
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have seen here.”13 Matters of care can be used as an umbrella to combine the material 
focuses of remediation, the moral-ethical focuses of ecological restoration, and the long-
term maintenance of the Giant Mine, within an environmental justice framework that 
continually questions, critiques and tinkers with power relations, inequalities, 
geographies, temporalities and values/perspectives of waste and mining landscapes. 
Arguably, the creation of the Giant Mine Oversight Board provides a foundation for this 
kind of long-term care. While there are many barriers and challenges at the Giant Mine, 
this case presents an opportunity to think through and discuss the implications of 
perpetual care of mine wastes. 
 This research on Giant Mine remediation is significant because it illustrates that 
remediation does not always implicitly lead to environmental justice. As Tsosie states, 
science and resource extraction policy tend to “omit the experiences of harm as spiritual 
and cultural.”14 However, justice can be sought through community engagement and 
leadership in remediation. More than this, at the Giant Mine, environmental injustices are 
fundamentally linked to the YKDFN’s experiences of colonization and racism. Therefore, 
this thesis concludes that remediation projects across Canada need to account for broader 
processes of reconciliation, as it applies to relationships with both First Nations 
communities and their traditional lands. This research also aims to contribute to the 
ongoing discussion on best practices for mine remediation and restoration in Canada, with 
an increased focus on the importance of community engagement in remediation and the 																																																								
13 MVEIRB, “Giant Mine Remediation Project Environmental Assessment Hearing, Part 5 of 5” 
(Yellowknife: September 13, 2012), 37.	
14 Rebecca Tsosie, “Indigenous Peoples and the Ethics of Remediation : Redressing the Legacy of 
Radioactive Contamination for Native Peoples and Native Lands Indigenous Peoples and the Ethics of 
Remediation,” Santa Clara Journal of International Law 13, no. 1 (2015): 271. 
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discussion of long term care for toxic sites. Looking forward, remediation is important 
beyond just mining and the Giant Mine. There are much larger questions to be addressed 
about our relationships with the waste and contaminated landscapes that we create and 
how we care for them. Further research on remediation needs to investigate the broader, 
cumulative implications of mine waste that cannot be contained easily in time or space.  
 The Giant Mine Remediation Project forces us to think beyond the normalized 
‘life cycle’ of a mine as exploration, operation, remediation and closure to something 
beyond remediation – a recognition of the necessity for structures that facilitate the 
ongoing and dynamic processes of monitoring and maintenance programs, community 
dialogue, education and stewardship of the land. Without a community objectives-based 
approach to remediation, mine remediation risks continuing systems of degradation and 
marginalization that allowed for such destruction to happen in the first place. However, 
the Giant case also illustrates the potential for community activism to shift remediation to 
include social issues such as environmental justice, reconciliation and intergenerational 
equity. Within this context of healing, relationality and care, the Giant Mine example 
pushes us to think beyond the actual act of remediation towards a focus on the ongoing 
processes of trust building, reconciliation, environmental justice and perpetual care for 
humans and nonhumans alike. Remediation at the Giant Mine can confront and care for 
the monster in all its forms.  
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Appendix I: List of Interview Participants 
DATE 
(2016) 
NAME AFFILIATION INTERVIEW 
TYPE 
LOCATION 
May 9 Rob Lok City of Yellowknife Individual Yellowknife 
May 10 Mayor Mark 
Heyck 
City of Yellowknife Individual Yellowknife 
May 10 Dennis Kefalas City of Yellowknife Individual Yellowknife 
May 11 Natalie Plato Giant Mine Remediation 
Project Team 
Individual Yellowknife 
May 13 Kevin O’Reilly MLA Frame Lake, 
Alternatives North 
Individual Yellowknife 
May 13 David 
Livingstone 
GMOB Director Individual  Yellowknife 
May 16 Erica Janes Alternatives North Individual Yellowknife 
May 16 Craig Wells Giant Mine Remediation 
Project Team 
Individual Yellowknife 
May 17 Mike Auge City of Yellowknife Individual Yellowknife 
May 17 Sharon Low Giant Mine Remediation 
Project Team 
Individual Yellowknife 
May 17 Walt and Diane 
Humphries 
Yellowknife Mining 
Heritage Society 
Group Yellowknife 
May 19 Randy Freeman YKDFN, Lands and 
Environment Employee 
Individual N’dilo 
May 19 William Lines YKDFN Member and Land 
and Environment Employee 
Individual N’dilo 
May 25 Tony Brown  GMOB Director Individual via. Skype 
May 26 Todd Slack Former employee of the 
YKDFN Lands and 
Environment Department 
Individual Yellowknife 
May 27 Gordon Hamre Alternatives North Individual Yellowknife 
May 27 Shin Shiga North Slave Metis Alliance Individual Yellowknife 
May 31 Ben Nind GMOB, Executive Director Individual Yellowknife 
May 31 Emma Pike and 
George 
Lafferty 
INAC, Contaminants and 
Remediation Directorate 
Group Yellowknife 
May 31 Lisa Dyer and 
Erika 
Nyssonnen 
Government of the 
Northwest Territories, 
Environment and Resources 
Group Yellowknife 
June 2 Alan Erlich Mackenzie Valley 
Environmental Impact 
Review Board 
Individual Yellowknife 
June 3 Tom Hoefer NWT and Nunavut 
Chamber of Mines 
Individual Yellowknife 
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June 3 James 
Lawrence 
INAC Individual Yellowknife 
June 6 Ryan Fequet Wek’eezhii Land and Water 
Board 
Individual Yellowknife 
June 7 Adrian Paradis Former manager for the 
Giant Mine Remediation 
Project Team 
Individual  Yellowknife 
June 7 Ken Hall GMOB Director Individual Yellowknife 
June 8 Tyree Mullaney Mackenzie Valley Land and 
Water Board 
Individual Yellowknife 
June 8 Johanne Black YKDFN Member and 
Director of the Land and 
Environment Department 
Individual N’dilo 
June 8 Fred Sangris YKDFN Member and 
employee of the Land and 
Environment Department 
Individual N’dilo 
June 23 Bill Slater Technical Consultant for the 
Stakeholders of the Giant 
Mine Remediation Project 
Individual via. Skype 
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Informed	Consent	Form	for	Research	
Rethinking	Remediation:	
Mine	Closure	and	Reconciliation	in	Northern	Canada		
	
Researcher:	 Caitlynn	Beckett,	Master’s	Candidate,	Memorial	University,	9	Spencer	Street,	St.	John’s,	Newfoundland,	A1C	4H1,	clb268@mun.ca,	(306)	491-2672.		
Supervisors:			 Dr.	Arn	Keeling,	Memorial	University,	akeeling@mun.ca,	(709)	864-8990		 Dr.	John	Sandlos,	Memorial	University,	jsandlos@mun.ca,	(709)	864-2429		You	are	invited	to	take	part	in	a	research	project	entitled	“Rethinking	Remediation:	Mine	Closure	and	Reconciliation	in	Northern	Canada.”		This	form	is	part	of	the	process	of	informed	consent.		It	should	give	you	the	basic	idea	of	what	the	research	is	about	and	what	your	participation	will	involve.		It	also	describes	your	right	to	withdraw	from	the	study.		In	order	to	decide	whether	you	wish	to	participate	in	this	research	study,	you	should	understand	enough	about	its	risks	and	benefits	to	be	able	to	make	an	informed	decision.		This	is	the	informed	consent	process.		Take	time	to	read	this	carefully	and	to	understand	the	information	given	to	you.		Please	contact	the	researcher,	Caitlynn	Beckett,	if	you	have	any	questions	about	the	study	or	would	like	more	information	before	you	consent.		It	is	entirely	up	to	you	to	decide	whether	to	take	part	in	this	research.		If	you	choose	not	to	take	part	in	this	research	or	if	you	decide	to	withdraw	from	the	research	once	it	has	started,	there	will	be	no	negative	consequences	for	you,	now	or	in	the	future.	
	
Introduction:	
	As	part	of	my	Master’s	research	in	geography	at	Memorial	University,	I,	Caitlynn	Beckett,	am	conducting	research	under	the	supervision	of	Dr.	Arn	Keeling	and	Dr.	Johns	Sandlos.	This	project	is	part	of	a	larger	SSRHC	funded	project,	“Northern	Exposures:	Science,	Indigenous	People	and	Northern	Contaminants”	at	Memorial	University,	which	includes	co-investigators	across	Canada.		
		
Purpose	of	study:	
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This	project	examines	mine	remediation	processes	in	the	Canadian	sub-Arctic	and	investigates	how	local	communities	become	involved	in	these	processes.	Recognizing	that	remediation	plans	tend	to	focus	on	the	physical	and	economic	aspects	of	containing	pollution,	this	projects	asks:	
• What	are	the	wider	social	costs	and	benefits	of	remediation?	
• How	can	local	historical	and	ecological	knowledge	be	used	to	improve	and	manage	remediation	plans?	
• How	can	the	current	approach	to	mine	remediation	be	changed	from	a	focus	on	site	containment	to	a	broader	emphasis	on	community	remediation?			Through	these	questions,	this	study	explores	issues	of	environmental	justice	for	communities	dealing	with	mine	remediation	using	the	case	study	of	the	Giant	Mine	in	Yellowknife,	NWT.	This	research	will	benefit	local	partner	organizations	and	will	contribute	to	a	broader	understanding	of	the	social	dimensions	of	mine	remediation	and	the	development	of	best	practices	for	community	engagement	during	mine	closure.	
	
What	you	will	do	in	this	study:	You	are	being	asked	to	participate	voluntarily	as	an	interview	participant	as	part	of	the	research	project	outlined	above.			
Length	of	time:	The	estimated	time	for	interviews	is	about	an	hour.	Interview	times	may	vary	between	participants.	Participants	may	choose	to	end	the	interview	or	withdraw	their	participation	at	any	time.		
	
Withdrawal	from	the	study:	Participants	may	withdraw	from	the	study	before,	after,	or	during	the	interview	process	without	consequence.	Participants	have	the	right	to	ask	that	recorders	be	turned	off	during	an	interview	and	that	sections	or	the	entirety	of	a	recording	be	deleted.	Data	will	be	altered	or	destroyed,	or	the	conditions	of	its	use	altered	(for	instance,	made	anonymous)	up	to	six	months	after	the	interview,	according	to	the	wishes	expressed	by	the	participant,	regardless	of	previous	representations	of	consent	and	with	no	consequences	for	the	individual	participant.	Their	withdrawal	or	participation	is	a	confidential	matter	and	will	not	be	shared	with	other	participants	or	organizations.			
Possible	benefits:	
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Participants	will	have	the	opportunity	to	share	their	experience,	knowledge	and	understanding	of	contaminants	and	remediation	related	issues,	and	to	share	them	with	fellow	community	members	and	participants	in	other	communities.	It	will	also	enhance	the	voice	of	northern	communities	in	proposals	for	mitigation	and	remediation	of	contaminated	sites.			Benefits	to	the	scholarly	community	and	society	from	the	involvement	of	participants	are	significant.	As	noted	above,	indigenous	engagements	with	industrial	development	and	remediation	are	not	well	documented	in	many	parts	of	northern	Canada.	This	research	will	enable	comparison	with	studies	to	be	done	by	the	researcher’s	supervisor	and	others	in	other	northern	indigenous	communities	affected	by	historical	mineral	development	and	remediation.	The	communities’	stories	will	enhance	scholarly	and	popular	understandings	of	remediation	in	the	region,	contributing	to	policy	debates	and	decision-making	around	the	benefits	and	impacts	of	contemporary	mining	and	mine	closure	in	the	region.	In	more	general	terms,	the	research	will	enhance	scholarly	understandings	of	mine	remediation	in	Canada’s	North	and	the	long-term	historical	legacies	of	extractive	development	in	northern	and	remote	regions.		
Possible	risks:	There	are	no	foreseeable	physical,	emotional	or	financial	risks	for	participants.			
Confidentiality:	The	ethical	duty	of	confidentiality	includes	safeguarding	participants’	identities,	personal	information,	and	data	from	unauthorized	access,	use,	or	disclosure.	Because	a	fundamental	goal	of	this	research	is	to	glean	information	from	first-hand	participants	or	individuals	with	first-hand	knowledge	and	personal	experiences	of	the	remediation	process,	in	some	cases	we	will	be	seeking	informed	consent	to	use	the	names	of	the	interviewees	in	published	research	material	(for	instance,	from	research	scientists	or	key	informants	in	communities).			If	consent	to	use	the	interviewees	names	cannot	be	obtained	or	is	not	appropriate,	we	will	refer	to	participants	using	generic	terms	or	using	a	pseudonym.	In	all	cases,	research	papers	or	book	chapters	will	be	sent	to	interviewees	and/or	relevant	cultural	authorities	for	comment	prior	to	submission	for	publication.	In	community	workshops	where	oral	history	or	other	local	material	is	presented	and	discussed,	the	same	conditions	on	personal	and	private	information	will	apply.		
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Data	confidentiality	will	be	protected	during	the	conduct	of	the	research	through	limited	distribution	and	reproduction	of	the	interviews.	The	student	researcher	will	be	responsible	for	storing	the	interviews	and	producing	the	transcripts.	The	student’s	supervisors	will	have	access	to	this	data,	but	it	will	not	be	made	available	to	other	research	partners.	No	further	use	or	distribution	of	these	interviews	or	transcripts	is	contemplated	without	obtaining	further	written	consent	from	individual	participants	themselves.	Interviewees	will	be	provided	with	a	final	approved	version	of	their	interview	transcript	for	their	personal	records.		
	
Anonymity:	Anonymity	refers	to	protecting	participants’	identifying	characteristics,	such	as	name	or	description	of	physical	appearance.	Our	purpose	is	not	to	collect	private	information	on	the	interviewees.	While	a	small	number	of	questions	may	address	personal	involvement	or	knowledge	(i.e.,	what	is	your	involvement	in	the	mine	remediation?),	in	all	cases	the	emphasis	will	be	on	the	issue	of	the	mine	remediation	and	not	the	personal	and	private	life	of	the	interviewee.	If	anonymity	is	desired	every	reasonable	effort	will	be	made	to	ensure	the	participants	anonymity;	and	they	will	not	be	identified	in	publications	without	their	explicit	permission.		The	research	sites	are	small	communities	with	a	limited	number	of	people	who	may	have	extensive	knowledge	of	the	remediation	processes,	making	it	easier	to	identify	interviewees	despite	anonymity	in	published	documents.	When	observing	and	participating	in	community	consultations,	meetings,	and	workshops	etc.,	ensuring	the	anonymity	of	participants	may	be	impossible	to	achieve	do	to	the	specialized	nature	of	these	meetings.	Individuals	involved	in	these	meetings	will	be	aware	of	the	student’s	research	intentions.		
Recording	of	Data:	Interviews	will	be	recorded	using	an	audio	recorder	unless	otherwise	indicated	by	the	participant.		
Storage	of	Data:	The	primary	researcher	and	her	supervisors	will	securely	store	interviews	and	transcripts	on	password-protected	and	encrypted	computers	for	the	duration	of	the	project.	Only	the	researcher	and	her	supervisors	will	have	access	to	the	data	on	these	computers.	Thereafter,	these	products	will	be	stored	in	a	locked	and	secure	
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office	for	a	minimum	of	five	years,	as	required	by	Memorial	University’s	policy	on	Integrity	in	Scholarly	Research.		
	
Reporting	of	Results:	The	information	collected	during	the	interview	will	be	used	for	the	above	project	only.	These	uses	will	include	a	written	thesis,	academic	publications,	conferences	and	communication	of	the	results	to	the	communities	and	organizations	involved.	The	thesis	will	be	publically	available	at	the	QEII	library.	The	information	will	be	reported	using	direct	quotations	or	personally	identifying	information	only	if	participants	consent,	otherwise	information	will	be	reported	only	in	a	summarized	form.	
	
Sharing	of	Results	with	Participants:	Copies	of	recordings	and	transcripts	will	be	sent	to	participants.	Individual	participants	and	community/regional	authorities	will	be	provided	notice	and	copies	of	publications	(where	relevant)	and	will	be	provided	with	a	copy	of	the	thesis	that	will	be	a	result	of	this	project.	Results	will	also	be	communicated	through	presentations,	posters,	and	reports	targeted	to	community	members	and	regional	government	authorities.	Results	will	also	be	shared	via	a	“Northern	Exposures”	website	to	be	created	in	the	near	future.	
	
Questions:	You	are	welcome	to	ask	questions	at	any	time	before,	during,	or	after	your	participation	in	this	research.	If	you	would	like	more	information	about	this	study,	please	contact:		
• Caitlynn	Beckett,	Master’s	Candidate,	Memorial	University,	9	Spencer	Street	St.	John’s,	Newfoundland,	A1C	4H1,	clb268@mun.ca,	(306)	491-2672.	
• Dr.	Arn	Keeling,	Memorial	University,	akeeling@mun.ca,	(709)	864-8990	
• Dr.	John	Sandlos,	Memorial	University,	jsandlos@mun.ca,	(709)	864-2429.	
The	proposal	for	this	research	has	been	reviewed	by	the	Interdisciplinary	Committee	
on	Ethics	in	Human	Research	and	found	to	be	in	compliance	with	Memorial	
University’s	ethics	policy.		If	you	have	ethical	concerns	about	the	research,	such	as	the	
way	you	have	been	treated	or	your	rights	as	a	participant,	you	may	contact	the	
Chairperson	of	the	ICEHR	at	icehr@mun.ca	or	by	telephone	at	709-864-2861.		
Consent:	Your	signature	on	this	form	means	that:	
• You	have	read	the	information	about	the	research.	
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• You	have	been	able	to	ask	questions	about	this	study.	
• You	are	satisfied	with	the	answers	to	all	your	questions.	
• You	understand	what	the	study	is	about	and	what	you	will	be	doing.	
• You	understand	that	you	are	free	to	withdraw	participation	in	the	study	without	having	to	give	a	reason,	and	that	doing	so	will	not	affect	you	now	or	in	the	future.			
• You	understand	that	if	you	choose	to	end	participation	during	data	collection,	any	data	collected	from	you	up	to	that	point	will	be	retained	by	the	researcher,	unless	you	indicate	otherwise.	
• You	understand	that	if	you	choose	to	withdraw	after	data	collection	has	ended,	your	data	can	be	removed	from	the	study	up	to	6	months	after	the	interview.		
	 I	agree	to	be	audio-recorded			 	Yes			 	No	I	agree	to	the	use	of	direct	quotations		 	 	 	Yes			 	No	I	allow	my	name	to	be	identified	in	any	publications	resulting	from	this	study	 	 	Yes			 	No		 		 		 	By	signing	this	form,	you	do	not	give	up	your	legal	rights	and	do	not	release	the	researchers	from	their	professional	responsibilities.		
Your	signature	confirms:							I	have	read	what	this	study	is	about	and	understood	the	risks	and	benefits.		I	have	had		adequate	time	to	think	about	this	and	had	the	opportunity	to	ask	questions	and	my	questions	have	been	answered.								 		I	agree	to	participate	in	the	research	project	understanding	the	risks	and	contributions	of	my	participation,	that	my	participation	is	voluntary,	and	that	I	may	end	my	participation.															 	A	copy	of	this	Informed	Consent	Form	has	been	given	to	me	for	my	records.				_____________________________	 	 	 _____________________________	Signature	of	participant	 	 	 	 	 												Date			
Researcher’s	Signature:	
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I	have	explained	this	study	to	the	best	of	my	ability.		I	invited	questions	and	gave	answers.		I	believe	that	the	participant	fully	understands	what	is	involved	in	being	in	the	study,	any	potential	risks	of	the	study	and	that	he	or	she	has	freely	chosen	to	be	in	the	study.			______________________________	 	 	 _____________________________	Signature	of	Principal	Investigator	 	 	 	 Date									
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Appendix III: Sample Interview Questions 
Introduction and Context 
 
1. Begin with introducing ourselves (both the interviewer and interviewee). What do 
you do in your community? What organization or group do you work for/represent 
and what is your position within this group? What are the responsibilities that go 
along with this position? 
 
2. How have you and/or the organization you represent been involved in the 
remediation process?  
 
Community Engagement in the Remediation Process – general questions for 
community leaders 
 
3. What do you know about the remediation process and how it has unfolded in your 
community?  
 
4. Who/what are the major organizations, groups, companies or individuals defining 
the remediation planning? Do you think these different groups approach the 
process differently, how/why? 
 
5. What do you think are the defining environmental, social and/or scientific 
characteristics of the Giant Mine remediation in Yellowknife? In your opinion, 
what is the scale of the Mine’s impact (what areas has it affected most, how far do 
these affects reach, what are the affects beyond the physical ones etc.?) 
 
6. What do you think the goals of remediation are or should be? 
 
7. How has the community been involved in the remediation? How has the 
community been involved in follow-ups and consultations? Have there been any 
economic and/or employment opportunities for the community? 
 
8. What are the positives and/or negatives of remediation? 
 
9. Do you think the remediation process in Yellowknife has been successful? Why or 
why not? 
 
10. What has gone well, what hasn’t, what has been improved and what could be 
improved? 
 
11. Do you think the Environmental Agreement has changed the remediation process 
at all? If so, how? How was the Environmental Agreement brought about – what 
was the inspiration for such an agreement and what were the goals of the 
stakeholders? 
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12. What is the merit of the Environmental Assessment process? What could be 
improved or changed?  
 
13. Going forward, what do you hope to see happen at the Giant Mine? How do you 
envision the space in the future? 
 
14. How do you think the community could communicate with future generations 
about the legacies of the Giant Mine? 
 
15. Do you see the remediation process at Giant Mine as something that can help to 
build trust and reconciliation – reconstruction of relationships between the 
government, the First Nations and the community? 
 
Government Involvement in the Remediation Process – questions for government 
representatives and consulting companies.  
 
*Questions from both sections could potentially be asked to participants from different 
groups, depending on their role 
 
16. What is the government’s role in the remediation process (municipally, 
territorially, and/or federally)? What are the policies/legislation directing these 
roles? Do you think the policy/legislation for remediation is lacking in any way, 
why or why not? 
 
17. How has the government worked with local community organizations to plan for 
remediation? 
 
18. What would you consider successes or failures of remediation in the specific case 
of the Giant Mine? 
 
19. How does remediation planning differ in Northern Canada from other jurisdictions 
across Canada and/or internationally? 
 
20. What is (or what should be) the role of industry in the remediation process?  
 
21. What is the role of consulting companies in mine remediation, both generally and 
specifically for the Giant Mine case? 
 
22. How does the government work with consulting companies in remediation 
processes? 
 
23. What do you think is the appropriate role for local communities to play in 
remediation planning? 
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24. How are final decisions about remediation planning actually made? 
 
25. How will this site be regulated in the future? How is planning for future 
monitoring and maintenance included in remediation planning? Who will be 
responsible for the site in the distant future? Are there any plans for training and 
monitoring programs? 
 
26. How was the decision to use the frozen block method reached? What community 
consultation done prior to the Environmental Assessment? 
 
27. What has been, or can be, done on the site without a water license?  
 
28. Has the government used its emergency powers under s. 119 of the Mackenzie 
Valley Resource Management Act to push through remediation plans? 
 
29. Can I get any more details regarding the FOS process (2011) – Has any of the data 
been published? The website says a plan language report of these findings will be 
produced – timeline?  
 
30. At what point are the Health Effects Monitoring Program and the Health 
Assessment? How do these play into the present remediation planning? 
 
31. The Environmental Agreement states that the Co-Proponents have to produce a 
perpetual care plan within 5 years of the signing on the agreement? How has 
planning for perpetual care been addressed so far and what are the plans for the 
upcoming years?  
 
32. How will the ‘end’ of remediation be determined? The Environmental Agreement 
states many stipulations that the Co-proponents must produce yearly reports etc. 
How long will this last? Is there a date where this will no longer happen? 
 
33. How does the Federal Contaminated Sites Action Plan account for perpetual care 
and maintenance of remediated contaminated sites? How does it plan for 
“forever”? 
 
34. Where is the project at in regards to the Measures for the Environmental 
Assessment and Agreement? Are deadlines being met? How is it being funded at 
the moment? 
 
35. How far back does remediation planning go? (What were previous closure plans 
and how could I get access to them?) Might be a good question to ask Kevin 
 
36. How has the government’s approach to remediation changed throughout the last 
10-15 years? 
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Environmental Assessment Specific: 
 
37. How was this environmental assessment similar or different from other 
environmental assessments in the NWT? 
 
 
City of Yellowknife 
 
38. In letters from the City to the Review Board, there is mention of the creation of a 
land use plan. However, there was no commitment to include this land use plan in 
the Remediation Plan? Why or why not? Do you think a land use plan is an 
important part of the remediation process (in order to plan for future land uses, or 
to ‘block’ land use in the future)?  
 
39. City water comes from Yellowknife Bay, which there has been public concern 
about. Has any commitment been made to reroute this water supply, or to carry 
out testing on the water? A letter from the City to the Review Board in 2012 
mentions this. 
 
40. Newspaper Article from the Northern New Service states that the city was denied 
pipeline help (Mar 2, 2012) “The replacement of the water line is not part of the 
proposed project.” (in reference to the environmental assessment) Vern 
Christensen (Executive Director MVEIRB) 
 
41. Newspaper Article from CBC (2008) mentioned that Mayor Gordon Van Tighem 
said he thinks the City should be compensated for land at the site that will not be 
cleaned up. Does the city still take this stance? Why or why not? 
 
42. What would the City like to see for future land use? How will this be decided? 
How have future land use considerations been incorporated into remediation 
planning? 
 
 
General Questions 
 
43. How does what has happened at Giant Mine compare with Con Mine? 
 
 
44. There seemed to be a major concern about the Federal government acting as the 
proponent, the regulator and the inspector. Do you think the signing of the 
Environmental Agreement and the establishment of the Oversight Committee has 
dealt with this problem? Why or why not? 
 
YKDFN  
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45. How do land claims come into play in the Giant Mine Remediation Project? 
 
46. How does YKDFN envision the site being remediated and used in the future? 
Technically the City of Yellowknife and the GNWT will decide future land uses, 
how, if at all, will YKDFN be involved in deciding future land uses? 
 
Concluding Questions 
 
47. Do you know of anyone else who would be a good candidate to interview in 
regard to this subject? Could you provide me with their contact information? 
 
48. Any additional documents/literature that you think may be helpful? 
 
49. Any questions for me about the interview process and research project? 
 
50. Do you have an address I can send the transcripts of this interview or would you 
prefer it sent via email? 
 
 
